THE
MODERN CHURCHMAN

By identifying the new learning with heresy, you make orthodoxy synonymous with ignorance.—*Erasmus.*

A State without the means of change is without the means of its conservation.—*Edmund Burke.*

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THE TWELFTH CONFERENCE OF MODERN CHURCHMEN

THE FAITH OF A MODERN CHURCHMAN

By the Editor.

THIS number of the *Modern Churchman* contains the papers[1] read at the twelfth annual Conference of Modern Churchmen held at Oxford on August 24th—31st.

The subject selected for consideration on this occasion was *The Faith of a Modern Churchman.* Members of the Conference appreciated highly the privilege of using the debating Hall of the University Union for papers and discussions. The locality accounts in some measure for the discussions being a good deal above the level of last year. This was also no doubt due to the papers being more within the capacity of the audience to follow. A particular piquancy was added to the debates by the eloquent speeches of Professor Kirsopp Lake and the incisive criticism of Father Francis Woodlock, S.J., the leading Roman Catholic controversialist in this country, who played most usefully the part of *advocatus diaboli*, or rather that of a sign-post on which *Danger* is written in large letters. Father Woodlock's warnings as in the fairy tales were three.

Father Woodlock's First Warning.

His first warning was directed against the new form of Christian apologetic, which, it seemed to him, based its argument for the truth of Christianity solely upon religious experience and ignored or discarded the older proofs. Had Dean Rashdall been present, we feel sure that he would have supported Father Woodlock's warning weightily. Many present sympathized strongly with Father Woodlock, and regarded the warning as needed. The time-honoured theistic proofs may in some cases be in need of re-casting, but certainly in essence they are sound and indispensable. Father Woodlock is essentially a Thomist and a rationalist, and it is only fair to admit that there is a Scotist and anti-rationalist element among Modern Churchmen ready to carry the revolt against rationalism too far—partly because they wrongly identify rationalism with intellectualism, whereas rationalism is much more broadly based and includes within its sphere the moral consciousness. Father Woodlock's warning was timely, and we are sure was favourably received by many present; but the way in

[1] With the exception of a paper on Christian Ethics, by Dr. Douglas White, withheld from publication at the desire of the author.—Ed., *M.C.*

which he developed his argument did much to weaken his case. Having asserted the authority of reason and conscience quite rightly, he went on, as it seemed to us, quite wrongly to identify their objective authority with the external authority of the Church. Now while it is quite right to speak of the authority of reason and conscience as objective in contrast to subjective, it is not right to make objective equivalent to external, for the authority of reason and conscience is internal: it belongs to the invisible, not to the visible order to which ecclesiastical authority belongs. It is, however, only fair to give Father Woodlock's argument in his own words. He said:

'I have gathered from all the papers as a whole, rather than from actual quotations I could make, that religious experience is the final and only sound argument producing conviction which Modern Churchmen as such are prepared to accept. It seems to me that this is the most dangerous of all the dealings with theology that have come forward in the history of Christianity. That is a wild thing to say here. What I mean is this. I, in my course of business, as a professor of Natural Theology, have dealt out to my students—and with a firm and abiding conviction of their validity—a completely different set of proofs of the existence of God.

'My belief is that in setting aside these older proofs of theism, and in falling back upon experience, there is a terrible danger confronting Christianity as my Church understands it in this country. The danger is this, that you accept from science the conclusions of science, and in the next fifteen or twenty years there will be a popular handbook of psychology which will make plain to the ordinary self-educated man the fact that religious experience is a purely subjective thing, and that man is self-contained, and that the Psycho-analyst and the New Psychologist will give you the full explanation of your experience, or your sense of the existence of God and your sense of the adorableness of Christ. I do not see how you are going to get the better of it, or what answer you will have to give to the New Psychologist when he destroys the objective and the rational foundation for your theism. I believe that we need an external, an objective criterion of truth. Your President (Dean Inge) spoke of faith as super-rational. Many people would ask: How do you know it is super-rational and not sub-rational, this faith of yours? You can only prove that it is super-rational and not sub-rational by having some external authority on which you can rely, to the bar of which you can bring it for judgment. I am old-fashioned, but there are many old-fashioned people still in the world, and I believe that that external bar to which it is brought is Church authority. It sounds ridiculous when stated in this audience, but we believe quite simply that God is standing by Church authority. We believe in the method of faith, relying on external authority. It is the only means of bringing men to the same truth. Religious experience follows.'

The Reply of Professor Kirsopp Lake.

Professor Kirsopp Lake met the danger arising from the new apologetic as follows:—

'I am well aware that to take religious experience as the basis of a sound theology is extraordinarily dangerous. I do not live in America without fully appreciating the danger, to which Father Woodlock referred, arising from the growth of a new orthodoxy, a psychological

orthodoxy. I am as much afraid of the orthodoxy of the future as I am of the orthodoxy of the past, but the way to meet orthodoxy is not to take it lying down, but to stand up to it, and question it, and answer it. It is true that there is a school of psychology which is telling us that religious experience is merely a subjective reaction which has no ultimate significance for any of us: it is merely a kind of thrill. What is our answer? My answer, which I have found not wholly without an echo in the younger generation, is that religious experience may work along the lines which the psychologists point out. When they talk to me about neural canals, I throw up my hands and admit that I know nothing about them. Neural canals may be the lines along which religious experience works, quite possibly: but they are no more religious experience itself than a tap is the water which you obtain from it. I think that, in the end, the last speaker and myself, though we differ profoundly on many things, would agree on this point. Religious experience we both of us, I think, should agree, is the opening of the door into the world of another reality, which does not deal with neural canals, or with brain tissue, or with muscles, or with molecules, but with the things which are not material at all, with what Dean Inge calls 'the world of values,' the world which the mystic sees, and which other people who are not mystics find through religious experience. We have that other world, and we believe it is just as real as the material world. It is a world into which there are many doors. There is one door which is open to the man who works, who suddenly feels that he is so identified with his work that he is moving about in another reality. There is another door which opens to the artist. And so you can go through the whole range of human experience. One of the greatest doors is that which we call the religious experience of the saints. I have at least read enough about that experience to feel that it is in line with what I know from my own experience, and to believe that it is quite real. That is the world which is immaterial, into which we can and do enter: and, so far as I can see, provided you make the admission at the start that the way in which you enter is at first along material lines, and no one who holds sacramental theories ought, I think, to object to that, so long as you make that admission to start with, you will find that the psychologist, or many of the younger psychologists to-day, have no quarrel with you. They will listen, and they will admit, as one did to me once: "We psychologists are not dealing with the water, we are dealing with the tap." Along those lines I believe we can meet the danger of a new psychological orthodoxy, but I admit we can only do so by keeping on arguing and talking and criticizing, and seeing to it that nothing, not even psychology, is allowed to obtain the petrifaction which has destroyed the old orthodoxy.

'Moreover, I would like to give the answer which to me is valid, to the contention that you must have an external authority to tell you what is true. My answer is that there is no such external authority, and that there never will be. The reply to the objective authority of Church or Bible which have been claimed to be infallible and indefectible, is that they are not infallible: their teaching on certain occasions and in certain matters has been wrong. That is once more the argument from experience. All that we have to guide us in this world in making a judgment is reason and conscience, and so far as I know neither reason nor conscience is infallible. But I would urge that the advantage of using them is that the more you use them the better they

become. If you constantly submit everything to the test of reason and conscience, your reason and conscience, unlike anything else, obtain a keener cutting edge than they had before: whereas if you do not use them, if you rely upon an external authority, instead of on those powers of judgment which you have in yourself, they will become blunt and dull, and the time will come when the man is obliged to make a decision for himself, and because he has never used them, the weapons which were put into his hands for making such a decision, will be dull and blunted, and he will decide wrongly instead of rightly.'

Father Woodlock's Second Warning.

Father Woodlock's second warning was directed against using as an argument for Christ's moral and spiritual authority that He is 'the crown of the evolutionary process.' He said:

'With regard to evolution, we had the phrase about Christ having crowned the evolutionary process. Again I am making this argument for the future. What business have we to say that Christ has crowned the evolutionary process if we cut out the old-fashioned proof of the Godhead of Christ and the rest? Why should we not say that Christ—well, is the best revelation hitherto? Why should evolution stop still in this unique instance, if Christ be, as I am afraid He is to many, not God Who can be adored, but merely the supreme man supremely inspired up-to-date? That leaves us with a difficulty—that here is evolution violated by the Supremest appearing in quite an early stage of human evolution. There may be twenty million years to come. There is to be mental development a very long way ahead, and why should we say that we reached the climax of moral evolution nineteen hundred years ago? If we can recognize Christ with an absolute certainty as God in our midst, and not merely a man of extraordinary divine-like life, then we can sweep aside the argument of an evolutionist.'

There are several observations to be made with regard to this well-meant warning. First, the argument used is *a priori*. It is not experience, but human prescience which is invoked. It is best met by Bishop Butler's warning: 'We are in no sort judges *beforehand* of the Divine methods.' Secondly, we would observe that you do not strengthen the old apologetic by indicating, as Father Woodlock attempts to do, the weakness of the new apologetic. Modern men are not going to stay in the traditionalist frying-pan, because it can be demonstrated to them that the Modernist fire is hotter. There is a cool, spacious, many-chambered *tertium quid* in which they can take refuge. It is this of which Traditionalist champions are seldom conscious, but which the Modernists whom they attack can never forget. This *tertium quid* may take the form of Secularism, or Agnosticism, or Materialist Monism, or Deism, or Pantheism, or Pluralism, or a non-Christian Theism, etc., etc.

If the Modernist can no longer maintain with the Traditionalist the spiritual and moral authority of our Lord on the ground that He performed extraordinary and superhuman miracles, or that He exactly fulfilled in a marvellously precise manner predictions about Himself uttered hundreds of years before by Jewish prophets, or that He was born into this world in an unique way and left it in an unique way, it is because at the bar of historical and literary research and criticism these 'proofs' have broken down. They no longer carry conviction to the mind of the modern educated man and

woman. This is not because these men and women are more sinful or sceptical than their ancestors; it is because they have been educated in a different way. They are ready to reverence, and believe in Jesus Christ; they are ready to see in Him the truest and deepest unveiling of the Divine Nature which has yet been vouchsafed to humanity; they are ready to adore that unveiling of the Divine Nature in Him. If you tell them that He is the Second Person of the Blessed Trinity, they answer frankly that they know nothing about that, and would like to know how you know it. If you tell them that there is strong evidence that the evolutionary process reached a height in His Personality which it has reached in none other, they will assent readily. If you tell them that as you read human history, humanity took a fresh beginning in Him: that it attained a higher stage which promises to carry the human race on to its goal of moral and spiritual sonship to God, they will declare that that also is their faith—their working hypothesis. This, we take it, is what was meant by the phrase which Father Woodlock criticizes that Jesus Christ is the crown of evolution. Obviously that phrase does not solve all our christological difficulties. The Modernist does not believe in Jesus Christ because He is the crown of evolution; he believes that He is the crown of evolution because of what He has shown Himself to be, not simply in His earth-life in Palestine, but also in the history of the Christian Church ever since. Father Woodlock may give *a priori* reasons for supposing that this estimate will prove incorrect in the future. To that the Modernist answers: It has not proved itself incorrect so far: as a judgment of faith we may regard it as sound: if it is not sound, of course the experience of the future will show it: when that contingency arises it will be time enough to meet it: in any case, if you cannot hold that Jesus Christ is the Crown of Evolution, which is only the modern equivalent for the old traditionalist term 'Perfect man,' it will be impossible to show that He is Deity in human form—*deitas sub specie humanitatis*—the two so it seems to English Modern Churchmen stand or fall together. This is not the conviction of Romanist Modernists, for they have separated the Jesus of history from the Christ of the Church, but it is the conviction of English Modernists.

What lies behind all christologies and the various terminologies that they have invented to express themselves, is the desire to protect and affirm the supreme and authoritative unveiling of the Divine Nature in Jesus Christ—that He is the supreme revelation of God in this world.

> 'There may be other Words in other worlds,
> But for this world the Word of God is Christ.'

The terms matter but little, in which this is expressed: some are effective in one age, some in another age: some appeal to one type of man, some to another: some to charcoal burners, some to *savants*: to some men it will seem far more convincing, in asserting the moral and spiritual claims of Jesus Christ, to say that 'He is the Crown of Evolution,' than to say that 'He was conceived by the Holy Ghost, and born of the Virgin Mary': to men of future ages neither of these ways of speaking of Him may seem either convincing or accurate. Our little systems and their terminologies have their day. What do the terms matter?

> 'What's in a name? That which we call a rose
> By any other name would smell as sweet.'

It is the curse of theology, as was pointed out more than once in the Conference, that theology is the slave of terminology—a terminology which is

out of date and yet is enforced by ecclesiastical authority, and so which no orthodox teacher may reject without being charged with heresy. Yet to teach and win modern men we need a new terminology—a terminology which shall be regarded as being as orthodox and as honourable as the old terminology, and so *pace* Father Woodlock, we view the attempt to create it by the invention and use of such a term as 'the Crown of Evolution' not with repugnance, but with rejoicing.

Father Woodlock's Third Warning.

This brings us to Father Woodlock's third warning. This was directed against the public recitation of the creeds by those who are not able to interpret their clauses literally, namely, in the sense in which they were originally written. Father Woodlock claimed that such action was dishonest. He himself, with perhaps the exception of the phrases 'descended' and 'ascended,' was able to accept every word and clause in its original sense. Modernists could not, and therefore they ought not to recite the creed at all. Its recitation in such a case demanded 'a more than Jesuitical casuistry' to defend it. We should have supposed for one trained in casuistry as is Father Woodlock that the *intention* with which the act is performed, rather than the act itself, would have constituted the moral ground either for exoneration or condemnation. The Modernist does not recite the Creeds *in order to deceive*: he recites them because loyalty to Church authority requires it—the avoidance of disobedience and scandal: he does it for the sake of the body to which he belongs, not for the sake of himself. On proper occasions and to the proper authorities he makes it quite clear how he interprets the clauses of the Creed which he recites, and that he cannot interpret them in their original and literal sense. There is, therefore, no fundamental dishonesty in such action on his part. At the same time there are grave disadvantages connected with it. It is only tolerable during a period of transition. To alter the 'I believe' into the original 'We believe' of the Nicene Creed would not meet the difficulty for many, although it might relieve it for some. As one of the younger Oxonians present remarked, 'It is not a case of "I believe," or "We believe," but "They believe."' For this reason a number of older Modernists, although such impartial ethical judges as J. S. Mill and Bernard Bosanquet would acquit them of dishonesty in reciting the Creeds in this way, feel compelled, in the interest of the future of the Church and its ministry, to take their stand beside the younger men and to demand some relaxation in the recitation of the creeds, either by removing the rubric requiring their public recitation by the clergy or by substituting modern alternative creedal forms. There is really no need for the recitation of the *Quicunque Vult* at all. Theologians should study it: the laity invariably misunderstand it. There is also no need for the recitation of the Apostles' Creed at the daily and Sunday services. It may rightly, in accordance with immemorial Church practice, be retained at the Baptismal Service, but should then be recited by parents and sponsors or the baptized person.

The Nicene Creed may rightly be recited at the Eucharist, but here it might well take the form of an Anthem. Here too a simple alternative declaration of faith, preferably in scriptural terms, might be permitted, or a rubric inserted stating the purpose of the liturgical use of the Nicene Creed. We ourselves do not ask these things for ourselves, but we do ask them for our younger brethren and for the sake of the Church of the future. The charges of dishonesty made by Father Woodlock leave our withers

unwrung, but possible ordinands, and these sometimes the best, feel differently about these matters, and the Church's leaders would do well to remedy the situation.

A Controversial Note.

It was a matter of regret to those most responsible for the organization of the Conference that it could not altogether escape a controversial note in some of the papers. This was present particularly in the paper of Mr. Fawkes. The bitter attacks which have been consistently made by the Anglo-Catholic and Roman Press on English Modernists culminating in the recent attack by the English Church Union on a Sermon preached some two months ago in Westminster Abbey by the Bishop of Birmingham was responsible for this controversial note. While the superstition of the ignorant and 'humble poor' should be treated with tenderness as being closely akin to the spirit of reverence: even as John Huss treated it, when he exclaimed *O sancta simplicitas!* as an old woman hobbled forward with a little faggot to assist his burning: it ought to be treated in a very different manner by Christian teachers when it is deliberately propagated by an organization of educated men in the interests of an ecclesiastical policy.

The Ethical Teaching of Jesus Christ.

The theme over which Conference opinion was most divided was that treated by Professor Sorley and Dr. Douglas White: 'What we believe about the ethic of the Kingdom.' As there was little time for discussion in the Debating Hall, most of the discussion took place outside.

In this connection it may not be amiss to draw the attention of readers to Dean Rashdall's brief, lucid, and masterly statement in his volume, *Conscience and Christ.* For ordinary educated persons nothing can be better. *The Ethics of the Gospel,* by F. A. M. Spencer (a member of the Churchmen's Union), just published,[2] will also be found very useful. In Chapter xiv Mr. Spencer gives an admirable summary of philosophical ethics in the light of the Gospel ethics. He writes:

> 'Ethical systems have been well classified under three headings: those in which the standard is law, those in which the standard is happiness, those in which the standard is perfection. According to the first, right conduct is that which conforms to the primary laws of right and wrong. According to the second, right conduct is that which conduces, or is intended to conduce, to happiness. According to the third, right conduct is that which forwards the evolution of souls in or towards their perfect nature' (p. 216).

After presenting an outline of Kant's ethics, Mr. Spencer concludes thus:

> 'There are certainly affinities in Kant's ethics with the Gospel ethics. That the good will is a primary condition of the best kind of life: that moral principles are innate in human nature, so that even unspiritual men have some perception of them: that right must be done in scorn of consequence: that souls are of value in themselves and therefore must be treated as ends: that goodness and happiness are to be combined, through God, in a life to come—these fundamental doctrines of Kant's

[2] By G. Allen and Unwin, 40 Museum Street, W.C.1.

were also enounced or clearly implied by Jesus Christ. But the formalism, the rigourism, the negative view of virtue that pervade much of Kant's ethical writings, make them seem poor indeed beside the Sermon on the Mount and the parable of the Good Samaritan' (p. 221).

Of utilitarian ethics, Mr. Spencer remarks:

'Utilitarianism well emphasizes the command to love others as we love ourselves. So far it is true to the Spirit of Jesus. But it overlooks the ultimate aim and fulfilment of love, which is to live as children of God in eternal life. Utilitarianism expresses the altruism of the ethics of Jesus: it is oblivious to the idealism' (p. 231).

What we need to remember is that Christian ethics is not static. There is need of development in accordance with growing knowledge and expanding needs. This was emphasized by Dr. Rashdall. He said of the teaching of Christ, 'We do discover in it a supreme and final principle which we do not expect to be transcended—the rule of universal love, which (expressed in cold philosophical terms) implies that human duty consists in the promotion of the true good for all mankind, the good of one being considered as of equal intrinsic value with the like good of every other. Why is this principle insufficient for the guidance of life without any further expansion? For two reasons: in the first place we want to know the means by which human good is to be promoted: and in the second place we must know what in detail constitutes this "good" which we are to promote for all mankind. It is obvious from the nature of the case that there can be no finality in either of these directions. The discovery of any fresh means of promoting human good not only adds new rules of life to the ethical code: it actually cancels old rules.'[3]

Whilst conscious that the ethical teaching of Jesus should not be interpreted or applied with a crude and unenlightened literalism, the modern Churchman is also conscious that there is a terrible temptation 'to tone down' His teaching to suit the tastes of a morally insensitive and spiritually unimaginative utilitarianism. The interpretation and application of the heroic idealism of the Gospels ought to change with the ages, but not so as to make it easier of attainment. The words of Bonar's hymn are true for every age.

'No wider is the gate,
No broader is the way,
No smoother is the ancient path,
That leads to life and day.'

The Task ahead of Modern Churchmen.

Moved by zeal for the Modernist cause, various members of the Conference felt constrained on occasions to 'exhort the brethren.' The Reverend L. Elliott Binns, the preacher of the concluding sermon, did this with much earnestness. He summoned the Modernists to leave their academic groves and intellectual fastnesses and to invade the parishes. It is doubtful how far the preacher's advice is practicable at present. For one Modernist clerical don in a University fastness, there are to-day twenty Modernist parish priests. There is no need to advertise the latter. To do so would probably be to injure them both in their parishes and dioceses. Anyone by consulting

[3] *Conscience and Christ*, p. 197.

the list of members of the Churchmen's Union can see that members of that Union at present have charge of some notable town parishes in which good work is being done. Equally good work is being down in country parishes. Because he has recently left us, we venture to refer to one such by name, the Rev. J. E. Kelsall, M.A., F.L.S., Rector of Milton from 1897 to 1924. A volume of his sermons, *The Child Enthroned*,[4] has just been published. It is an admirable example of Modernist teaching given to normal English congregations. A trained theologian or a strong Traditionalist would recognize its Modernism. The ordinary man would not.

The Modernism is apparent more by what the preacher does not say than by what he does say; and by the way in which he says it, than by what he says. The ordinary man and woman would only notice that the teaching was sincere, sensible, and uplifting. What the preacher was as a parish priest is not so easily described, but anyone visiting his parish could easily learn. There are a number of such clergy in country places; wise, quiet, thoughtful, modern teachers of the Christian religion. Though they be almost unknown outside their parishes, it is not right to ignore their existence in speaking of Modernist work. Of course there is great need for more Modernist parish priests, but as we see the present situation, there is far more need for Modernist professors, tutors, and chaplains in our Universities old and new; Modernist tutors in our Theological Colleges; Modernist headmasters and chaplains in our Public Schools; Modernist Examining Chaplains, and Modernist Canons in our cathedrals. In parochial work and the conducting of the services the Modernist will hardly differ at all from the Traditionalist, but he will differ profoundly as a teacher. His teaching should be of use to all, but where it is most needed at the present time is by the educated classes, who have largely abandoned Traditionalism and are becoming paganized. Modernists are reaching some of them by publications, and hope to reach many more, but where the Modernist ought to be most at the present time is in all places of sound learning where bodies of educated men and women congregate. Charcoal-burners have souls to be saved as much as the educated classes, but the charcoal-burner at present does not need the Modernist teacher, whereas the educated man does if he is to become or to remain a Christian. What the Modernist priest needs most at the present time is a revised Prayer Book and a revised Hymn Book, and we hope that we may secure both shortly: what the Modernist Cause needs most is a supply of Modernist ordinands, and how to obtain them is the great problem under existing conditions.

The Leaven and the Lump.

It seemed to us that Professor Kersopp Lake, although his valuations and conclusions would differ in various ways from ours, yet gave the best practical advice to the Conference when he said in one of his speeches:

> 'I cannot help thinking that the Modern Churchmen's Union, with which I have been associated almost from the beginning, has still got its great work to do in helping the next generation to do what it must do, and that is become articulate, to find a new language to express thoughts which, though they are not new, are being thought as it were in a new way. They are not articulate to-day, because the language of theology is, on the whole, Greek, whereas they talk in English. It may seem a

[4] *The Child Enthroned and other Sermons*, published by Warren and Sons, Winchester (1925). Price 5/-.

small thing, but one of the most important things of the Modern Churchmen's Union is to help people to think their theology in English. I know you can do this if you will remember two things. One is that you cannot be a great society numerically, because in life you can always choose between two things: you can be the leaven or you can be the lump, but you cannot be both, and I think that the Modern Churchmen's Union is the leaven.

'The other thing takes me back to our first Conference at Ripon. I know that there some of us saw visions of the future, and for you as for all of us, success in life depends on whether in our work we are able to remember the visions which were showed us in the Mount.'

Next Year's Conference.

We are glad to be able to state that the numbers attending this year's Conference exceeded even those of 1924, when it was supposed that a record had been reached which there was little likelihood of breaking. This fact, combined with the definitely-expressed opinion from many quarters, has made it seem highly desirable in the interests of our cause to continue the annual Conferences of Modern Churchmen.

It has been decided that the subject of next year's Conference is to be 'Practical Problems of Modern Churchmen.' In making our selection of subjects, we shall not necessarily follow either Copec or Stockholm. Our purpose will not be to teach the world at large its duty and how to discharge it, but to become clearer about some aspects of our own. In order that the range from which the Conference Committee make their selection, may be as wide, varied, and intimate as possible, readers of the *Modern Churchman* are invited to send in suggestions to the Editor before October 7th. These suggestions will be submitted to the Committee in the following week.

FAITH AND REASON

PRESIDENTIAL ADDRESS

By the Very Rev. W. R. Inge, D.D., F.B.A., C.V.O., Dean of St. Paul's.

THIS is, I believe, the twelfth of the annual Conferences held under the auspices of the Churchmen's Union. Whether this year's meeting is to complete the series, or whether these Conferences, which have attracted so much interest and been productive of so much good, are to be continued, I am glad that this year we are assembled not to controvert the opinions of others, nor even to defend ourselves, except indirectly against misunderstandings and misrepresentations, but to testify to the faith that is in us. We are here, primarily, to help each other, though we hope that in formulating our own beliefs we may perhaps help others too.

The general title of the papers which are to be read this week is ' The Faith of a Modern Churchman.' The indefinite article was not chosen without purpose. We want the readers of the papers to speak for themselves, not for the Society. We are not a well-drilled army, all marching in step. We have no party programme, no official syllabus of opinions, which we all have to defend. We agree only in our confidence that the Spirit of Truth, and of Truthfulness, guides and blesses honest enquiry, and that ' the Bible of the race ' is still being written. We reverence tradition, but we will not be fettered by it. God is still revealing Himself; and if it is true that ' the invisible things of Him from the foundation of the world are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made, even His eternal power and Godhead,' then we must expect that the mass of new knowledge about the things that are made, which science has revealed to us, will prove to have important bearings even on our beliefs about invisible things, and especially about the manner in which the power of the Godhead is exercised. And when we speak of science, we include not only the study of natural law, but the scientific study of history, and Biblical criticism.

There are of course many who accept the principles of free enquiry, but are not Christians or Churchmen. We are Christians and Churchmen, and we hope that we can give a reason for the faith that is in us without being false to the strictest obligations of intellectual honesty.

We have discarded the two infallibilities, the infallible Church and the infallible Book. Neither of them is primitive. The former grew in the struggle, first with Paganism, and then with heresy, in the course of which Christianity was changed from a religion of the Spirit to a religion of authority. The latter was the basis of another religion of authority, at war with the first. It seems to all Liberal Churchmen that belief in the Holy Spirit holds a far less central position in traditional Christianity, whether Catholic or Protestant, than it does in the New Testament. I am thinking not only of St. Paul and the Fourth Gospel, but of the Acts of the Apostles, in which the appeal to the guidance of the Spirit, or (in one place) the Spirit of Jesus, is the *leit motiv* of the whole book.

We have been called by others, and we sometimes call ourselves, Modernists. I have always disliked the name, which seems to me even less suitable than the long word Latitudinarians, which was hurled at the Christian rationalists and Platonizing theologians of the seventeenth century, and which, as one of the victims complained, 'they have taught themselves to pronounce as glibly as if it were shorter by four or five syllables.' We are not Modernists, except in the sense in which Irenaeus claims that all Christians are Modernists '*Omnem novitatem attulit semet ipsum afferens*.' We are not Modernists, because our Christianity is no new thing, but older, we may venture to say, than Catholicism, and much older than Protestantism. We find it in St. Paul and St. John, and we reverently hold that we find it in the teaching of Christ Himself. For though our Lord shows no obligation to Greek thought, which from the time of St. Paul onwards has had a marked influence upon Christian theology and worship, it is surely no accident that as soon as the Church began to speak and write in Greek, it began to think in Greek, and that the original Gospel, with all its essential features unaltered, came to Europe, and conquered there, in a Greek dress. Most of us, I think, are glad to find that what was best in the old civilization, its spirit of unfettered enquiry, its long tradition of deep thought, its reverence for knowledge, its robust faith that divine truth is accessible to man, was carried over into the new religion, and preserved a real continuity with the glories of the ancient culture, so soon to be eclipsed in the welter of barbarism. In any

case, whether we value the heritage of Greece or not, it is certain that the tradition which we wish to follow, whether we call it Greek, or Platonic, or mystical, or Liberal, or Renaissance, has a history within the Christian Church. It was weak only during the dark ages; it took fresh life at the Renaissance, and has maintained itself in the Church, by the side of Catholicism and Protestantism, ever since. No one, I think, can justly dispute our right to be in the Church, and to carry on, to the best of our ability, a tradition which has been, on the whole, a singularly honourable one. We wish to deal with the new knowledge which has come to us, whether scientific or historical, in the same spirit in which the Greek theologians dealt with Greek philosophy, the Schoolmen with the partially rediscovered Aristotle, and the Renaissance scholars with the newly-recovered Greek Testament. We try to be up to date with our science and our scholarship; but there is nothing 'modern' in our desire to add to our faith knowledge, or in our hope that the Spirit of Christ is still with us, to guide us into all truth.

I have been asked, by way of introduction to the other papers which will be read at this Conference, to say something about the relations of Faith and Reason. Both words need careful consideration, for they are not always used in the same sense, and we have to remember that Christians do not all speak the same language. I do not want to inflict upon you a learned discussion of technical terms, but I think we must try to define what we mean by Faith and by Reason.

When we use the word Faith, without special reference to religion, we mean either the holding for true of something which is neither verified by experience nor demonstrated by logic, or else confidence in the wisdom and integrity of a person. We have two verbs, 'believe' and 'trust,' which correspond to these two meanings of Faith.

Pistis, in Plato, means unverified conviction, or incomplete science; it is a stepping-stone to real knowledge, but belongs itself to the region of opinion. But in later Greek philosophy the word rises somewhat in dignity. Plutarch, for example, says, or quotes his father as saying: 'The ancient ancestral Faith is sufficient, than which it is impossible to mention or discover anything clearer. If the common foundation for the pious life is shaken at any point, the whole becomes insecure.' Philo,

and, I believe, some of the magical papyri, use the word in an exalted sense. Proclus, in agreement with the magical papyri, though not with Plotinus, actually puts Faith above Reason. 'Those beings which are not enlightened by Reason are necessarily deprived of Faith, which is above Reason.' The following passage from Proclus is extremely interesting. 'There are three constitutive factors of divine things, which are present in all the higher modes of being, Goodness, Wisdom, and Beauty. And there are three contributory factors, which are secondary to those just named, but which pervade all divine dispensations—Faith, Truth, and Love.' Faith is 'that which establishes everything and settles it in the Good.' This, as we shall see, is not quite the Christian doctrine.

Faith in the Synoptic Gospels is a spirit of receptiveness towards Christ and His teaching, loyalty to His person.

In St. Paul's epistles, I would call special attention to *Gal.* iii, 23: 'before the coming of the Faith,' words which show that the first Christians felt their Faith to be as new a thing as their Hope and their Love; and to 'the household of Faith' for the Church. I do not think that *Pistis* in St. Paul is ever equivalent to mere *fiducia*, the subjective assurance of Lutheranism; we must remember that at that time belief involved a changed life and membership of a persecuted society. 'The new and significant peculiarity of Paul's conception of Faith,' says Pfleiderer truly, 'is the mystical union with Christ, the self-identification with Christ in a fellowship of life and death . . . Life in the Faith means the same as "Christ liveth in me."' The words in *Romans* v, 23, 'whatever is not of Faith is sin,' does not mean, 'all works done before justification are sinful'; it merely means, in its context, that whether we observe dietary rules or not, we are to have a clear conscience. While we are here, 'we walk by Faith, not by sight': the form of the risen Christ is hidden from us; but some day we shall see face to face. Then Faith will not be abolished, but will become eternal (I *Cor.* xiii). Lastly, the Christian 'stands fast in the Faith' (I *Cor.* xvi, 13), but also grows in Faith, and attains the status of the full-grown man by coming unto 'the unity of the Faith, and of the knowledge of the Son of God.' In these passages we have a deep conception of Faith, which has determined the Christian use of the word.

In the Epistle to the Hebrews we have the famous but obscure definition: 'Faith is the assurance of [or, giving substance to] things hoped for, the proving [or, test] of objects not seen.' I have not space to discuss the meaning of the disputed words, on which Chrysostom's comment is noteworthy: 'Whereas things that are matters of hope seem to be unsubstantial, Faith gives them substance, or rather does not give it, but is itself their being.' This, in modern language, seems to make Faith rather too subjective. There are two other important sentences about Faith in this Epistle. 'Without Faith it is impossible to please Him, for He that cometh to God must believe that He is, and that He is a rewarder of them that diligently seek Him.' Again, 'Faith is the seeing of the invisible One,' God, during our earthly pilgrimage. Augustine's comment is, '*Errabant adhuc et patriam quaerebant; sed duce Christo errare non poterant. Via illis fuit visio Dei.*'

The word *Pistis* does not occur in the Fourth Gospel; it is, I think, avoided like the other party catchwords of the time, *Wisdom* and *Knowledge*. But the use of the verb seems to lay about equal stress on the two meanings of conviction and complete trust.

In the earlier Fathers the doctrine is quite explicit that, to quote Ignatius, 'Faith and love towards Christ Jesus are the beginning and end of life. The beginning is Faith, the end is love.' This is further developed by Clement of Alexandria, in admirable language, which I must find space to quote. 'Faith, which the Greeks disparage as futile and barbarous, is a voluntary anticipation, the assent of piety—the substance of things hoped for, the evidence of things not seen, as the Apostle says. Others have defined Faith as a uniting assent to an unseen object. If then it be choice, the desire is in this case intellectual, since it desires something. And since choice is the beginning of action, Faith is the beginning of action, being the foundation of rational choice, when a man sets before himself, through Faith, the demonstration which he anticipates. Voluntarily to follow what is expedient is the beginning of understanding it. Unswerving choice, therefore, gives a great impetus towards knowledge.' Again: 'Fear develops into Faith, and Faith into love. But I do not fear my Father as I fear a wild beast; I fear and love Him at once. Blessed therefore is he who has Faith, which is

compounded by love and fear.' Once more: 'Faith is a compendious knowledge of essentials, while knowledge is a sure and firm demonstration of the things received through Faith, carrying us on to unshaken conviction and scientific certainty. There is a first kind of saving change from heathenism to Faith, a second from Faith to knowledge; and knowledge, as it passes on into love, begins at once to establish a mutual friendship between the knower and the known. Perhaps he who has reached this stage is "equal to the angels."' I do not think we shall find sounder teaching about the nature of Faith anywhere than in Clement. Faith begins as an experiment, and ends as an experience. It begins as a resolution to stand or fall by the noblest hypothesis, as Frederick Myers says; but it is verified progressively as we go on. It passes into knowledge, and knowledge in turn passes into love, which unites knower and known. This is the mystical ascent to God, of which Faith is the first step. There is in it, and there must be, an element of real moral venture; but it is not irrational; as we climb higher, we can see further.

Augustine recognizes three elements in Faith—*assensus*, *notitia*, *fiducia*. 'There are,' he says, 'three classes of credible things: those which are always believed and never understood, such as historical events; those which are understood as they are believed, such as all subjects of human reasoning; and those which are first believed and afterwards understood, such as those about divine matters, which cannot be understood except by the pure in heart; and this condition comes from keeping the moral law.' It is well known that Anselm said *Credo ut intelligam*, and that Abelard altered this into *intelligo ut credam*. The schoolmen were not agreed as to the respective claims of primacy for Faith and knowledge.

Catholicism has always been rationalistic, up to a point. Thomas Aquinas taught that divine truth is divided, not in itself, but in its relation to our faculties. Part of it can be known by human reason, part of it only by revelation. The existence of God is demonstrable, though it requires brains and education to follow the argument. Faith involves an act of the will, but it is not an arbitrary choice; it presupposes some knowledge. I do not find the position of Aquinas very clear. He makes it plain that there is a moral and an intellectual element in Faith; but

on the intellectual side it seems to rest on Church authority, which he does not permit us to scrutinize. But it is important to know that this limited rationalism is still the orthodox Catholic doctrine; the Vatican Council of 1870 anathematized those who say that the one true God cannot be certainly known by the light of natural reason.

I will not go into the Reformation controversies about Faith. The Council of Trent condemned the propositions that justifying Faith is nothing but confidence in the mercy of God, who forgives our sins for the sake of Christ, and that man is absolved and justified because he firmly believes that he is absolved and justified. This protest against identifying Faith with mere *fiducia* was made necessary by the language of Luther himself, Melanchthon, and the Confession of Augsburg.

The Anglican Homilies teach that Faith is not merely belief, but also trust and hope. Saving Faith 'is not dead, but worketh by charity, as St. Paul declareth. If thou have it, thou hast the ground of all good works.'

The pragmatist doctrine of Faith, as an act of violence exercised by the will upon the intellect to make it accept what we find it helpful to believe, has doubtless been often acted upon at all times, but it has never been crudely avowed till our own time. According to George Tyrrell:

> 'A certain sense of unreality is part of the trial of Faith. . . We hold to a belief in obedience to the command of God. . . But this will not prevent that seeming black to us which God tells us is white.'
> 'The great mass of our beliefs are reversible.'

This is the teaching of the real 'Modernists,' who are anything rather than Liberals.

I have argued elsewhere that Faith is belief in the objective existence of a realm of values, which religion connects with the name of God. I have also protested against the opinion, which is widely held, that while science, by a deliberate abstraction, contemplates a world of facts without values, religion contemplates values apart from facts. When we consider that both science and religion desire to know things as they are, this bisection of experience would seem to be suicidal to both alike. It is true, and very important, that science tries to express everything in terms of quantity, which shall be commensurable, while religion, and the other spiritual activities of the human mind, are interested almost entirely in quality. But the scientific view

of the world is not indifferent to quality or value. It seeks to find law, harmony, uniformity in nature; it regards disorder and inexplicable irregularity as a scandal to be removed by more patient observation. Here surely we have a Faith, that fuller knowledge will confirm that belief in the character and methods of the cosmic process which we have adopted because it seems to us to be the worthiest as well as the most probable. The reign of law is certainly a hypothesis which belongs to our judgments of value; a strictly impartial weighing and counting of atoms would hardly have led us to it. And, on the other hand, it is surely untrue to say that the objects of religious contemplation are unrealized ideals, ends towards which action is directed. 'He that cometh to God must believe that He *is*.'

Science and religion, philosophy and politics, have all alike suffered from the nineteenth century passion for throwing ideals into the future. The future is a convenient place in which to put our dreams, though prudence might suggest that as it is not yet born, it is too early to baptize it. A great part of the quarrel between science and religion arises from divergent opinions not about the world as it is, but about what it will be. Faith, for a vast number of people, means a belief that the scheme of things will gradually, or suddenly, be remoulded nearer to our heart's desire. Thus, in forming our estimate of the world, we levy unlimited drafts on the future, like Mr. Lloyd George's government. These drafts are not likely to be honoured. A saner idealism would look for its values in the world we know, around us and within; and as these values are real existents, and accessible to all who seek them in the right way, they will bring the faith of the scientist and the faith of the religious mystic very much nearer together. What estranges them at present is very largely that they reciprocally doubt the solvency of each other's investments in 'futures.' This is also what exacerbates politics.

The ultimate values, which religion calls the revealed attributes of God, are the objects of Faith. The familiar classification into a triple star—three sisters that never can be sundered without tears, as Tennyson says—cannot be improved upon. As Goethe says, in Carlyle's translation:

> 'As all nature's myriad changes
> Still one changeless power proclaim,
> So through thought's wide kingdom ranges
> One vast meaning, e'er the same:

This is Truth—eternal Reason—
That in Beauty takes its dress,
And, serene through time and season,
Stands complete in Righteousness.'

Lotze thinks that our appreciation of these ultimate values s given intuitively, and I think he is right. They are absolute, is being incapable of being resolved into each other or into nything else. They are ends, never means. 'If a man desires he good life except for itself,' says Plotinus, 'it is not the good ife that he desires.' Or, as Spinoza says, 'Blessedness is not he reward of virtue, but virtue itself.' The same is true of the worship of Truth, and of Beauty. The rival claims of the three nay sometimes conflict, but chiefly when our service is impure nd not wholly disinterested. Complete unification is forbidden y the conditions of finite existence, but we are able to discern hat they are the attributes of the same supreme Being.

There has been endless discussion whether we have a distinct aculty for the knowledge of God. The faculty-psychology is ightly discredited, and it is probable that the champions of ne intellect, the will, and of a special mystical sense, trans- gured and exalted feeling, are not so far apart as in controversy ney seem to be. Nevertheless, mistakes are often made, and is worth while to call attention to them.

Emotional theism is not the same thing as mysticism. The ntuition in which the mystic believes, and which he hopes to ttain, is the pearl of great price, to procure which all else must e surrendered. The mystics do not make things easy for them- elves. But emotional theism, as we frequently encounter it, is soft and easy creed. 'Dreaming is easy and thinking is diffi- ult'; the emotionalist steeps himself or herself in luxurious eeling and pathetic imagination, which make no severe call upon ither the will or the intellect. 'The heart has its reasons which ne intellect knows not of.' How often have these words of 'ascal been abused to justify a temper too indolent to enquire, o bigoted to doubt, a voluptuous devotionality allied perhaps refined aestheticism, but totally alien to the austerity and pene- ating sincerity of the Gospel!

It is rather deplorable that Robert Browning, in his later oems, should have seemed to countenance a Faith resting on ure feeling:

'Wholly distrust thy knowledge, then, and trust
As wholly love allied to ignorance.'

And:

> 'So let us say—not, Since we know, we love,
> But rather, Since we love, we know enough.'

This is surely not the real Browning, unless we say that it is the product of a strongly-willed optimism contending with intellectual pessimism. It may be that Faith begins in an emotion, and that in the beatific vision it ends in what we may call pure feeling; but it has to pass through those intermediate stages which Clement describes, and which, as Proclus says, are complex, though the lowest and highest things are simple.

That Faith is purely an act of the will is equally false, and equally popular as a theory. Of course, the wish is often father to the thought; and Hobbes may be right when he says that even the axioms of geometry would be disputed if men's passions were concerned in them. But Hobbes does not say that they could be disproved or rendered doubtful if men's interests lay in denying them. It is also true that we can in the first instance 'adhere to' (the expression is well chosen) a creed because we choose, and then cut off our retreat by refusing to listen to arguments on the other side, and above all by making a personal wager by so acting that we should be losers if it were false. As Clough says:

> 'Action will furnish belief; but will that belief be the true one?'
> That is the point, you know. However, it doesn't much matter.'

This is pragmatism before William James. But how does he know that it doesn't much matter?

Among the schoolmen, the Englishman, William of Occam, was a champion of the will and practical reason against the moderate intellectualism of Aquinas. This philosophy is naturally allied to scepticism, and may be easily turned into the service of a blind acceptance of authority. Kant, as is well known, distinguished between the theoretical and practical reason, and attempted to restore, through the latter, those fundamental beliefs which, according to him, could not be established by the former. This was to admit a rift *within* the reason. Some of his successors have gone much further, and have sought to discredit the reason itself. Herbert Spencer was, I think, justified in his protest:

> 'Let those who can believe that there is eternal war between our intellectual faculties and our moral obligations. I for one can admit no such radical vice in the constitution of things.'

This disparagement of the intellect is connected with the separation between judgments of fact and judgments of value, to which I have already taken strong exception. This is the philosophy which is connected with the name of Ritschl. There is a strong sceptical element in Newman, though he would have been shocked at the developments of his position by the Roman Catholic Modernists. Many modern writers, such as Kidd and Lord Balfour, have defended a Faith based on sceptical anti-intellectualism. Lord Balfour sets up 'authority' against reason. He calls authority the rival and opponent of reason, and makes it stand for 'that group of non-rational causes, moral, social, and educational, which produces its results by psychic processes other than reasoning.' It 'coerces the operations of reason to a fore-ordained issue,' which is fortunate, since 'reason is a force most apt to divide and disintegrate.' I cannot see why these non-rational processes, which coerce the operations of reason to a fore-ordained issue, should be called 'authority.' They seem to me a dignified phrase for what the schoolboy calls fudging his sums.

But we cannot afford to despise this revolt against the intellect, for it has affected much of our recent philosophy and theology. The two most notable theological books since the war, Heiler's *Catholicism* and Otto's *The Holy*, are both irrationalist in tendency, especially the latter. I am disposed to think that the mechanism and determinism of nineteenth century science are very unwelcome to the temper of our generation, which is wilful, superstitious, and sentimental. The naturalists of Queen Victoria's reign built on their scientific studies a superstructure of badly designed philosophy, an incongruous mixture of atomism and pantheism, which the religious mind rightly refused to accept. Then a revolt against materialism broke out within the domain of science itself. Many biologists, and most psychologists, have broken loose from mechanistic determinism, as we saw in our Conference last year. Thus the authority of science is divided and shaken. The study of religious psychology seems to have diminished the importance of reason as a constitutive factor of Faith, and there are men who for various causes would be glad to be given freedom to believe—'at their own risk,' as is sometimes added—what they would like to be true.

Modern anti-intellectualism is not based on the primacy of the will over the intellect, so much as on the genuinely pragmatist contention that all our beliefs are founded on practical needs. Our whole picture of the world, it is said, is a selection from the mass of experience, an artificial construction determined by our necessities and interests. We notice what helps or harms us; what does not concern us we neglect and hardly perceive at all. Even the so-called laws of nature are only instruments to be used; they are diagrams which may be approximately correct, but they have no sacredness in themselves; we are not obliged to believe them. I have collected elsewhere some characteristic utterances by members of this school. 'No fact,' says Le Roy, 'has any existence and scientific value except in and by a theory; whence it follows that strictly speaking it is the savant who makes the scientific facts.' 'A dogma is a truth belonging to the vital order; it presents its object under the forms of the action commanded to us by it, and the obligation to adhere to it concerns properly its practical significance, its vital value.' This suggests not obscurely that it does not matter to Faith whether a historical dogma ever went through the form of taking place or not. But as all other events are in the same position, there is here no special disparagement of those which are miraculous. To take his own example, when we say that Jesus rose from the dead, we only mean that we should 'treat Him as if He were our contemporary.'

George Tyrrell, in slightly more guarded language, takes the same view:

> 'Beliefs that have been found to foster and promote the spiritual life of the soul must so far be in accordance with the nature and the laws of that will world with which it is the aim of religion to bring us into harmony; their practical value results from and is founded in their representative value.' 'Mistakings of faith-values for fact-values are to be ascribed to the almost ineradicable materialism of the human mind.'

I can withdraw nothing of what I wrote in 1909 on this subject:

> 'Such a philosophy would never have attracted Christian priests except at a time of exceptional difficulty and perplexity. The aid which it brings is illusory; it enables a man to blow hot and cold with the same mouth and feel no qualms, but it offers no solution of the problem.'' This almost absolute scepticism about objective truth, if followed to its logical conclusion, would lead us, as it has led Loisy,

far outside Christianity. A scepticism which denies all confidence even to the instrument of thought, obliterating the difference between fact and fiction, history and fable, has hardly enough ground left on which to plant its own feet. This school has betrayed some of the *arcana imperii* of Catholicism, but, as might be expected, this has not diminished the determination of the hierarchy to repudiate it.'

The relation of Faith to authority requires a little more consideration. Authority in the religious sphere generally means absolute or infallible authority, such as Catholics ascribe to the Church, some Protestants to the Bible, and a few mystics to the Inner Light. In fact, there are no such infallible authorities. Alan of Lille in the thirteenth century wittily said: 'Authority has a nose of wax; it can be twisted either way.' But of course we can decide for ourselves that we will follow one authority only, and refuse to listen to any others. It is not a very dignified position, for it amounts to saying, 'I will believe because I choose.' This kind of religion cannot be anything better than an anodyne; but an anodyne is unfortunately just what many people want from their religion.

What authority means for a Catholic has been clearly stated by Cardinal Newman. The authority of the Church 'has the prerogative of an indirect jurisdiction on subject-matters which lie beyond its own proper limits, and it most reasonably has such a jurisdiction. It could not properly defend religious truth without claiming for that truth what may be called its pomoeria, or, to take another illustration, without acting as we act, as a nation, in claiming as our own not only the land on which we live, but what are called British waters. The Catholic Church claims not only to judge infallibly on religious questions, but to animadvert on opinions in secular matters which bear upon religion, on matters of philosophy, of science, of literature, of history, and it demands our submission to her claim. It claims to censure books, to silence authors, and to forbid discussions. It must of course be obeyed without a word.' This is the terrible slavery of soldiers on the march. 'Theirs not to make reply, Theirs not to reason why, Theirs but to do and die.'

The tyranny of the infallible Book is less shocking, because it is weaker. 'The Bible,' says Chillingworth, 'is the religion of Protestants.' I do not think I need waste time over it here, since Oxford is not in Tennessee.

Nor need I say much about the supposed infallibility of individual inspiration, the 'testimony of the Holy Spirit.' It is still sometimes abused, as when people ask for a 'leading' on some question which they have to decide, and then omit to use their best judgments upon it, or to ask for good advice. The early Quakers, as the Friends of to-day admit, fell into the error of making the inner light something wholly alien to man's nature. 'The light of which we speak,' says Barclay, 'is not only distinct but of a different nature from the soul of man and its faculties.' This is to make the inner light itself external, and it may lead to absurdities, as when a Quaker woman exclaimed: 'Jerusalem? It has not yet been revealed to me that there is such a place.'

Authority, like a good educator, ought to aim at making itself superfluous. We cannot do without it, but our progress in the spiritual life may be measured by the extent to which our Faith rests no longer on authority but on experience. Faith, as we found Clement saying, must pass into knowledge, the state in which God's commands are no longer arbitrary edicts, but are understood and accepted by our minds. This is the 'reasonable service' of which St. Paul speaks. To give authority any higher place than this implies the one really bottomless scepticism, which denies that the human mind can distinguish truth from falsehood in criticising an alleged revelation.

I think I have made it plain how I understand Faith. There is, I believe, in all of us an innate attraction for things that are true and pure and noble and of good report. The act by which we resolve, God helping us, to take our stand on this side is the initial act of Faith. In proportion as we adhere to this resolution, we come to see more clearly what God means us to make of our lives. The facts and laws of the spiritual world become more familiar to us; we begin to have the testimony of the Holy Spirit within us that our prayers are heard; and though we may too often forget God, we do not seriously think that He forgets us, or doubt His existence. Those who have advanced further in the life of grace tell us all that the saints and mystics say about the irradiation of the whole personality by the felt presence of the Holy Spirit. Their testimony is so clear and so consistent that we cannot suspect it of being unreal. It does

not, of course, certify us of the truth of any event in the past or future; but as our best moments are, almost from the first, connected with the figure of the human Christ, and with His recorded words, we are surely justified in following St. Paul's example, and calling the spiritual presence which envelops us the Spirit of Christ. So far as we have a living Faith, it seems to be an enhancement of our whole personality, and though in some persons the will is the strongest faculty, in others the intellect, in others the affections, it does not seem that Faith strengthens one part of our nature and starves another. When this happens, it means that we have been badly taught; and this happens very often, for imperfect, and worse than imperfect, conceptions of Faith are very rife.

We have now to consider the second noun in our title—the word Reason. The word in this connection means the intellectual side of our nature, treated as something apart from the will and feelings. A religion which rests on reason is called rationalism; and when we have mentioned this word we feel at once that we are in a controversial atmosphere. A rationalist, in common speech, means one who applies to religious matters the same tests that he uses in judging the things of this world; and we assume, not always rightly, that he comes to negative conclusions.

I have shown that there is a rationalistic element in orthodox Catholicism, and we hear the charge of 'intellectualism' brought against the Greeks, against the schoolmen, and against philosophers of the school of Hegel. I do not think that the criticism is justified in the case of the later Greek teachers. The word *Nous*, which they used for the highest of our faculties, is carefully distinguished from the discursive reason, which has an honourable place, but not the highest. So much misunderstanding has been caused by translating *Nous* by 'intellect' or 'intelligence,' that I prefer to render it by 'spirit' when dealing with the later Platonists. The Christian Platonists, in fact, used *Pneuma* where their Pagan contemporaries used *Nous*.

The Schoolmen undoubtedly used their admirable logical training on the dogmas of religion, and often forgot that the concepts of religious thought cannot be manipulated like counters. But, if I may venture to speak with very scanty knowledge

of scholastic theology, I do not think that the contempt expressed for it by some Modernists is justified. I have read some of the modern Jesuit manuals, which follow the methods of St. Thomas Aquinas, with profit.

The Panlogism ascribed to Hegel is perhaps open to the charge of intellectualism, though I thoroughly dislike the word. The time has probably passed when these gradiose constructions could seem to have solved the riddle of the universe. There are, however, some powerful religious thinkers still among us who acknowledge a great debt to Hegel.

Rationalism suggests to most of us a type of religion which flourished especially in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. It has done valuable and necessary work in driving out the intruding forces of ecclesiastical authority from secular subjects. You will not have forgotten the amazing sentences which I read a few minutes ago from Cardinal Newman. But the claim to judge spiritual truth by what is called common sense, rejecting with scorn all that can be called mysticism, soon carries us out of religion properly so called. The rationalist may become a mere moralist, or he may write a book like Paley's *Evidences*, on which a Cambridge don pronounced a suitable epitaph when he said that Paley had the merit of reducing Christianity to a form eminently fitted for examination purposes.

The Cambridge Platonists, and especially Benjamin Whichcote, are full of the praises of Reason. From Whichcote's Aphorisms we may quote:

> 'A man has as much right to use his own understanding in judging of truth, as he has a right to use his own eyes to see the way.' 'He that gives reason for what he saith has done what is fit to be done and the most that can be done. He that gives no reason speaks nothing, though he saith never so much.'
>
> 'When the doctrine of the Gospel becomes the reason of our mind, it will be the principle of our life.' 'Reason discovers what is natural, and receives what is supernatural.'

Nevertheless, the Cambridge group were not rationalists in the ordinary sense, but devout disciples of the Platonists, in whose writings they had steeped themselves. Their aim is to establish the autonomy of the Christian faith as a self-evidencing religion of the Spirit. If Whichcote talks rather too much about Reason, without clearly defining what Reason means in spiritual matters, his friend John Smith, whose university sermons are perhaps

the best ever written, makes it abundantly clear that it is only the spiritually enlightened mind that can reason truly on divine things. He says:

> 'God is not better defined to us by our understandings than by our wills and affections. He is not only the eternal Reason, that almighty mind and wisdom which our understandings converse with; but He is also that unstained Beauty and Supreme Good which our wills are perpetually catching after; and wheresoever we find true Beauty, Love, and Goodness, we may say, here or there is God.' 'Reason in man being *Lumen de lumine,* a light flowing from the Fountain and Father of lights, it was to enable man to work out of himself all those notions of God which are the true ground-work of love and obedience to God, and conformity to Him; and in moulding the inward man into the greatest conformity to the nature of God was the perfection and efficacy of the religion of nature. But since man's fall from God, the inward virtue and vigour of Reason is much abated, the soul having suffered a *πτερορρύησις,* as Plato says, a *defluvium pennarum:* those principles of divine truth which were first engraven upon man's heart with the finger of God are now, as the characters of some ancient monuments, less clear and legible than at first. And therefore God hath provided the truth of divine revelation. . . But besides this outward revelation, there is also an inward impression of it, which is in a more special manner attributed to God. We cannot see divine things but in a divine light. . . He that made our souls in His own image and likeness can easily find a way into them. . . Thus it is God alone that acquaints the soul with the truths of revelation; and He also it is that does strengthen and raise the soul to better apprehensions even of natural truth, God being that in the intellectual world which the sun is in the sensible, as some of the ancient Fathers love to speak, and the ancient philosophers too, who meant God by their *Intellectus Agens,* whose proper work they supposed to be not so much to enlighten the object as the faculty.'

When we come to the Deists, we are sensible at once of a sharp fall of temperature. One of the first, Charles Blount, who says that

> 'Faith is like a piece of blank paper, on which you may write as well one miracle as another,'

protests that his own religion is based entirely on reason. He was modern enough to commit suicide because he was not allowed to marry his deceased wife's sister. Toland's *Christianity not Mysterious* made him famous. He is more interested in the content of Christianity than in the evidences for it. All that we are required to believe can be understood and proved. 'If by knowledge be meant understanding what is believed, I stand by it that Faith is knowledge.' Toland ended in a kind of pantheism. In nearly all these writers, and in their orthodox opponent Butler, there is a cool common sense which seems to belong to

ethics rather than to religion. After a time attention was concentrated on so-called evidences, and this era of arid rationalism came gradually to an end.

It may be worth while to compare St. Paul's words with the tones of these cultivated but unspiritual reasoners. 'My speech and preaching were not in persuasive words of wisdom, but in demonstration of the Spirit and of power; that your faith should not stand in the wisdom of men but in the power of God. Howbeit we speak wisdom among them that are perfect; yet a wisdom not of this world . . . but we speak the wisdom of God in a mystery, even the wisdom that hath been hidden, which God foreordained before the world unto our glory.' Spiritual wisdom, you see, is unchanging and eternal; it is communicated to us in types and shadows dim—in symbols—till we grow up into the power of understanding it. This wisdom is something very different from the dry rationalism, whether orthodox or deistic, of the eighteenth century. The writers of this period, on both sides, had forgotten the meaning of Faith. They wanted to prove Faith, not experimentally, but logically. This is just what cannot be done. They wanted to find a place for God in their scheme. But God is too big to be fitted into a frame. He is not one of the factors for which science has to account.

The upshot of the whole matter is that Faith leads us to a Reason above rationalism. Spiritual things are spiritually discerned. But whereas organized religion has spread its aegis over a multitude of beliefs which do not concern spiritual things, and which can be established or rebutted only by the natural understanding, we must be on our guard against insidious attempts to disparage the findings of Reason, or to oust it from its proper province. In spite of much recent philosophy, this is not a sceptical age; it is not an age when the triumphs of natural science and scholarship can be bowed out of court as irrelevant to the seeker after truth; it is not an age when the same event can be said to be true for faith but untrue for science. We must be humble, for we are compassed by mysteries, and our spiritual faculties are poor and dull; but we can be, and we must be, perfectly honest with ourselves and with others. As Harnack says: 'If piety should suffer in the process, there is a stronger interest than that of piety—namely, that of truth.'

WHY WE BELIEVE IN GOD

By the Rev. Alfred Caldecott, D.Litt., sometime Professor of Philosophy in King's College, London; author of *Philosophy of Religion in England*, 1901.

FOR the discharge of the weighty task laid upon me I must devise a limit. I will do so by making it a brief survey of what philosophy of religious belief in Britain in the quarter-century 1900-1925 has to show. For two reasons: (1) the Churchmen's Union's history covers that period; and (2) in 1900 I ventured to print a survey up to that time, which in so far as it was worth anything should enable me to discern prominent features in what has been done since that year.

First let me note the great volume of published thought which the period has produced. This has been partly due to improved mechanism for publication. The foundation of the Gifford Lectures in Scotland has, with a profusion scarcely Caledonian, provided four sets of lectures every year in addition to the Bamptons, Hulseans, and Boyles, which were limited to the clergy of the Church of England as expounders and defenders of Christian beliefs. Further, universities and colleges have established professorships or lectureships, and the subject has a place in the curricula of the degrees. And, in addition to reviews published by Christian Churches, the *Hibbert Journal* has provided an open arena for some hundreds of articles on religion from almost every possible aspect. It seems scarcely rash to suggest that never before in so brief a space of time has such a variety of the results of thinking upon religion been added to the literature of the world.

The first feature I would notice is a preliminary to constructive work by the advance made in removing an obstacle in the path of Theistic belief. The demurrer lodged on behalf of Science has been so effectively countered that it has been withdrawn by the leaders of science themselves, with few exceptions. Those who have given attention to the scope and method of the sciences have become content with acceptance of such limits as to preclude their dealing with the problem of Theism at all. Not

only has Materialism not produced a single new defender of any note in this period, but Science in the wider range which includes psychology and sociology has relinquished the claim to establish an all-sufficient Naturalism. Shortly before 1900 Lord Balfour's protest against Naturalism was followed by the heavy artillery of James Ward's Gifford Lectures, and successive delimitations of the scope of Science have proceeded from Pearson, Poynting, Soddy, Whitehead, and Rutherford, with parallel procedure across the Channel by Mach, Boutroux, and Poincaré. It is rare now to hear even echoes of the claim for self-sufficiency which arose in the first period of the acceptance of the idea of Evolution by science. The general attitude disclosed so attractively to us at our last year's Conference amounts to arrival at friendly association. And it is pleasant to note that it is in no way true that the change has come about because of the defeat or the bankruptcy of Science, but because of its solvency and prosperity within its own area. 'In the heroic age of Physics it has come to be realized that explanation, in the proper sense of the term, is the task of philosophy' (Hoernlé); and what is said of physics is scarcely less true of the other sciences, including the Humanist as well as the Natural.

There are several prominent classifications of the factors of religious belief. I have come to work by six; which, however, I will simply name now: the Traditional, the Rational, the Emotional, the Volitional, the Mystical, and the Revelational.

As to the first: I do not offer any estimate as to changes in this factor. This would require a study of the course of the historical religions, and of their influence, quite beyond the scope of this paper. Probably in the course of the Conference some judgments bearing upon it will find expression. Looking at Theistic belief as produced by the other factors, I select as the first feature of these twenty-five years the thought which has been devoted to working by the concept of *Value*.

The system of known existences is subjected to incessant enquiries as to the different degrees of worth which belong to the varied objects of our intellectual beliefs: mere existences are not enough: we seek values on different levels. On the lowest level, as satisfying our primary appetites, desires and impulses, lie concrete values of multifarious kinds; then arise

such levels as the comforts, enjoyments and graces of life; and above these a level, later in genesis but superior in quality, which methodical study has agreed to summarize as Moral and Æsthetic, taking their place side by side with the Intellectual. And above these, Christian Theists emphatically, but other Theists also, acknowledge Religious value with a character of its own, as Professor Webb so vigorously claimed at our Conference last year.

The movement towards the method of Values had been going on all through the nineteenth century. It is latent in Kant, and had been made explicit by Lotze, as our President pointed out last year. But Lotze had not done more than set value-judgments side by side with judgments of existence, and left them there. By the close of the century Sidgwick had declared that it had become 'the final and most important task of Philosophy to connect fact and ideal in some rational and satisfactory manner.' And so we find the majority of British workers in the philosophy of religion marching together in the employment of Values. But with varying estimates. Amongst them some, *e.g.*, Pringle-Pattison, are able to assign only 'adjectival' status to values; Professor Sorley cautiously suggests that we may at least venture on making trial of superiority; while Professor Taylor asserts that 'the conviction that what is has its source and explanation in what ought to be is the central thought of all philosophical Theism'; Professors Alexander and Lloyd Morgan hold that the value-system is as fundamental in the spiritual order as the space-time system in the natural; and Bishop Temple thinks that the contest for equality is closed.

Thinking out from the standpoint that values have no equal as determinants of belief, and especially from the consideration of the highest values, there has issued a stream of vindications of the beliefs which take form in Theism. Not, indeed, in a single form of Theism, as the reader of the next paper will show, but with a firm nucleus of concordant features.

Partly as a consequence of the value-theory, and partly from other impulses, we see in this twenty-five years an increase of *Personalism* all over the idealistic area. This must have been so, as the concept of values requires combination of the emotional and the volitional factors along with the cognitional:

and, further, perpetual insistence on their working in a totality which is never separated into independently-acting constituents as the requirements of our thinking and speaking about them lead us at times to seem to mean. Emotions without influence, passionless volitions, and totally disinterested cognitions are of course unreal. And this Personalist character of belief has told with prominent effect in the area of religious beliefs. Conspicuously in these we really are concerned, not with beliefs, but with believers. As in cognition we strive to replace ignorance and conjecture by knowledge, so as persons we strive to gain values from our life in the cosmos in which we are placed. This status of personality dominating the thought of our period tells with conspicuous impressiveness when we turn to the supreme issue of Theism. The place of Personality in Theistic belief is far from being agreed upon, however. Some Idealists limit it to finite spirit; others so define it as to render it applicable to infinite spirit also. I venture on the estimate that in recent thought there is greatest support for the position that the concept is valid for both : in short, for God as for man, and for the relationship between them which constitutes the religious life.

The next feature of our period I take to be the re-vindication of the *Mystical* element in religious belief. A definition of Mysticism I will not attempt : Dr. Inge offered us twenty-six at the beginning of this period, and more have come to hand since. This factor, though never non-existent, had for some time sunk below the surface upon which men of sanity and understanding moved through life, even in religion. For these, where Reason was insufficient, there was Revelation to resort to; if that also failed, Agnosticism lay open. But in the nineteenth century there were outbreaks of Mysticism in Coleridge and Wordsworth, Carlyle and Emerson, though for the latter this did not lead to Theism. Within the Christian Churches it came to the surface in Maurice and Westcott, in Martineau (as I hold) and Illingworth. But the full recognition of Mysticism I should assign to our President's Bampton Lectures of 1899 on Christian Mysticism. Here, both by his exposition of its long history in the past, and by his own criticisms and valuations, it was laid upon the threshold of the Church of the twentieth century. Concurrently, the admirable American psychologist, William

James, was preparing his Gifford Lectures on the *Varieties of Religious Experiences* (published 1902), in which he presented a mass of experiences collected from many sources, but, it must be said, of very unequal value and too frequently of a pathological kind; yet with effective impressiveness as a whole. Henceforward the Christian believer inclined to Mysticism was relieved from the fear of being charged with unorthodoxy on the one hand, or of being fantastic in his psychology on the other. In 1908 came the vindication, based upon massive learning and rare insight for the profound amongst the superficial, by Baron von Hügel. Then rapidly followed Miss Underhill's successive studies, both expository and independent. Besides these special vindications, it has come about in this period that neither theologian nor philosopher attempts to treat of religious belief without at least examining the claims of Mysticism: nearly always with great respect, and very frequently with more or less degree of acceptance.

The first task of exponents of Mysticism arises from the unfortunate circumstances of its previous history. The name, and with it much of the popular view of its meaning, had been captured for mental experiences of a different kind and value. Abnormal and often pathological exaggerations of nervous conditions, of simply sensational experiences, of fanciful constructions, or of emotional vagaries, have been its supposed constituents: visions, auditions, ecstasies, even mere hysteria and intoxications. These weedy growths have had to be cleared away, and very effectively this has been done. No one is competent now to speak on this subject who is not aware of the thorough pruning which has taken place, but who still charges religious Mysticism with the load of the excrescences which have attached themselves as parasites to the genuine experiences upon which it takes its stand.

In this purificatory work the exponents of Mysticism have had great assistance from the remarkable extensions of scientific psychology in our period. These extensions have enabled them to hand over to psychological explanation a great variety of the extraordinary mental facts alluded to, and to present the phenomena which carry a religious significance quite separated off from such associations.

The literature of Mysticism during our period has been prolific in several ways. There has been extensive republication of the choicest writings of the great Mystics of the past. Names which had been forgotten have been brought into view again: their writings have been studied critically and comparatively, whether on a large scale such as those of Plotinus and St. Catherine of Genoa, or such precious miniatures as those of our own countrymen, Richard Rolle, the Lady Julian, and Traherne. And besides such as have won their place expressly as Mystics, our attention has been drawn to the vast number of men and women in whom the Mystical element was only one feature among the others which have given them their fame. Miss Spurgeon's little book on *Mysticism in English Literature* does this admirably for Shelley, Keats, Browning, Tennyson, Emily Brontë, for example.

In another direction these publications of our twenty-five years have cleared out of the way that other mis-shapen Mysticism which leads to it as signifying the absorption of many individuals in One Supreme. It is, of course, true that this tendency has been widespread, but we know enough to see that it is a misconception quite alien to the interpretations given by the leading minds, in intention if not always in accomplishment.

It should be understood that Mysticism professes to deal with phenomena which are not extra-natural. They are extraordinary in the sense of being rare. But not only do they belong to man's spiritual nature, but nothing belongs to it with so central a right. Further, they are credited by critical and competent observers with belonging conspicuously to minds in full health and of great vigour in the areas of reason and morals and art. This is traceable in minds of quite ordinary stature, but it has been made prominently clear in the characters of men and women whom general judgment acclaims as geniuses or saints. In these there has been manifested, not a narrowing, but a broadening of mental life; not a disintegration, but a consolidation of mental powers and faculties; not a perturbation, but a calm and a serenity due to the ordering of constituents and elements round a centre. This is true for religious beliefs as well as for religious life in other ways. And it tells with great force in favour of the personal Theism in which so great

a succession of Christian Mystics concur in expressing their ultimate belief.

Of course we must be careful not to think of Mysticism, even in its most eminent exemplars, as meaning a knowledge of Deity in His fullness given in a single expression, however central and profound. It is only claimed that there are direct experiences each of which opens an aspect or gives a contact; but the fullness is only to be thought of as at the end of a long Mystic Way: and indeed no high Mystic thinks of it as attained, or attainable, in the present sphere of the life of the spirit.

In this period, when the comparative study of religions has made many gains, it is helpful to Christian believers to have learnt that the Mystical element has a place even in religions which have been supposed to have no place for it. For example, within the Hinduism which has been presented to us as so largely a production of misdirected abstraction or of disordered fancy, we are assured that Mysticism of an ordered and healthy type lies in the deeper reaches of the stream. Surely Theism of profound and ultimate character, even though not agreeing with ours as to Personality, is signified in the words of the Professor of Philosophy at Calcutta when he writes, 'Brahman is envisaged in Divine Self-Consciousness; and throughout its long career the oneness of the ultimate Spirit has been the governing idea of the Hindu religion.' That Buddhism has been chiefly regarded as negative and agnostic in regard to Theism is probably due to imperfect apprehension of it by Western students, themselves impregnated with eighteenth and early nineteenth century conceptions, whilst it is being brought out by Buddhists themselves that it aims at the liberation of a deeper self towards communion with a Reality which has many characteristics of Deity.

The markedly Deistic character of official Islam does not cover its whole ground: the Sufi type has always been within our knowledge, but we have had recently from Dr. Nicholson and others opportunity of being acquainted with a mass of Islamic Mystical literature—poetical and speculative as well as religious. Parallel opportunity has been given for recognition of a continuous stream of Mysticism in Judaism. Even with Confucianism it may be suspected that there are deeper ponder-

ings than the Western expositors upon whom we have chiefly relied have had the faculty for discovering.

It remains to ask, What has been the course of thought as to there being also a Revelational feature in religious belief?

There is a sense in which every fact is a revelation, every enlightened belief an inspiration. But, besides this usage, Revelation is employed to designate disclosures of concrete truths apart from our ordinary experiences, and it has been almost universal to claim that some such disclosures occupy an important place in the formation of Theistic belief. Some have assigned the whole of Theism to such revelations : but the majority of Theists have asked only for recognition of some revelational elements operating concurrently with the usual factors.

As I read the literature of our twenty-five years I find that there is increased ground for our recognizing both the possibility and the fact of special revelations. The value-theory, with its prominent reference to degrees and variety of values, opens out the likelihood of fresh values being disclosed to us, and appreciated by us, from time to time. The acknowledgment of *Emergents* is as prominent in the massive philosophy of Professor Alexander as in the wide-ranging science of Professor Lloyd Morgan, as well as in Bergson. If, then, new values do, as a matter of history, emerge—that is, are not mere effects or re-arrangements of those already presented — and if they cannot be regarded as self-originating, resort to Theistic explanation is plainly offered to our choice.

Further, the advance of Personalism is in accord with the increased acknowledgement that History shows many degrees of Inspiration in individual minds. However much we may have expected or desired to find equality among men, we do not find it. On the contrary, insight in perceptive powers and energy in activity are unequally distributed : broadly, the many learn from and follow the few. This is accepted as true in the areas of the sciences and philosophy, of art, and of practical life; and it is conspicuously true in the area of religious beliefs and of religious life generally. And not only inequality as between individuals, but as to groups, national and racial, as

shewn in the history of religions. The history of Mysticism especially shows inequality and variety of spiritual endowment.

Hence the concept of Inspiration arises naturally in our minds; and the correlative concept of Revelation stands waiting to be invoked.

The acceptance of special Revelations does not, however, prevent us from surrounding them with the idea of universality as the ideal. The wish that 'all the Lord's people should be prophets'; the goal 'till we all come to the unity of the faith,' express the ultimate ideals. But in the present age or order this is not what is found. Only, those who receive abundantly must be deemed not to be favoured as by privilege, but to be honoured by appointment to vocation; to be centres of radiation of the Spirit in the world around them.

In conclusion. I have presented the thought of the last twenty-five years in Britain as marked by at least five important influences upon the answer to the question set to me—why we believe in God.

The acquiescence of *Science* in limitations which prevent interference with the areas of philosophical and of religious belief;

The increasing adoption of judgment by *Values*, supporting what I cannot but think has been at least an undercurrent in religious belief at all times;

The increase of confidence in the supremacy of the concept of *Personality;*

The extension of the area of spiritual Experience by inclusion of sane and healthy *Mystical experiences*, whether sporadic or systematized;

And the extensive, though not universal, reading of the history of Religions as disclosing within revelations of the universal kind, *special Revelations* which have increased man's knowledge of God and given fresh inspirations to the religious life.

WHAT WE BELIEVE ABOUT GOD

By the Rev. J. S. Bezzant, M.A., Vice-Principal of Ripon Hall, Oxford.

THE ultimate problem of religion is concerned with the nature of God. What men are able or unable to believe about the nature of God ultimately determines whether or not they believe in God. If it be true that 'such as men themselves are, such will God appear to them to be,' it is equally true that men tend to become such as they really believe the nature of God to be. To this question men's thoughts are turned and are turning at the present time. For the younger generation, the main obstacles to religious belief are not concerned with the familiar difficulties of the Gospels, such as the virginal birth and the physical resurrection, or even with the problem of the Person of Jesus Christ. The former seem to them to be relatively unimportant, and of the latter they feel that little is likely to be said which shall be at once final and true. They are anxious about those much more fundamental beliefs which concern the providence of God and His action in the world to-day. They can find little or no evidence that He does anything. They are uncertain what the Church means to teach; her teaching seems to them inconsistent and self-contradictory; they are only certain that they disbelieve much of which her formularies appear to say and much of what the Bible seems to imply. The character of God, His power, His love, and His present relation to the world and the individual—these are the problems to which Christian theologians must give increasing attention if they are to appeal to or help those to whom these vital matters are too obviously open questions.

It seems to us in approaching the problem of the being and nature of God that authoritarian and traditional lines are more than usually barren. We meet with a vast store of learning and speculation, characterized by amazing ingenuity, but which leaves the foundations of the matter untouched, inasmuch as we feel that it is largely an artificial creation designed to support dogmatic positions which, as a matter of history, were originally formulated on much less data than we possess to-day. The

growth and great success of scientific method, and particularly the theory of Evolution, has involved a new approach to the facts of life which is experimental and empirical. If, in religion, the empirical cannot take us very far, it provides us with a reliable foundation for our inferences, and we believe that the experimental method can take us as far as the dogmatic, and with greater security. The question for us, in regard to any doctrine, is not: Why should this not be believed? but rather: Why should it be asserted? If we have to be content with a large measure of agnosticism, this allows for ventures of faith, and is not only wiser, but more in keeping with the spirit of the Christian religion than is anything which suggests pretence to knowledge which we do not possess.

Those who attended the Modern Churchmen's Conference of last year, or read its report, must have been impressed by the witness of learned scientists to the fact that they find material and mechanical categories inadequate to explain existence. It is very easy, and therefore very usual, for theologians to draw inferences from this kind of testimony which go far beyond what it can or is intended to bear; but when scientists, shirking no difficulty, find evidence everywhere of a directive tendency which may, at least analogically, be called Purpose, then we may say that science is no longer hostile to theism, even though as science it does not, and by reason of its self-chosen limitations cannot, give much positive testimony to that religious or philosophical inference. Some there are, like Mr. Julian Huxley, who cannot admit what they and the theologians call theism, but attention to their writings sometimes reveals the fact that it is the word rather than the idea of God that is absent. Others, like Dr. J. S. Haldane and Professor Lloyd Morgan, commit themselves more definitely. At our last Conference the former spoke of 'the spiritual Reality of our Universe—the Reality which men call God,'[1] and the latter said that there is no event of which, in its passage through time and space, we dare to say that it has no spiritual significance. He also speaks of the scientific approach to religion, though only an approach, yet as 'one that is consonant with religious experience,'[2] and more recently has ack-

[1] *Report*, p. 279 (*The Modern Churchman*, Sept., 1924).
[2] *Report*, p. 293.

nowledged that he attributes 'the whole sweep of evolutionary advance to Spiritual Agency.'[3] We do not wish to build too much upon this, but only to emphasize that where it is held that the evolutionary process witnesses to a Spiritual Agency behind and within it, which religion calls God, then the God thus revealed is a God of power, not indeed of capricious power, yet nevertheless so vast that all human analogies must be confessed to be but symbols; also God thus revealed is of surpassing majesty, and that a majesty of beauty; in great things as in small, the Universe is simply crammed with beauty. Whatever else for other reasons and from other sources we may come to believe about God, we cannot but hold fast to the evidence of His power and His majesty as revealed in the works of His hands. To us, more than to the Psalmist, the heavens declare the glory of God, and the firmament sheweth His handiwork. Nevertheless, it is to be noted that our belief about God as derived from the study of nature, is inferential. We believe our inferences to be valid inferences. But inasmuch as we believe God to be unconditioned by time and space, we thereby acknowledge that He transcends thought and cannot be comprehended in thought, but that in Himself He remains unknowable.

If God cannot be comprehended in thought, and is therefore in that sense unknowable, this does not mean that He is unknown. The history of religion is the long story of man's desire to commune with God in the conviction that it is possible to do so. Nor in the light of the phenomena provided by the moral and religious consciousness is there anything irrational in believing that man can be aware of a Reality which transcends thought, even as his own life is much more than thought. Inasmuch as man can act and perceive beauty as well as think, we believe that these, equally with thought and not resolvable into it, are ways of approach to God; and as religion is concerned not only with thoughts, acts, and experiences, but also with their values, it is better to represent God Who is the object of religion, under the irreducible ideals of Wisdom, Love, Righteousness, Truth and Beauty, rather than in definite intellectual concepts which, confessedly inadequate, nevertheless all too readily tend to become mental idols. It is but lost labour when men try to injure religion

[3] See *Evolution in the Light of Modern Knowledge*, p. 162.

by arguing that God is unknowable; religion suffers a greater injury when men are presented with a theology which seems to imply that God is much better known than He really is.

If in attempting to state what we believe about God the metaphors which we are obliged to use are dangerous because of their tendency to harden and therefore to result in mythology and superstition, so also the widespread and time-honoured use of negatives is of little value.[4] Every negative statement must imply a positive of which it is the negation, and if that positive transcends our conception and cannot be understood, the use of the negative tells us nothing. Indeed, it seems that the only way in which the Godhead can, in default of adequate concepts, be expressed in forms of thought at all, is by the affirmation of apparently contradictory conceptions such as transcendence and immanence. This is attractive to many minds, and appears to give us what we want, but as the mind cannot at the same time think two contradictory ideas, and can only hold them in succession, this method is a frank confession that the Reality as a whole cannot be thought at all. Thus we hold on the one hand that the Divine nature in its plenitude, and the mode of the Divine existence, is unknowable, and can only be expressed in symbols from which it is folly to draw logical deductions; but on the other hand, we believe God to be that Reality of which man's moral and religious consciousness is aware, the Reality which is the meeting-place of our highest values and ideals of the Wise, the Loving, the Righteous, the Beautiful and the True. If we may not know God as He is in Himself, we may know what He is to us, and if we can claim this knowledge to be true so far as it goes, that is sufficient for a working faith. Further, we believe the knowledge of God thus gained to be more direct and less inadequate than that derived from the study of physical nature, though not really separable from it. For whatever Power has produced the Universe has also produced man with all his aspirations, his values, and his ideals. To set man and his values over against the material creation as a kind of by-product of no essential value, is only possible on the perverse assumption that the lower is more real than the higher.

[4] It is a pleasure to acknowledge that here, as frequently in this paper, the form of anything that is of value is largely due to Mr. G. F. Allen, of Ripon Hall.

We recognize the danger of anything like anthropolatry, but anthropolatry is more rational than materialism. Man and his ideals exist, and are demonstrably as real as anything else, and if man is able increasingly to realize his ideals in practice, and in the formation of character, he can do so only by understanding and using the means with which the Universe, which has also produced him, provides him. We are thus justified in thinking of the nature of the Power behind the Universe in the light of the highest it has produced; and where shall we find that save in the creatures possessed of the mystery called consciousness by which deep calls unto deep—in those who are conscious that they can apprehend that Reality by which they feel themselves to be apprehended? If God's nature is revealed anywhere, it will be in human nature at its highest and best, and there we shall see the revelation in the highest form we can understand. 'For we cannot know what God is till we see Him incarnating His Spirit in man.'[5] This, for us, is precisely the true significance of the person and life of Jesus Christ; for us, the fundamental importance of the New Testament is that it reveals a new conception of the nature of God and the effect of this upon the first generations of Christians. When we claim that Jesus reveals to us the nature of God supremely, we mean just this: that in so far as His life and ideals are not only understood and pondered intellectually, but are set as the practical guide of human conduct, we arrive at a richer and more worthy conception of the nature of God than this world elsewhere affords.

Accepting then the Christian revelation, we believe of the God of Whom we infer from nature to be of surpassing power and majesty, that His inmost nature is Love. Mr. Emmet used frequently to emphasize the fact that Jesus, in speaking of God, not only used the term Father, but that He used no other. This conviction dominated the whole outlook, life and teaching of Jesus. For Him, God was not, as on Sinai, a terror to evil-doers, but the great Inspirer to active good. This lies at the basis of His morality which awakens in the heart the inward 'Thou shalt' to replace the written 'Thou shalt not.' It was because He knew God as Love, and conceived it under the image of Fatherhood,

[5] See Dr. J. M. Wilson's *Christ's Thought of God*, p. 45—a valuable little book, not nearly so well known as it deserves to be.

that He taught that the kingdom or rule of God was within the heart. He saved men by awakening within them the sense of their Sonship to a Divine Father. It is just this fundamental doctrine that men need to assimilate and to teach. Higher than it we cannot rise, and we are very far indeed from having reached that height; because it appears paradoxical it remains unassimilated on the surface of men's minds, while they attempt to hold it side by side with other ideas of God which are inconsistent with it, and opposed to it. For centuries its significance has been almost entirely obscured by the crude and dreadful doctrine of everlasting punishment, as well as by the fact that most of the popular metaphors of God have their origin in that type of military and political civilization with which Europe has been far too long familiar. It is little wonder if, in a world the basis of which is becoming increasingly economic, that sort of God appears as an anachronism, and has little influence. It also affords us a warning of the present danger of giving an economic or even a scientific twist to the character of God. Similarly, as F. D. Maurice argued, the conception of the Fatherhood of God should supersede the old thought of His relationship to man expressed in the metaphors of contract and covenant. These, and the imagery taken from royal courts, terribly distort the truth as Christ saw it, while nothing could be further from His thought of God, as revealed in the parable of the Prodigal Son, than the popular image of God as a superhuman despot, angry at man's disobedience and threatening dire punishment. Nor have we any part or lot in a conception of God which thinks of Him as desiring to be propitiated by sacrifice. We recognize the almost universal religious instinct to offer propitiation, and it is quite rational where the thought of God falls below what we are stressing as the essential Christian revelation. When that is understood, all that is of value in the instincts prompting to propitiation is included and transcended in the passionate desire for complete self-sacrifice which inevitably follows when a man is awakened to the nature of sin in the light of the love of God. When it is admitted, as it is by Bishop Gore, that God needs no propitiation to make Him willing to forgive, we must add that we cannot think of Him as desiring that which He does not need. The whole thought of propitiation calls for the frankest abandon-

ment. It distorts our whole conception of God and provides us with no compensating value whatsoever. When we say that Jesus reveals to us the true nature of God, we bear in mind not only what He taught and what His life was like, but also what He did not teach, and what He Himself was not. Christ's revelation of the nature of God is the most distinctive thing in Christianity, and it is our task to allow it to sink into our minds, to fathom its implications and make our theology express them, and rigidly to exclude the addition of other thoughts of God which distort, obstruct and obscure this, or render it ineffective—thoughts which appeal to the lower and more primitive instincts in us, such as the type of fear which it is the function of perfect love to cast out.

Very closely connected with, and indeed included in, the all-embracing thought of God as love, is our belief that He is righteous, claiming righteousness in us in our relations to Him and to one another. The Old Testament shows with what difficulty this attribute was ascribed to God, but insistence on it is nevertheless characteristic of all that is best in the Bible. Nor can we doubt that the categorical imperative of the deliverances of our moral consciousness is the most convincing revelation we have within us of the character of God. These are the very thoughts of God; not that God is bound by the detailed rules of human life, but that the ultimate principles of our moral judgment express His nature and apply to Him as they do to us.

Belief in the nature of God as loving and righteous brings us at once against the most formidable of all difficulties, namely, how to reconcile this conception of Him with the pain and evil in the world. Our moral consciousness assures us that pain is a bad and sin a worse evil, and by no ingenuity can they be thought to be anything else. The difficulty is increased by the usual ascription to God of omnipotence, as also when we claim, as we do, that our belief about the nature of God as loving and righteous is revealed in Holy Scripture. There can be little doubt that the war finally killed even popular belief in the cataclysmic and the miraculous as present methods of God's working. To the question, 'Why did not God stop the wickedness of the war?' it is dangerously easy to frame a reply, having the appearance of logic, designed to shew that the question is unreasonable. But the fact remains that, in the Bible, men see

God acting visibly in human affairs, and their own experience of life forces them to doubt whether God in fact ever did so act, and if He did then, why He no longer does so. I cannot do more than indicate briefly the only way in which I think these difficulties can be met. In the first place we must say frankly that the Biblical stories of cataclysmic interferences with the natural order are in some cases very dramatic interpretations by the moral and religious consciousness, of natural and fortunate events; in others that they are not history at all, but myth. To-day, we are compelled to teach that any hope of such interventions is vain. Secondly, we make no pretence to having a wholly satisfactory answer to the problem of evil. Our belief in a loving and righteous God is an act of faith and not a piece of knowledge; a reasonable faith that ultimately God will justify the highest values the Universe has produced. If it be granted as at all conceivable that God's purpose may be the shaping of human souls through conflict and conquest of uncertainty, difficulty, pain and evil, souls which shall have learnt to refuse the evil and to choose the good, then evil must necessarily exist, and the Universe is not ill-adapted for that purpose. In that case pain and evil are means to a greater good, only to be attained by the conquest of them; not that they cease to be evil, but that they as well as good should exist will ultimately be seen to have been a good. The problem should not be left exclusively to the sphere of thought. He Who taught us to think of God as a loving Father, Himself encountered in a terrible form most of the experiences which have led men to deny the goodness and the love of God. It has frequently been pointed out that God's nature cannot be understood or justified merely by thinking about it; it is not capable of that sort of demonstration, and it is, for the most part, when we merely look on at the pain and evil of the world, that we think of God as doing likewise. But if Christ reveals to us the nature of God, this means that the Divine nature shares in the world's sorrow, and that not merely as a temporary incident in a certain historical situation. It reveals the eternal character of a God Who suffers and Who shares in the travail of the creative process. Whatever may be thought of this, and admittedly it goes beyond what we can claim as a certainty, I am sure that, when doubt on this fundamental matter has once arisen, it is only when we have accepted Christ's

revelation of God as our *working* hypothesis, and our governing principle, that we can come to understand His nature and His name as Love. In the end, we only *know* what we arrive at by our own experience.

The use of the word omnipotence as an attribute of God should be dropped. It is too apt to give a wrong conception of the Divine government of the world. The term all-ruling is much better. This does not mean that we set up some other power external to God and independent of Him, by which He is conditioned and limited. We believe that He possesses all the power there is. But we can see only absurdity in supposing that God has power to act in conflict with His own nature. No one supposes that God can change the past, and, as Dr. Rashdall used to insist, it may well be no limitation of God if He is unable to evolve highly organized beings without there being a struggle for existence, or to train human souls in the practice of virtue without allowing the existence of pain and sin. The popular thought of omnipotence can hardly be freed from arbitrary associations, and merely leads to difficulties. If we can best think of God in terms of our ideal values, we must suppose that these exist by and express His will, of which Holiness rather than Freedom (in the sense of being able to act in conflict with these values) is the dominant characteristic. The conception of God as Love does restrict the idea of omnipotence; we can conceive of means which omnipotence might take to achieve ends, which we cannot conceive that love would employ. Omnipotence is rather a relic of the time when God was chiefly useful for military purposes, than of any use in the modern world or as adding anything of value to the distinctively Christian idea of God.

Again, the thought of God as Love, imaged in a Fatherhood that dealeth with us as with sons, has been in the past much obscured by a conception of Him which resembled a judge of assize, though this latter metaphor is tending to disappear with the abandoning of an untenable eschatology which Christianity inherited from Judaism. The overwhelming evidence which led to and justifies the doctrine of Evolution has given to man a wider grasp of the creative process; this, together with what we may reasonably regard as the end of human life upon our earth, has rendered the old idea of judge and judgment unreal.

It is a case where, with a little effort, the facts themselves are as capable of being understood as are the symbols which used to express them. Instead of a judge, we think of God as a creator whose faithfulness is everlasting. It may be, as Dr. Tennant has lately insisted,[6] that 'of laws which never shall be broken' we know nothing; but of laws which never are broken we know a great deal, in the only sense in which we can be said to know anything. These laws express the will of God, and He does not change them. If the study of the evolutionary process leads us to belief in God at all, it is in a God Who abideth faithful. The deeper men dig into the secrets of nature the wider and vaster becomes the range in which cause and effect are found in unvarying sequence, and the problem of change resolves itself into the question: Why is there any evolution at all? All that is of religious value in the idea of God as judge can be found alike in the world and in our own experience. It is that sin, which is lawlessness, the failure to act in accordance with the highest that we know, is inevitably tracked by consequence of loss and disaster. Not necessarily material loss, for moral and spiritual loss are quite compatible with material gain. Every man who is morally and spiritually awake is aware that loss is tied to sin, and that we may not mistake the Divine mind upon it. The world which includes the world of values, speaks to us of a faithful Creator Who has set His face against evil, and Whose judgments as expressed therein are by no means to be bought off; though in so far as we strive to live in accordance with the highest values, there is in the world a Power to aid us, which enables us to endure the consequences of sin, and by so doing to rise above both the consequences and the sins. The knowledge that temporal acts have eternal and inevitable issues inspires us with a type of fear which no sane man would wish to repudiate, but which, for its reality and operation does not depend on the maintenance of such crude metaphors as the wrath of God or of God as a judge. The only possible value in such metaphors is that they, like Jehovah in the Old Testament, can easily be pictured in the imagination, whereas an effort is needed to think

[6] See *Miracle and its Philosophical Presuppositions*. Dr. Tennant argues that while the *a priori* possibility of miracles cannot be ruled out, miracles are nevertheless devoid of all evidential value, since testimony to fact cannot reach to divine agency. The book concedes all that Modernists have any interest in claiming.

of a more spiritual idea of God; but the only alternative to making the effort is an unworthy conception of God, which in time inevitably results in unbelief. If we bear in mind what nature reveals to us of the power and majesty of God, and remind ourselves that though the New Testament reveals to us the Fatherhood of God, it nevertheless represents Christ's ideal as a desire to establish the kingship or rule of God, this will prevent our conception of His Love and Fatherhood from degenerating into that of a merely tolerant benevolence.

The problem of God's relation to Creation is really the old problem of time. We cannot conceive of time before the creation of the means by which alone we know and measure time. Yet we can give no intelligible meaning to the word 'creation,' except that by it something comes to be which was not. As the nature of Love is to create, probably the best we can do is to think of creation as an activity essential to the nature of God and therefore co-eternal with Him. That is to say, He is the *alpha* and *omega* of all existence, which is implied in the very idea of God. Our inability to give any more intelligible content to the thought of God as 'Creator' serves to remind us of our inability to comprehend the non-spatial and the non-temporal, and the word is chiefly of use in reminding us that we do not identify God and the world. We are not pantheists: we hold that the world and ourselves depend, every moment of our existence, upon the creative will of God, Who has not exhausted Himself in His creation, which is not essential to His *existence*, though it probably is essential to his *nature* as love. We do not say that the world is as necessary to God as God is to the world; but if He is love, we must think of Him as indwelling and sharing the life of His creation, in its joys and in its sorrows; otherwise love is no more love. We do not believe in a Divine nature described in our dogmatic formularies as impassible, incapable of suffering. On the other hand, our knowledge that the future of human life upon this earth is finite, forces us to believe either that God and the world of values have a reality of existence independent of, however closely connected with, the seen and temporal, or else God and all our values are but names for ideals which must ultimately be fruitless.

As there are objections to the term omnipotence, so there are to omniscience, though they are less obvious, particularly as

this attribute seems to follow as a necessary consequence from any thought of God's love as extending to the individual. But the popular idea of omniscience is by no means the highest ideal of knowledge, and we cannot attribute to God a lower ideal than we set before ourselves. The highest ideal of knowledge is truth, and a grasp of Reality. We see no reason to suppose that for the Eternal Mind knowledge consists in knowing the infinite number of possibly connected, probably disconnected, facts and events which occur in the temporal series, but rather we think of the Divine knowledge as the true understanding of all Reality of which all events in the temporal series are but broken lights. The popular idea of omniscience either complicates the problem of free-will beyond hope of solution, or else and more probably settles it negatively. That all past and all future history should be present to the mind of God is not necessarily required by religion: religion demands that God should be the ultimate Reality and the source of those laws which give coherence, meaning and reality to history and to present events in the world of time.

Similarly the term omnipresence is open to objection. If it is allowed to convey any clear idea at all, the idea is a bad one, for it inevitably introduces spatial conceptions into the idea of God. It suggests that God, as Spirit, is everywhere present like a finely-diffused gas, or like the ether. Certainly it lends itself too readily to pantheism of the lower kind. The truth in the thought of God as omnipresent is sufficiently, and much better, indicated in the advice of S. T. Coleridge. 'Do not say that God is everywhere, but rather wherever I am, I am in the presence of God.' The objection to these metaphysical terms is that they misrepresent God to ordinary men, and require so much *mis*interpretation if they are to be made intelligible and capable of defence. We are aware that they receive such treatment by learned theologians, but it would be far better simply to drop them. To-day we are overburdened with such language, and theology is largely a science for the explanation of terms which do not mean what they appear to say.

The doctrine of the Trinity, it would be generally agreed, is rather a speculation as to the nature of the Being of God than a necessary representation of God as known to religious experience. Undoubtedly experience led to its formulation, commen-

cing with the experience of the first Christians of the historic Jesus, followed by their experience that His Spirit remained an active factor in their lives after the withdrawal of His visible appearance. Theologians admit that the doctrine of the Trinity is an inadequate statement of the Divine mode of existence; as all such statements must be, it is but a symbol. To the non-theological or unphilosophical mind, in so far as the doctrine has any meaning, it is held as something indistinguishable from Tritheism. Nor is there any escape from that position if the word 'Person' in the statement 'three Persons in One God' is taken to bear its meaning to modern ears, namely, an individual or separate consciousness or mind. We cannot here trace the complicated history and significance of the terminology employed in formulating the doctrine.[7] It must suffice to say that for us, God is One Mind. For us, the doctrine of the Trinity means that God is known to us in three ways: through nature, in Christ, and in conscience. It enables us to say that Christ shares in the reality which God is. It also symbolizes our faith that ultimately the study of the world, of man, and of philosophy will not lead to contradictory results. It helps us to understand our experience of God as Immanent in the world and in our own hearts, and yet Transcendant and far above us; and this is most certainly required by that awareness of a Reality which transcends thought, of which we believe man to be capable. We do not believe that the acceptance of the doctrine of the Trinity makes it any more possible than it would otherwise be, to comprehend God in formal thought.

It remains to ask in what sense we believe God to be personal. If it be granted that the creative process everywhere, or even in part, gives evidence of purpose, and that on an immeasurably grander scale than any human analogy can represent, then, as we only know of directive purpose in connection with personality, we must believe that God is at least personal as we know personality. It is also certain that the religious consciousness cannot conceive the relation of God to the soul as less than a personal relationship. If we find in the experience of life a power not ourselves which makes for righteousness, we may let Dr. Rashdall remind us that *things* do not make for righteous-

[7] Perhaps the best summary is to be found in Professor Clement Webb's *God and Personality*, Lecture II.

ness. It is difficult to understand in what sense we can ascribe personality, as alone we can conceive it, to a Spirit and a Life which is immanent in creation, and yet transcending it, but there is no reason why we may not speak of God as super-personal provided that that does not imply, as it often does, something less than personality as we know it. Traditional theology, as Professor Webb reminds us, has never treated Personality as the primary attribute of God, and has thought less of the personality *of* God than of personality *in* God. Religion requires a God with whom man can come into personal relationship: it does not claim that the nature of God is exhausted in that relationship.

We conclude that what we believe about God is least inadequately represented by saying that He is the Reality in which our highest ideals of Wisdom, Love, Righteousness, Beauty, and Truth, have their ground and being; that it is in these ideals which, like Himself, cannot be explained in words, that we least unworthily conceive Him. God cannot be known to thought alone, but only as He stands in relation to the whole man, to our whole personality, which includes the moral and the religious consciousness as well as the intellectual. This belief about God is confirmed by the Christian revelation of Him as Loving and Righteous. The metaphysical and intellectual attributes which are often ascribed to God, such as Immutability, Impassibility, Omnipotence, Omniscience and Omnipresence, either tell us nothing at all, or else if, by misinterpretation, they are made to mean something, they are either included in our highest values or are inconsistent with them. We must recognize that the Divine government of the world is by laws, which, so far as experience goes, are not set aside or overridden, and that these express the will of God, which is highest and best. Finally, we remember that Christ's revelation of God was not so much in word as in Himself. We know God when we find Him around and within. Christ's knowledge of God is possible only to those who share Christ's life and spirit, and that way to knowledge is not easy. But the issue of the discipline and the struggle involved can be expressed in the words of our President, in a question which needs no answer:

> 'Do we know of any who have sought after the knowledge of God as diligently as other men seek after wealth and honour, and have come away empty-handed?'

MAN—HIS NATURE

By the Rev. J. C. Hardwick, M.A., B.Sc., Vicar of Partington, Author of *Religion and Science from Galileo to Bergson.*

THE old uncritical writers on natural history attributed to the elephant, amongst other laudable qualities, a capacity for religion; but the religion of elephants belongs to the realm of fable. The elephant may be no less moral and intelligent than the majority of mankind, but he is less religious, for religion has its basis in the essential difference between man and the brutes. Hence it is that the religious instinct rightly resists all attempts to identify human with animal nature. So far as theories of biological evolution attempt this identification, they are necessarily hostile to religion. So far, Fundamentalists are right.

The religious problem is, at bottom, none other than the problem of human nature. To understand man is to understand, or to begin to understand, religion. But man is understood in the light of his unlikeness to, rather than in that of his likeness to, the animals. A genus is known by its *differentia.* Hence those who approach the religious problem through a study of human nature should resist the temptation to simplify the problem by interpreting man in terms of the animal nature out of which he seems to have evolved. If they so interpret him they will interpret religion in terms purely biological—of reaction to environment, of infra-rational *libido*, or what not. In a word, they will interpret religion in terms of a lower stage of reality, and will resemble those who seek to interpret all biological phenomena solely in terms of chemistry and physics.

Thus, to realise that the religious problem is the problem of human nature, though it is a right beginning, is a beginning only. For human nature itself presents many problems, irreducible to merely biological terms, and insoluble to all but the very wise or the very ignorant. Yet there is this to be said about human nature, that our knowledge of it is on the increase; psychology and anthropology are pre-eminently 'live' sciences, and if we know very little more about God than our forefathers, we know a great deal more about man.

What, then, are the *differentia* of human nature? What are the characteristics which distinguish man from the animals?

Those usually emphasized are: (1) the power of reasoning, (2) the power of speech, (3) versatility or educability, and (4) imagination.

Each of these is important. (1) Reason gives to man an advantage over the lower animals comparable to that enjoyed by the latter over creatures which have no eyes. Eyeless creatures are aware only of objects coming into direct physical contact with themselves, while animals possessing eyes are aware of a wide circle of near and distant objects. But man, through his faculty of generalization, comprehends not only what is actually present to his senses, but a vast field of events absent in time and space.

(2) Closely connected with the power of abstract generalization, or of reason, is the power of speech, by which experience and knowledge can be stored and shared. One generation stands upon the shoulders of another. There is created an 'aggregation of minds,' and culture becomes cumulative.

(3) Man enjoys a degree of elasticity and versatility unattainable by the animals. Whereas these are endowed with specific instincts enabling them to perform comparatively few actions (often highly complex and difficult) smoothly and automatically, man is capable of a large variety of types of action. Whereas a soldier ant, though an efficient fighter, can never learn to perform the rôle of a worker or queen, a man can specialize in a number of different directions without lessening his capacity in any. Leonardo da Vinci was an incomparable draughtsman and painter, a physiologist, a philosopher, and an engineer. He painted the 'Monna Lisa' and invented the humble wheelbarrow.

(4) With regard to imagination, man can by means of it construct an ideal world, or picture realities which he may never have looked upon.

These characteristics of humanity — reason, speech, plasticity, and imagination — taken together, have one common result: a consciousness far wider and richer than that of the animals. Man is not only aware of himself and of the world to an extent impossible for the animals; but it is a far wider

world, and a far wider self, of which he is aware. This indeed is only what one might expect from a survey of the field of organic evolution, the successive stages of which are characterized by an increasing degree of consciousness. Consciousness seems to be a function of neural complexity. The more complex the nervous system, the more numerous are the possible reactions to any stimulus. And it is the choice between possible reactions that seems to involve consciousness. It is his more complex nervous system that makes a dog more conscious than a starfish; and a man than a dog.

Now if man's religion is the complement of his differentiation from the animals; and if that differentiation somehow consists in a more intense consciousness, it should follow that intensity of consciousness, and religion, are somehow causally connected.

This causal connection may perhaps be discovered in the fact, first revealed by Schopenhauer to an age sunk in optimism, that this heightened consciousness is an ambiguous blessing. He it was who laid it down that ' as man far surpasses the brutes in power, so also he surpasses them in suffering.' This is due to several causes.

(1) Whereas the animal lives in and for the present, man, through reason and imagination, has memories of the past and forebodings of the future.

> ' He looks before and after,
> And pines for what is not.'

(2) If the physical needs of an animal are satisfied, it is content. But so soon as a human being is free from want and suffering he requires diversion. When existence is assured, he knows not what to do with it. Almost all men who are free from want and care are a burden to themselves.

(3) The greater sensitiveness of man, due to his higher neural complexity, renders him liable to more acute distress. The life of a Shelley, or of a Dostoyevski, is a life of suffering. Pain, or the potentiality for it, increases proportionately with the increase of consciouness. Not for nothing has Christianity represented the highest type of humanity as a man of sorrows.

(4) His power of preserving the past and of looking into the future has implanted in mankind ideals and desires which,

so far as we can see, can never be realized—certainly not in the lifetimes of those who cherish them. This is a source of unrest and dissatisfaction. *Apropos* of this, the poet Whitman somewhere says of the animals that he would like to turn and live with them, they are so placid and self-contained :

> ' They do not sweat and whine about their condition ;
> They do not lie awake in the dark and weep for their sins ;
> They do not make me sick discussing their duty to God ;
> Not one is dissatisfied ;
> Not one is respectable or unhappy.'

This puts the point quite clearly. The animals do not cherish ideals which can neither be realized nor abandoned.

(5) In a creature so self-conscious as man, the problem is bound to arise of his own relation to the universe :

> ' Between the animal and the external world there is nothing. But between us and the external world there is always our thought about it, which makes us often inapproachable to it, and it to us.' [1]

Man's increased consciousness makes him aware of his own values as against a universe apparently indifferent to them—save that it has somehow produced them. The question presents itself whether the essence of existence reveals itself at the points where human values appear, or whether those values are accidental and the universe hostile. Man can neither escape nor solve such enigmas.

Thus man's superior consciousness and intelligence seem to be doubtful blessings if peace and happiness are the *criteria* of blessedness. What with his insatiable desires, extravagant ideals, and anxiety about the fate of his values in the world, man is less happy than the beasts. And the further removed a man is from the merely animal condition, the less enviable is his lot.

Pascal, to whom the credit belongs of having been the first to approach the religious problem from the human side ('We know not what man is ; how can we know what God is ?' was his remark), based his religious philosophy upon this enigmatic condition of the human race afflicted by sin and by misery.

> 'What a chimera is man ! What an oddity, what a monster, what a chaos, what a mass of contradictions ! . . . The glory and the refuse of the universe ! . . . Unfortunate as we are, we have an idea of

[1] Schopenhauer, *World as Will and Idea* (E.T.) : vol. ii, p. 231.

> happiness, and yet cannot reach it; we perceive an image of truth, and possess only deceit—we are incapable alike of absolute ignorance and certain knowledge.'

This tragic condition of the human race seemed to Pascal evidence that man was somehow 'fallen':

> 'For who thinks himself unhappy because he is not a king, but a deposed king?'

In his analysis of human nature Pascal followed the Augustinian tradition. He and the great African were alike profound psychologists, and were both pessimists in their view of human nature. And modern psychology, it should be noted, thinks as they did. The Freudians would have startled an optimist like Pelagius. The new psychology has few generous illusions about human nature. It could dot St. Augustine's *i's* and cross his *t's*. It regards human nature as having its roots, not merely in the soil, but in the dunghill. *La nostalgie de la boue* is its ruling passion.

But though St. Augustine's psychological analysis would pass muster to-day, the theological interpretation which he placed upon it, and which Pascal took over from him, would be rejected. The opinions held to-day about human nature are certainly low enough to have satisfied the saint, but no one draws from them the conclusions which he drew. The notion of a fall no longer seems credible.

It is true that a new school of anthropological opinion is inclined to regard these myths of a golden age and the fall therefrom as having had an historical foundation. They are the product of epochs when culture degeneration had taken place, and the memory or tradition of happier days still persisted. Yet this actual or probable fall from a golden age would not to-day be asked to bear the weight of theological speculation which has hitherto rested on the *Genesis* narratives. They just tell us that civilizations have gone down before the barbarian or the mosquito, or have been exhausted by the domestic militarist or philanthropist. The modern anthropological doctrine of a fall has nothing in common with the Augustinian doctrine.

Nor can modern psychological theories, pessimistic as these are, provide a basis for a revival of Augustinian theology.

Though keenly alive to the infirmities of our nature, the psychologist would not attribute them to a fall from paradise. He would, on the contrary, tend to speak, not of a fall, but of a rise, partial and precarious no doubt, but still real. He would lay considerable emphasis upon the humble ancestry of our race, and point out that each individual, as a microcosm, contains within himself a number of more or less incompatible elements, which are the several heritages of successive stages of evolution. And just as a man's nervous system is a complex hierarchy composed of systems of more ancient, less ancient, and comparatively recent heritage, so also with his mental, moral, and spiritual constitution. A man may thus embody certain incompatible elements, the result of their co-existence being conscious or unconscious discord. But the resultant *malaise* is a symptom, not of a fall, but of a rise—a rise which is still only partial. This rise seems to have carried mankind out of one environment into another; one which is less comfortable and more perilous.

This is a view which the novels and poems of Mr. Thomas Hardy have brought home to that section of the public which is capable of understanding them. The tragedy of humanity is that of a creature divided against himself. He may be regarded as an animal afflicted with ideals, or an idealist (like Jude the Obscure) afflicted with an animal nature. In either case the result is tragic.

But whether man's misery is due to a fall or to a rise is a question we may perhaps leave on one side. The important point is that he is one 'born out of due time,' for whom the world is a misfit, and whose life is replete with unrest, dissatisfaction, and ennui. Man's differentiation from the animals is indeed his undoing—it lies at the root of his troubles.

But it also lies at the root of his religion; and his religion and his troubles are indissolubly connected. It is but one step from this proposition (that religion is the correlative of unrest) to the theory, championed with such wealth of illustration and depth of insight by Feuerbach, that religion is what a more recent nomenclature styles a 'compensation'—an objectivication of the subjective ideals of mankind. The dearest dreams of the heart cannot be realised save by the imagination. But

for man this suffices. The prisoner consoles himself by the thought of freedom, the sick man with the hope of health, the bereaved with the idea of fellowship in heaven. Despair has its consolations—figmentary but sufficient, 'a poor thing, but mine own.' The tyranny of the actual may be forgotten in the contemplation of the ideal. Religion is man's protest against the horrors of reality.

The temptation to rest satisfied with some such position is sometimes too strong. Yet it is a philosophy of despair. And does the tragedy of man's life really drive us to conclude that the universe is a comedy? Is it altogether fanciful to suggest that man's restlessness is a symptom of the creative force at work in the race; so that men feel themselves to be, or at any rate are, its instruments? Their *malaise* and misery are the 'groaning and travailling' of that which is in process of being created. Man stands at life's growing point: this is his privilege, and also his tragedy.

Had the creative power ceased to operate; if an entirely new quality of life were not now in actual process of development in man, he would cease from troubling, for he would, like the animals, feel equal to the *rôle* he was called upon to play. He would be self-sufficient, happy, and, at the same time, non-religious; for it is his restlessness which infects him with religion. The *malaise* from which he suffers is a symptom that his *rôle* is too exacting. It is only when his own powers are felt to be inadequate to the demands made upon them that man turns elsewhere. The animals are self-sufficient: 'They do not lie awake in the night and weep for their sins.' They do not need to 'find God.'

In actual fact, wherever man sinks to a more or less animal complacency and somnolence, religion, together with creative progress, evaporates. And it is edifying to observe that in such stagnant or decadent periods there develops a widespread belief in the power of man to ensure for himself an inevitable progress. Poets, with blasphemous optimism, sing 'Glory to man in the highest,' and Utopia seems imminent. On the other hand, in periods, like the thirteenth century, when mankind was really on the march, it will be found that people believed less in themselves than in the grace of God.

Creation in man is groaning and travailling, and if there is an absence of these phenomena there is also a cessation of the creative process.

Between these two views, the view of Feuerbach and that of the eighth chapter of Romans, there seems to be no alternative. Religion is either a symptom of creative activity (the turning outside oneself for help to perform a too exacting *rôle*) or it is a dream to console us for the miseries of life. Both interpretations accept the prominent fact—the tragedy of most human lives. Only the sheltered and superficial can deny the tragedy, and any philosophy of religion based on the obscuring of it is a pleasantry merely.

For it is worth remembering that Christianity is a pessimistic religion, so far as this life and this world is concerned. Its view of man is that, apart from God, he is impotent, insignificant, and miserable — is, in fact, nothing. The *bourgeois* theology of Herbert Spencer, or of some moderns who proclaim themselves theists, is optimistic but vapid. Christianity has a genius very different.

Our generation is unfortunate, perhaps, in being denied the luxury of a compromise. In Victorian days surprising feats were performed in this direction; but the time for them is past. The attempt to believe in man without believing in God seems to us laudable, but we know it to be vain. Belief in man as our deity, loudly proclaimed by the positivist as a simple and rational faith, seems an exploit of the boldest credulity. We can believe much, but not that.

Even in the nineteenth century those thinkers who took the trouble to think clearly knew quite well that atheism involved pessimism. Schopenhauer made no bones about it; the Hegelian fog, so widespread over Europe, did not deceive him. This is why to read him is a tonic and a discipline. It is true that he dwells on the misery, whereas St. Augustine dwells on the sin, of man; but these are but twin ways of emphasizing the same truth—the incompleteness and inadequacy of our race.

It is a strange nemesis, this rehabilitation of Augustine and Schopenhauer. The humanist and positivist revolt against theological pessimism has resulted, after a period of glorious optimism, in a pessimism equally profound and far more se-

curely grounded. Psychology, anthropology, history—all tell the same story.

It is a story of conflict, with progress very hardly won and insecurely held. Of intelligence and rationality barely holding their own; of savagery and superstition ever ready to break in. Progress and degeneration apparently alternating; mankind saved, if saved it is, by the few, a minority, a 'remnant.' For the strange thing is that significant personalities have not failed to emerge—individuals in whom the creative power has been dominant. These, indeed, have been the sole instruments of progress; their significance it is not possible to exaggerate. In them we see the creative power actually incarnate and visibly at work. In them we have, not man, but man *plus* God. They enable us to believe in man, and they are our only ground for believing in God—that is to say, in the God of religion. They serve as evidence that the creative power which has produced man out of the animal is striving, at any cost, to produce out of man an entirely new quality of life. What wonder that man is restless?

It should be added that this talk of the creative power working in man is not mere optimistic evolutionary jargon, but can be expressed in terms of Christian theology, and has been so expressed by St. Paul in the eighth chapter of *Romans*. This, indeed, is the classical *religious* expression of the creative theory of human nature. For St. Paul the movement has the inevitability of a cosmic process. 'If God be for us, who can be against us?'

Religion here appears as creative activity, or the consciousness of it; and yet religion has come to be regarded as the strongest of conservative forces. This reflection leads us, however, towards an area upon which, at this stage, we shall not venture to tread. Perhaps religion may have to cease to lie submerged under the heavy weight of the solidified lava which, fold upon fold, has accumulated after successive eruptions. Some day there will be another period of activity, the mountain will tremble, the lava crack and melt, and religion take on a new lease of life. For the creative *nisus* is at work even when we are most satisfied that it is exhausted. The volcano only sleeps.

MANS' NEEDS

By the Rev. Hubert Handley, M.A., author of *Theological Room*, etc.

Explanatory Note.—No one, I fear, can make much of this paper unless I just tell how it grew up. I believe that man's supreme need, covering other needs, is for God. But certain eminent psychologists challenge and attack the spiritual experience through which that need is met and God is found. They have raised the question of the day. Our spiritual experience, they say, is subjective and illusory; and objective God there is not. For three years I, a mere parish clergyman, have hacked my way through the wood of that difficulty. In this paper I tell how. My mental tale is of very slight intrinsic value; but it may be of some interest and even, if I dare hope so, of some help to those in like case.

ALL animals appear to be judges of their own needs. They appear to be judges also of their own satisfactions. You cannot tell any animal what it wants, it will tell you; and you cannot tell any animal, it will tell you, how its wants are met. This rule obtains, both for individual and for species, through all sentient life. Take a few examples in ascending scale. Begin, say, with a tiger.

(1) A tiger has certain primary needs—the need for food, for rest, for mating, for company in his own group, for combat. He, and he alone, knows what the needs are, and what are the satisfactions. Watch him, for instance, in his search for food. One evening he judges that he is hungry. Out he goes into the forest, and unexpectedly he comes upon a jungle-buck. In a flash he decides that here is fit satisfaction for his need, and at a pounce the beautiful, pathetic victim is doomed. Three days later he is hungry again, and towards night he meets a porcupine which bristles at his approach. The tiger pauses and, facing the bayonets, asks himself: Shall I eat that? The answer is in the negative, and the tiger moves on, hoping for better things. The lesson is plain. Buck, not porcupine, says the tiger; and no power on earth can alter his decision. The lesson is plain; but I venture to think that it will be found to be of rare significance, as we climb the biological ladder and reach certain final needs and satisfactions at the top.

(2) Go up now in the scale of life. Consider an ape. He has the old needs of the tiger for food, for sleep, etc.; but he has also the new needs of the ape. What are these?

Watch that orang-outang. He is up a tree, weaving together the small branches with skill and agility, making for himself a temporary platform or scaffold on which he reposes. Darwin holds that here probably are the first steps towards rude architecture. Again, see that baboon, as the burning sun beats down upon him, throw over his head a straw mat for protection. Darwin thinks it is probably a first step towards the useful art of dress. The ape, more clever than the tiger, wants incipient architecture and dress, and finds them.

But again, the ape also possesses, in advance of the tiger, what Darwin calls 'social qualities.' Watch that troop of chimpanzees herded on the rocky ground there. At a glance you see that they are more companionable, more adroit in mutual help, amusement, defence, than the tiger and his fellows could be. There are here new social or moral needs, finding apt satisfactions.

As with the tiger, so with the ape, our one point is this. Everything is decided from within. What he wants and what satisfies him the monkey knows and no one else.

(3) Rise higher. Come now to an animal whose nature is of mingled pathos and grandeur, whose name on earth is of singular renown—*man*. Come first to uncivilized man; and, in order to observe him, travel with W. H. R. Rivers in Melanesia.[1] What an advance, even in these rude islanders of the Pacific, is there beyond the ape! What a new creature have we now! What new needs and supplies! There is plainly development of intelligence manifested in language, canoe-building, etc. There is social advance in rules of marriage, of kinship, etc. There is a new sense—the sense of beauty shewn in ornamental tools and dress. But another and a greater characteristic gradually emerges, of arresting interest to us of the Churchmen's Union. This untaught Melanesian man becomes dimly aware of what we call the powers of nature. He relates himself to them in two ways—by magic and by religion.

[1] See Rivers, *The History of Melanesian Society*.

In magic certain human beings are held to exert controlling influence over natural forces without any appeal to higher than human powers. That, in effect, is Rivers's definition. A clear example is the task of the rain-maker. The rain-maker in the little island of Mota with a bright orange fruit imitates the rainbow; he imitates the thunder, the lightning, the clouds, and works for his object with words of incantation. Ladies and gentlemen, it is not ludicrous : it is elementary. The poor dark-skinned man in his childlike way is asserting a native human need and a radical human fact—man's knowledge and control of nature. Sir James Frazer declares that the original institution of the primitive magicians has on the whole brought 'incalculable good to humanity.' 'They were the direct predecessors, not merely of our physicians and surgeons, but of our investigators and discoverers in every branch of natural science.'

That is magic. In religion, on the other hand, there is an appeal, often conceived in awe, wonder, and love, from primitive man to powers regarded as higher than himself to work some desired effect. That, again, briefly is Rivers's definition.

Let us pause and weigh this new fact. Savage [2] man, whether contemporary in Melanesia or primeval in the remote past—savage man appeals to higher powers. The tiger did not. The ape did not. Savage man does. It is a monumental fact. It is, in Rivers's view, the birth of religion. Savage man wants higher powers and tentatively finds them. He is made that way. He might have been made so as to be satisfied with the bare informations of his five senses, to rest in superficial nature. He was not made so. He was ever after something else. He, too, may have known

> 'obstinate questionings
> Of sense and outward things,
> Falling from us, vanishings;
> Blank misgivings of a Creature
> Moving about in worlds not realised.'

And amid the wonder of life savage man became convinced that higher powers were about his path. No doubt, when we come to view the *shapes* in which the higher powers were mediated to savage man—no doubt, here he puzzles us, and his thought for

[2] The term 'savage' in this essay is used not in its extreme sense of 'wild,' 'semi-brutal,' but in its mitigated sense of 'uncivilized.'

us is unintelligible, outgrown, and gone. It does not matter. The master, ruling, fecund truth is that mankind in the early stages of its great pilgrimage moves on appealing, amid all the mystery and adventure, to powers higher than itself.

Take now a specimen of his appeal. Take his prayer. 'Put off thy shoes from off thy feet, for the place whereon thou standest is holy ground.' You are approaching primitive man in his prayer. Here is an example, quoted by Rivers, from that same little island of Mota.

> Prayer, father,[3] drop of Kava this they trouble continually me they ghosts.

Kava is juice squeezed from the root of the kava vegetable. A small quantity was ceremonially poured out on the ground while the above formula was recited. The formula itself, if correctly translated, is a prayer to the ghost of an ancestor for protection. Rivers, an admirably cautious scholar, is decided that among these islanders prayers of this kind are in use. He writes:

> 'They are true prayers, in which dead ancestors are asked for benefits . . . in which appeal is made to the ghosts of the dead.'

Someone, perhaps, thinks: 'There are no ghosts, and the savage prays to nothing.' That is a hasty judgment. We Europeans little know the inside of the Melanesian consciousness—what 'ghosts' mean to him. When a dog meets a cat, we hastily assume that the dog sees *our* cat—a cat humanly perceived; whereas, of course, what the dog sees is *his* cat—a cat caninely perceived, and no human being will ever be in the secret. So when the savage prays to 'ghosts,' it is not to our ghosts, but to his. We have lost the clue, but he has it. However, the impressive lesson for us lies not in the *form* of savage prayer, which we cannot understand, but in the *fact* of savage prayer, which we can. This child of nature amid the sincerities of nature, in the forest or on the mountain and the shore—this child of nature prays. And savage prayers like his in the dawning, misty past, were the scratched alphabet of all devotional literature since; they were the first whispers which have swelled, in a secular and unparalleled *crescendo*, up to the liturgies of great religions, up to the morning and evening prayers to-day of mankind.

[3] The word 'father' is said to be doubtful. But another formula, taken from the same authority, begins, 'Prayer, grandfather,' and thus supports the rendering 'father.'

There is a noble chapter in *The Golden Bough*, called 'Our Debt to the Savage.'

> 'Contempt and ridicule, or abhorrence and denunciation, are too often the only recognition vouchsafed to the savage and his ways. Yet of the benefactors whom we are bound thankfully to commemorate, many, perhaps most, were savages. . . . Their errors were . . . simply hypotheses, justifiable as such at the time when they were propounded, but which a fuller experience has proved to be [for us] inadequate.'

These considerations, let us insist, apply to religion as well as to science. Wholly to accept the scientific development, but to blow the meaning out of the religious, is a strange caprice. To hold, on the one hand, that, from the primitive magician onward to Lord Kelvin, the long human line of scientific experience was engaged with something and led somewhere; but to hold, on the other hand, that from the man who first prayed onward to Dr. Martineau, the long human line of religious experience was engaged with nothing and led nowhere—that does appear to be wanton and irrational. It would mean that we, believing ourselves to be immensely sane, impugn the sanity of the preceding human race. It would mean that we who were born at the last tick of the cosmic clock, think it could not keep good time till we handled the repairs.

To recapitulate: Savage man needs higher powers, and in his own way finds them.

(4) Come now to civilized man. Civilized man needs higher powers, and in his own way finds them. It is an improved way. Observe first civilized man of a humble grade—an English peasant. Come and stay for a week with a shepherd in his cottage on the Derbyshire hills, among the Tors about Matlock Bath. You arrive in the evening and receive from the old man a welcome which breathes the charm of peasant courtesy. You need not, for our purpose, pause to consider his mental or ethical advance beyond Melanesian standards. But his religious advance strikes your attention. After supper the shepherd, his wife, a grown-up son, two grand-children, and you sit round the little parlour. He takes down a large book and reads from it a message from Someone Unseen; whom in conversation he once calls 'the Supreme Being,' but usually 'Our

Heavenly Father.' Then we all kneel down, and in artless, moving words he speaks to the Great One out of sight. The happiness, the troubles, the difficulties, the wrongs of the day he tells; and he asks for protection during the night and for what he calls 'benediction' over us gathered there and for some dear ones away in Canada. It is all very tender, but very strong.

Next day, and during the week, you talk with him about this religion of his. How did he come to know God? He says his knowledge of God grew up with him from babyhood, just like his knowledge of the valley and the hills. But from the New Testament he learnt the biggest truth of all, which lit up all the world and is behind everything, namely, that 'the Almighty is chock-full of forgiveness.' And, as the old man says it, his face and bearing is as of one who has reached a *goal*, of one who, unlike the restless throng, is *there*, and who, amid the storms of time, enjoys a hidden, imperturbable repose.

On another day, asked how he could prove that there is a God at all, he says that he's no scholar and he never argues about it, but that he is like his favourite bird, the lark. As the lark from birth to death ever seeks the sky and finds it, so the shepherd from birth to death ever seeks God and finds Him.

That, of course, unconsciously is the exact argument of this paper.

(5) Come now to civilized man in the upper reaches. Come to a European philisopher. Come to Baron Friedrich von Hügel. Attend a monthly meeting of the London Society for the Study of Religion, where for twenty years von Hügel, in little unpremeditated speeches of fifteen minutes each, unveiled the Most High. We used to lean forward down the long table, catching every word, rivetted. I cannot tell you what Isaiah was like, or the evangelical St. John; I do not know; but I think we got a glimpse of them, a hint of their prophetic majesty, in the genius of von Hügel.

Von Hügel was a great mystic. He was also a philosopher and historian, 'holding a conspicuous place,' *The Times* declares, 'among the thinkers of our time.' Well, under that powerful historical and philosophical lens of his he placed

nystical or spiritual experience and examined it carefully for ifty-five years. He reported that though spiritual experience, ike other human experience, is subject to error, yet that spiritual xperience, like other human experience, is essentially sane and eliable; and that the very law of our nature by which we in- atiably long for the Eternal and find Him is planted in us by he Eternal Himself.

> 'Yea, I have loved thee with an everlasting love: therefore with loving kindness have I drawn thee.'

Of course, von Hügel did not stand alone; he was not a voice n the desert. The halls of spiritual literature down the cen- uries, from the Upanishads to Wordsworth, ring with the same roclamation.

It is challenged to-day by a group of eminent hostile psy- hologists. No one knows God, they say; there is no God to now; those who think they know God know only their only uggestions, fantasies, desires; the apparently objective God is ound to be made of subjective material; 'the gods,' as Jung uts it, '*are libido*.' Now the burden of this paper has been hat man, like other animals, knows what he is about, decides what he wants, and 'won't be happy till he gets it.'

Concerning our psychological assailants I add only two re- lections. (1) It all has happened before; within living memory. eventy years ago a group of hostile biologists insisted that roof of man's animal ancestry was disproof of man's present eligion. But educated opinion came to see that while biologists were excellent judges of biological phenomena, they were not, s biologists, judges at all of religion; that only a religious man, ot a biological man, gets inside the crust of that subject. So houghtful Christianity went on its way storing honey from the iological bee, but drawing the sting of the biological hornet. 2) Likewise with the psychological enemy now. You read a eading work of Jung, of Freud. What masters on their own ubject! eliciting your respect. But when religion is their theme —well, it is difficult to write impressively about a thing of whose eal existence you are not aware. If I may deferentially say so, hose writers do not know that such a thing as religion exists. hey write about something which they call 'religion'; but it is ot religion; it is a group of psychological facts incidental to

religion. And they know of religion only the psychologica surface; just as the mere ritualist knows only the ceremonia surface, or the mere theologian knows only the dogmatic su face, or the mere sightseer in a cathedral may know of religio only the architectural surface. And when those distinguishe psychologists use the word 'religion,' they are thinking—not o religion, but of psychology. So true is the epigram :

> 'Some men see the picture, and some men see the paint.'

Religious conversion often gives to religious objects a cer tain new and vivid actuality. There is a forcible account o such a change, relating to philosophical conversion, not to reli gious. It was written by Schopenhauer[4] :

> 'The effect which the principal writings of Kant produce in th mind to which they truly speak is very like that of an operation f cataract on a blind man.' 'For Kant's teaching produces in the mi of everyone who has comprehended it a fundamental change which so great that it may be regarded as an intellectual new birth.' 'O the other hand, he who has not mastered the Kantian philosoph whatever else he may have studied, is, as it were, in a state of inn cence; that is to say, he remains in the grasp of that natural a childish realism in which we are all born.'

What is this, in a lesser sphere, but the new and striking ou look of the converted sinner, noted by Pascal? What is it bu the Quaker jailer's cry?

> 'O happy George Fox! that first breathed that breath of lif within the walls of my habitation!'

And among all the great religions :

> 'Which has not cried to sunk, self-weary man :
> *Thou must be born again!*'

We must note von Hügel's classical division of the Christian elements into three, all of which an entire Christianity needs.

First, there is the supreme mystical element. Mystical ex perience, or spiritual perception, opens for us the eternal gates We have already treated it at length.

Secondly, there is the rational element. The rational task is to record in hard, dry doctrine the spiritual beliefs, and from age to age by revision, by deletion, by adaptation to keep the doctrine sane and appropriate. We need not now elaborate the

[4] This quotation is due to Lord Haldane, in *The Reign of Relativity*.

ubject. The endeavour to meet the rational need is the motive of this Union : it is why we are here.

Thirdly, there is the institutional element. Our High Church nembers, of whom in a very humble sense and degree I am one, et a particular value on the Institution, the Church, the City of God on earth. But the Church of which Liberal High Churchnen dream will be larger, more pitiful, more commanding than ny Church yet known. It will pull down the orthodox railings which now fence off from each other the unsophisticated Christian multitudes who want to shake hands. 'The Christian Church,' Dean Church avowed, 'is sometimes equivalent simply o Christendom.' Well, the Greater Church of which we dream will be Christendom healed of its distractions. God, we believe, will slowly draw into one Federation all the now split and rival Churches and Communions — to work together in federated trength, but each according to its own genius. The Greater Church will retain the core of doctrine, radically simplified. It will cherish the sacramental means of grace,[5] and will hold fast he hope of glory. It will have the everlasting gospel to preach. By the supremacy of its religious experience it will, under God, prevail. That for us is the pattern seen on the mount. And to his Greater Church for which we wait and pray, to this more pacious City of God on earth, I reverently extend and adapt roughly and from memory[6]) the words of Newman :

> 'Oh ! long sought after, tardily found ; rest after many wanderings, peace after many storms. Come to her ! Come to her ! children [of men],[7] for she it is, and she alone, who [adequately] can teach you the secret of your being, and the meaning of your destiny.'

(6) Finally, our Liberal Christianity needs to be purified even times in the fire of service and sacrifice. It is of no use o try conversion by the otiose. Schweitzer has set us here a

[5] Small, important contingents, *e.g.* the Society of Friends, will be exceptions to this rule.

[6] Many years ago, in some newspaper or book, I read these words, or very like words, of Newman ; and I have never forgotten them. I have not been able to verify them. Once I asked the late Mr. W. S. Lilly, an authority on Newman, if he could identify the passage. He wrote in reply that he could not ; but he did not deny, or even question, Newman's authorship.

[7] Newman's words, I believe, were not 'children of men,' but 'poor children.'

chivalrous example. But our own leaders in more homely ways have also told us the truth. Charles Kingsley, whom we have specially commemorated this year, himself served the poor and troubled in Eversley indefatigably, and so put salt into his theology. Dean Rashdall, a name loved and honoured among us, in a private letter answering congratulations on his appointment to Carlisle, wrote thus:

> 'It is a great comfort to know that some of those who are doing all the hard and disagreeable work do not think that those of us who are doing much pleasanter work in studies and Universities are doing nothing at all.'

The Dean, himself an eminent philosopher, here nobly affirms the need above all of the Cross.

The times in which we live appear on the surface to be rollicking and flippant; but underneath in the great heart of England there is a hungry seriousness, an expectancy, dumb, waiting for holier and more adequate satisfactions. The times are critical, and the duty of Liberal Churchmen is tremendous, but plain: it is, under God, to save England. Reformed, restated, reasonable Christianity will save England. Only, in heaven's name, Christianity it still must be—with all its heights and depths, packed with eternity, yes; but, equally, breaking out in daily, humble, persuasive deeds of sacrifice and service. That is the faith which once more will subdue kingdoms.

The occasion trembles with religious opportunity. Are we Modern Churchmen equal to it? We look into our poor, tarnished lives and draw back; we kneel before the Eternal Mercy, rise up, and go forward; and no man may set a limit to what a band of dedicated Christians can do.

> 'Then draw we nearer day by day,
> Each to his brethren, all to God;
> Let the world take us as it may,
> We must not change our road.'

MODERNISM AND LIFE AFTER DEATH

By the Rev. Maurice Pryke, B.D., author of *Modernism as a Working Faith.*

THERE is no specifically Christian teaching about what happens after death. The doctrine of the Last Things which bulks so largely in the New Testament is Jewish and not Christian in origin. And this assertion will hold good whether we suppose that Eschatology was central to the thought of Jesus Himself or whether we stand rather with those who seek to minimize the eschatological element in His authentic teaching. Even were it assumed that Jesus never thought of Himself as Messiah at all, it was undoubtedly as Messiah that He was believed in and proclaimed by His followers. Hence primitive theology was concerned solely with the vindication of the Messiahship of Jesus in face of the stumbling-block of the cross, its apologetic methods were Jewish, its background was the Old Testament, and the figure of the historical Jesus was inserted into an already prepared picture of the future, the name Jesus being alone new.

While, therefore, a belief in the visible return of Jesus, with its consequences of resurrection, judgment, torment for the wicked, bliss for the saints, was pivotal to the Christian theology of the early days, yet no part of this picture-thinking can claim to be original to Christianity, or in the slightest degree binding upon the modern believer. Indeed the whole eschatological scheme as accepted by contemporary Judaism was mainly an importation from Persian and Babylonian sources. If the primitive Hebrew doctrine of Sheol, with its dreary teaching of a kind of half-life in a twilight of wretchedness, has no more claim to acceptance than the Homeric belief in a joyless Hades, the same must be said of other and more elaborate doctrines borrowed by the Hebrews at a later date. To deny this is to claim infallibility not merely for the Old Testament, but for the later speculations of extra-canonical writers, and even for the non-Jewish sources from which those speculations were largely derived.

But to recognize the essentially speculative and transitory character of the entire eschatological framework is to feel oneself freed from an intolerable burden of confused thinking and artificial harmonization of incompatible beliefs. The Eschatology of Daniel, of Enoch, of the Apocalypse, or even of the Synoptic Gospels, will remain of interest to the student, but for the Christian in the street to-day it has become largely a dead letter. And in consequence the modern apologist for Christianity finds his task at once simpler and more exacting than was formerly the case. It is more exacting in that a saying of Paul or even of Jesus Himself can no longer suffice to foreclose discussion and silence an opponent. It is simpler since the argument for immortality is seen to depend not upon the acceptance of this or that dubious interpretation, this or that disputed saying, but rather upon the existence of what the philosopher terms the Absolute Values, and still more upon a view of God which to him who holds it renders the thought of extinction utterly impossible. It is upon Jesus Christ's view of God, and upon the interpretation of life's significance which that view entails, that Christian faith in immortality must ultimately rest. Hence while here as elsewhere the Modernist rejects that 'licence of affirmation' which so many allow themselves, while to some at any rate his position will appear disappointingly negative, if not actually destructive, while on many matters regarded by the Traditionalist as essentials of belief he is frankly and avowedly agnostic, yet fundamentally his simpler faith is as satisfying to the human heart as the more detailed and highly-coloured assertions of popular orthodoxy.

It must, however, be conceded that the path of the Modernist teacher is beset with difficulties. 'Picture-book theology' has gained a firm hold on the minds of ordinary churchpeople, and concrete presentations of the conditions which obtain in another life, dramatic descriptions of bliss or torment in a future state, will appeal more readily than philosophically-phrased arguments, however cogently expressed.

Moreover, be the risks what they may, the preliminary work of the Modernist must often be one of destruction. There are some beliefs which a man holds at his moral and intellectual peril. If it be true that a universe pictured after the manner of

a three-storied house is altogether devoid of reality, it must follow that those clauses of the Creed in which such a universe is pre-supposed are, if taken literally, false and misleading. The statement may be regarded as a common-place, and yet, as Dr. Inge has pointed out, 'the implications of Copernican astronomy in the field of dogma have never been faced and are not faced to-day.'

For example, the belief in our Lord's descent into Hades implies this three-storied universe. And the assertion of the Apostles' Creed must owe its origin to the speculations of the community rather than to any actual reminiscence of an experience related by the risen Christ to His disciples. The information vouchsafed in I *Peter*[1] is clearly legendary, the reference to the Flood being of itself sufficient to indicate the unwisdom of building upon it a superstructure of belief which it is clearly unfitted to support.

So too with the doctrine of the Resurrection, our Lord's and ours. The very word resurrection displays its kinship with a body of ideas with which the modern believer can no longer feel at home. The picture belongs to an eschatological outlook which time has rendered obsolete and unreal. Setting aside for the moment what resurrection implies in the case of Jesus, it is obvious that with the passing of a belief in the resuscitation of physical particles, the word is no longer strictly applicable to any experience which we ourselves expect to undergo. Indeed the opponents of the less bizarre views of Origen, the last-ditch champions of the popular faith in a *resurrectio carnis*, were justified in their contention that to speak of a resurrection at all implies the re-emergence of something which has previously been laid in the grave. But as Dr. Major has recently asserted, we can give no credence whatever to a belief in 'a resurrection of relics.' However positively the Modernist may maintain the survival in its fulness of all that is meant by human personality, he will have nothing to do with a resurrection in the etymological sense of the word, since he is assured that no part of that which has once been placed in the grave will ever come out of it again. Hence while such a phrase as 'the resurrection of the dead' is doubtless less open to objection than the *resurrectio carnis* of

[1] I Peter, iii, 19.

the Apostles' Creed, none the less it fails to express what is actually the faith of Modernist Christians.

It may indeed be reasonably contended that the word resurrection has become so closely interwoven with a faith in immortality that no other word can now be substituted for it without a loss incomparably greater than any corresponding gain in accuracy of expression which might result from its disuse. But be that as it may, when the instructed Christian professes his belief in the resurrection of the dead he must be clear how far the phrase is intended to be understood literally, and how far the words he elects to use are an accommodation to the inadequacy of human language to express his real thought.

But the use of old terms with a new meaning is never without danger, and in our own day it may be described not improperly as the besetting sin of the orthodox theologian. In a recent defence of his position, Dr. Gore wrote :[2]

> 'I affirmed in the strongest language the resurrection of the body (and by 'body' must be meant a *material* organ), but denied that this doctrine carried with it the idea of the re-collection at the Day of Judgment of the material particles of our dead bodies.'

Dr. A. H. McNeile, commenting with approval upon this pronouncement in his book, *The Problem of the Future Life*, interprets it thus :

> 'Bishop Gore's position,' he tells us, 'amounts to this : I believe in the Resurrection of the body, but it is not the body that was buried. I believe in the Resurrection of the flesh, but it was not the flesh that was corrupted and dispersed to the elements, and entered into the bodies of many other human beings. I believe in a material body after death, but it is not composed of matter of which we have any knowledge.'[3]

How beautifully simple it all is ! For Bishop Gore resurrection does not mean resurrection, body does not mean body, flesh does not mean flesh, matter does not mean matter. If words may mean anything we choose to make them mean, then loyalty to the old Creeds is a virtue easy of attainment ! For the Modernist so to juggle with words is to commit an offence against truth, and to leave the mind of the simple Christian in a state of confusion which no boasted allegiance to the demands of ortho-

[2] *Church Times*, August 8th, 1924.
[3] P. 104.

doxy can ever justify. In one passage Dr. McNeile himself admits the truth of the Modernist position. 'We should not dream,' he writes, 'of saying that when the seed dies there is a "resurrection of the seed." And yet to say that when the body dies there is a "resurrection of the body" is exactly analagous.'[4] Quite so. But then why continue to speak of the 'resurrection of the body' when you mean something quite different?

Inevitably the use of the word resurrection in connection with ourselves must raise the question of its legitimacy when employed with reference to our Lord. It does not fall within the province of this paper to discuss in detail the evidence for and against the acceptance of the story of the Empty Tomb. Yet the question is bound to present itself: if 'resurrection' is in strictness a wrong word to use in connection with human survival in general, to what extent does it describe with accuracy what actually occurred in the case of Jesus?

Now undoubtedly the word resurrection is not used for the first time in reference to the Easter faith, for it belongs (as we have already seen) to that cycle of apocalyptic beliefs borrowed by the Jews from their neighbours. If, as the majority of Christians assert, our Lord's body, either unchanged or having undergone some kind of transformation, came out of the tomb on the third day, then of Him at any rate the word resurrection is strictly accurate, and we shall be led to the conclusion that what in the case of Jesus was literally true can be no more than figuratively true for us, His followers. This apparently was the view of Dr. Barnes, when in a little book on Spiritualism published in 1920 he stated that

> 'All parallels between Christ's Resurrection-life on earth and our own future state . . . result from a perilous confusion between the normal and the miraculous.'[5]

And Dr. McNeile follows the same line of thought when he maintains that 'a belief in the empty tomb involves nothing more than a belief in a miracle wrought for evidential purposes.'

To many this kind of argument will appear unconvincing. They will prefer to range themselves on the side of St. Paul, who appears to have thought of Christ's resurrection as of the

[4] *Ibid*, p. 105.
[5] *Spiritualism and the Christian Faith*, p. 28.

same kind as that of believers, and will suppose with Dr. Glazebrook that legendary accretions in the Gospels have obscured or destroyed the resemblance between our Lord's resurrection and ours. While room is doubtless left for differences of opinion, it is worth while to insist that even were we to assume with Bousset that when Paul wrote I *Corinthians* he was as yet unacquainted with the legends of the Empty Tomb, it would still be possible to combine with these extreme conclusions a conception of the Easter faith at one in essentials with that held by more conservative critics, and at least devotionally orthodox.

In any consideration of the New Testament view of immortality the thought of St. Paul is naturally of the first importance. The background of that thought is quite clearly Jewish. In I *Thessalonians* indeed we have one passage so markedly eschatological in colouring that it would seem to have come whole and entire from some apocalyptic source.[6] Paul thinks of Christians who have already died as 'asleep.' That is to say, while their bodies decay in the grave, their souls slumber in Hades until the last trump. At the moment of the Parousia, or visible appearance of Jesus upon the clouds, soul and body are reunited and the exultant Christians are caught up to meet the Lord in the air, whence seemingly they return to earth in company with the victorious Christ in order to take part in the Messianic reign. It would appear that at this stage Paul shared with popular Jewish thought a belief in a 'resurrection of relics,' though this conclusion is perhaps disputable.

In I *Corinthians*[7] there is certainly some development of thought, though the precise nature of that development is not easy to determine. Whatever may be true of I *Thessalonians*, there is here no thought of a mere resuscitation of the earthly body. The bodies of the dead who rise will be 'spiritual.' They are the gift of God, and however debatable their precise nature, 'flesh and blood' they certainly are not. In like manner the bodies of the living will be transformed, changed in the twinkling of an eye, so as to be fitted to have their share in the reign of Christ. Here too as in I *Thessalonians* Paul holds fast to the conception of a first and second resurrection separated in time by the period of the Messianic reign.

[6] iv, 16 *f.* [7] 1 *Cor.*, xv.

But what in Paul's mind is the connection between the body 'sown' and the body 'raised'? Those who press the figure of the seed argue with some appearance of logic that the new body is thought of as developed out of the body which has been laid in the grave. But since both here and in II *Corinthians* he stresses the fact that the new body is the gift of God, it would appear that in reality the connection between the body of flesh and blood and the spiritual body is temporal rather than organic, so that in point of fact, however far Paul may have been from a clear realization of the trend of his own thought, the very idea of 'resurrection' has become superfluous.

This conviction is materially strengthened by reference to what Paul says in II *Corinthians* v.[8] Here he thinks of a spiritual body already existing in heaven, side by side (so to speak) with the human body on earth. At the Parousia the living will put on this new body over the earthly body in such a manner that the transformation of the old body is really its destruction. On the other hand, those who are already dead, and who are thought of as 'naked,' 'unclothed,' disembodied, will then be clothed with the spiritual body, which is the gift of God. So that when in *Philippians*[9] Paul speaks of 'the fashioning anew of the body of our humiliation,' he is referring to the living, not to those who have already died.

Here too it is evident that the logic of the Apostle's thought might have led him to the rejection of the entire apocalyptic scheme. But the facts are otherwise. Paul does not in reality, as Dr. Glazebrook maintains, think of the heavenly body as waiting to clothe the soul in the hour of death. He retains to the end the Hebrew conception of a disembodied life in Sheol, though it is true that such a life is robbed of its terrors when the dead can be spoken of as 'at home with the Lord.'

Thus while Paul's thought certainly undergoes development, while already in I *Corinthians* the idea of a resurrection has become in fact superfluous, while in the second letter to Corinth he approaches the Greek belief in a judgment of the individual at death, a belief which renders obsolete the whole dramatically-conceived picture of a Great Assize, preceded by

[8] *2 Cor.*, v, 1 to 10.
[9] *Philippians* iii, 21.

a waiting life of disembodied spirits in Hades, yet in reality he remains substantially faithful to the eschatological background of his Jewish training, and for that reason the form of his thought is no longer binding upon the modern Christian.

With Paul indeed we may reject decisively the cruder Jewish view of a resuscitation of physical particles. And we may share his belief in a spiritual body so far at least as it serves to protect the Christian's faith in the survival of the complete human personality. But further than this we cannot go. For (1) we ought not in strictness to speak of the 'resurrection' of this spiritual body, when in point of fact we mean something else. And (2) while we may retain the conception of a body laid up in heaven (provided we do not fall into the error of equating spirit with a highly rarefied form of matter), we no longer share the Pauline belief in a disembodied life of waiting between death and judgment (a life in which, as Canon Peter Green has recently suggested, 'the soul is conscious but passive'), but incline rather to the Greek theory of the judgment of the individual at death.

What, then, becomes of the Christian doctrine of the visible return of Christ, followed by a great Assize at the Last Day?

Before approaching the consideration of this question we must return for a moment to the New Testament idea of the universe as a three-storied house, and to St. Luke's picture of the Ascension as the visible return of Christ to the highest story of the cosmic building.

The narrative as it stands in *Acts*[10] has a direct connection with the pivotal Christian doctrine of the Parousia, and the reasons for its appearance in the particular form in which we have it are obvious enough. Moreover, the presence of the two white-robed figures, who assure the upward-gazing disciples of the return of their Master in precisely the same manner in which they had seen him go, should be sufficient proof of the essentially legendary nature of the story and its dependence upon popular ideas of a local heaven.

The Modernist will reject emphatically the attempt to claim accuracy for the wording of the Lucan narrative by recourse to a suggestion of Bishop Westcott's (a suggestion recently cham-

[10] *Acts* i, 9 to 11.

pioned, *mirabile dictu*, by no less a person than the Bishop of Manchester[11]) to the effect that we are here presented with the record of an acted parable. For, as Dr. Glazebrook has pointed out with convincing cogency,[12] if the story is to be taken as the account of a literal happening, if, that is, the body of Jesus was indeed raised a certain distance above the ground in view of the disciples, then what we have is not parable but drama, and drama which, whatever its supposed justification in the interests of faith, can serve at the present day no better purpose than to perpetuate in the minds of simple Christians an idea of the universe which no intelligent person can any longer accept.

None the less, the story as we have it establishes adequately enough the essentially literal character of primitive Christian beliefs. If the disciples were thought to have seen Jesus go into heaven after the manner of Elijah, then any attempt to explain away the language of the New Testament as intended to be merely figurative and not literally exact must be branded as futile. It is clear from passage after passage in Gospels and Epistles alike that the community expected a literal, visible and speedy return of Jesus upon the clouds of heaven. And it is clear further, first that this belief has been proved altogether erroneous, and secondly that no instructed Christian still looks for a return of his Master in any sense approximating to that in which the belief was originally held. Neither the Ascension nor the return as these were understood by the primitive community have the smallest claim to be regarded as facts by believers of to-day.

How far our Lord Himself may have held the belief in His own visible return, and even fostered it perhaps by His teaching, must remain an open question. The majority of modern scholars are of opinion that Jesus both expected and taught His return to judgment, and that the expectation has been falsified by the event. If so, then the mistake is, after all, relatively unimportant, since such teaching belonged to the husk, not to the kernel of His message to humanity; if not, and the belief that he would return is due in reality to the influence of current Messianic doctrines, combined with a misinterpretation of our

[11] In *Christus Veritas*.
[12] *Modern Churchman*, May 1918.

Lord's actual teaching, then the responsibility must rest no with Jesus Himself, but with His biographers, and more par ticularly with the writer of the first Gospel.

The probability is that Jesus gave at least a substantia impetus to the development of a belief in His parousia. An it is certainly the case that a sense of acute disappointment mad itself apparent towards the close of the first century, as i evident both from II *Peter* and the appendix to the Fourth Gospel. Moreover, a study of later Christian writings show how tenaciously the belief in a visible return of Jesus held its ground side by side with other eschatological conceptions which owe their origin to Greek rather than to Hebrew sources.

But now, if it be true that the eschatological conceptions of the early Church, and in all probability those also of our Lord Himself, have been shown to be erroneous, how far are w twentieth century Christians committed to a belief in a universal judgment at the Last Day, a belief which even to the thought of Paul had become logically superfluous? Here as elsewhere such glibly uttered phrases as 'Holy Scripture would appear to teach us' are of small value, since the evidence of the New Testament is itself inconsistent and uncertain, and even were it in fact otherwise, texts no longer serve to stifle enquiry or to dragoon opinion. In reality there can be no doubt that, regarded as a concrete future event, and pictured after the manner of the Jewish Apocalypses, no such universal judgment of humanity is to be looked for. The Great Assize, no less than the descent of Jesus into Hades or His ascension to a local heaven, belongs essentially to the eschatological framework of Christian thinking, and as such has no claim, however slender, upon our acceptance.

It is, however, of the first importance to notice that the primitive Eschatology occupies practically no place in the mind of the fourth Evangelist. For this writer (save in one strangely incongruous passage[13]) the old flamboyant imagery of Apocalypse is no more. Judgment has become a continuous and almost automatic process. A future, visible, catastrophic coming of Christ has given place to a present coming, inward and progressively realized. Problems of the fate of Christians who

[13] *St. John* v, 28 f.

have already died, of the condition of the unclothed soul, of the nature of the resurrection body are not discussed. Instead we have the pregnant conception of Eternal Life, viewed as a possession obtainable here and now in this present world through the knowledge of God and Jesus Christ. Nothing could be more marked than the change of atmosphere when we move away from Paul and the Synoptic Gospels to the serene certainty of this unknown disciple. Among New Testament writers he is the Modernist *par excellence*. His task it is to interpret Jesus to a non-Jewish environment. Categories no longer helpful, or alien from the thought of his readers, are quietly dropped; other modes of thought more in harmony with current ideas are boldly accepted as vehicles of Christian truth. Here in this Gospel of Ephesus we have indeed the very charter of Modernism, the justification of theological restatement, the triumphant vindication of essential Christian truth as the answer to human need.

Following the lead of the fourth Evangelist, we can proceed with some confidence to the separation of husk from kernel in primitive Christian theology. As has been already said, the preliminary task of the Modernist more often than not is one of destruction, or at least of careful discrimination between primary and secondary elements in the Christian creed. It may appear that hitherto we have been concerned in this paper with the work of demolishing time-honoured beliefs. But at least the ground has now been cleared for a more positive endeavour, and it is the conviction of the Modernist that nothing of permanent value in the older orthodoxy fails to find its due place in the Modernist creed.

For Traditionalists and Modernists alike Jesus Christ is central. And while the Modernist may confess himself uncertain as to the mode of our Lord's resurrection, or may even hesitate to assert that resurrection is in strictness the right word to use in explanation of what actually occurred, he is yet in no doubt at all as to the fact of the living and present Christ. If the more radical critics are right, and the Easter faith arising from the certainty of a living Jesus actually preceded in point of time a belief in the Empty Tomb, then for Modernists and early disciples alike the inwardly experienced conviction of a present Christ is of greater importance than stories which pur-

port to account for the experience and further to establish its validity by external proofs.

So too with the resurrection of believers. While the Modernist rejects emphatically the crude materialistic belief in a resuscitation of physical particles, and while he is unable to assert any organic connection between the corpse laid in the grave and the spiritual body which, in Paul's words, is the gift of God, he yet shares with Paul and with the earlier followers of Jesus an unshaken belief in the survival of human personality. Like them too he connects his faith in immortality with his belief in the presence of a living Christ. He finds proof of that presence not only in the Easter stories, but no less in the existence of the New Testament, of the Christian Church, the Christian Eucharist, and the Christian Sunday. And he is ready to agree that a doctrine of survival once based on theory alone is now established as fact by the experiences of Easter.

Not of course that he will lightly repudiate the more theoretical and abstract arguments for immortality. While the evidence of the Gospel stories, though valuable, is conflicting, and therefore to some extent unsatisfactory, the testimony of Jesus to the Fatherhood of God is clear and unimpeachable. And it is in the argument from the character of God as Jesus portrays it in word and life that we find the strongest and most readily assimilated evidence for human immortality.

Moreover, while belief in the resurrection of a physical body is jettisoned by the Modernist, while his attitude with reference to the precise nature of spiritual bodies is frankly agnostic, so that he feels himself under no obligation to accept as final even the suggestive language of St. Paul in II *Corinthians* v, yet he is sympathetic even with the crudest theories of resuscitation in as far as the motive behind them is the due safeguarding of a vital truth, the truth of the survival not of a part, but of the whole, of what we mean by human personality.

For the apocalyptic framework of much New Testament thought the Modernist has small use. A three-storied universe belongs to the region of 'Nursery Theology,' and, like all the beliefs of our nursery days, is harmless and even beautiful so long as it is not allowed to interfere with the freedom of adult thinking. The Modernist believes in neither a descent, an

ascension, nor a return of Christ in any sense comparable to that in which these beliefs were held by the early Christians.

To the use of apocalyptic conceptions by our Lord the Modernist is in the main indifferent. He may find insoluble the critical problem of the precise extent to which apocalyptic beliefs are directly attributable to Jesus Himself. And he is only disturbed if the employment by Jesus of an apocalyptic terminology should seem to indicate that He held views of the divine methods which find a place indeed in Jewish Eschatology, but are radically inconsistent with our Lord's central belief in the fatherhood and love of God.

Further, he is willing to admit that even the apocalyptic scheme, taken as a whole, altogether foreign as are its conceptions to the modern outlook, is yet not without value in its insistence on the divine activity, its challenging contrast between things temporal and things eternal. The world-view of Apocalypse is dangerous, as Dr. Inge remarks, if it leads us 'to postulate a second physical world,' but (in the words of the Bishop of Manchester) 'the spiritual value of all eschatological doctrine lies just here. Our temporal life is set against a background of the everlasting. The pictures of the end of the world may vary, but it has an end.'[14]

The words may serve to suggest the question in what sense, if in any, the Modernist can accept the primitive belief in a final judgment of humanity at the Last Day. Certain details of the belief he will definitely reject. Just as he looks for no visible return of Jesus upon the clouds, so he finds no place for an intermediate state of disembodied existence in Hades preparatory to a general resurrection on the day of final judgment. All this is husk, not kernel. And the Modernist, freed from the necessity of giving allegiance to apocalyptic conceptions as such, carries the thought of Paul to its logical conclusion, and if he postulates the existence of a spiritual body at all, is quite ready to believe that it clothes the soul in the hour of death. Nor does he think of judgment as deferred until the day of the Great Assize. For him judgment is individual rather than collective, not an isolated event at life's conclusion, but the inevit-

[14] *Christus Veritas*, p. 189.

able culmination of a process which, as the fourth Evangelist suggests, originated with the attainment of moral responsibility.

Whatever the conception of the Day of Judgment may have lost in outward pageantry for the mind of a more prosaic and literal age, the judgment-seat of Christ remains. It is by His standards that individuals and nations alike must inevitably be judged. And provided we do not delude ourselves into the belief that our modern outlook is precisely on a par with the conceptions of primitive Eschatology, we may go yet further and find proof in history not only of many 'comings' of the eternal Christ, but of a series of Judgment Days, of great moments when, as Dr. Temple expresses it, 'the authority of Christ was vindicated by the catastrophe in which its rejection issued.'[15]

What of the fate of the individual at death? What of heaven and hell, and the conditions requisite for membership in the rival kingdoms of the damned and the blessed? Here too picture-book theology has left its mark upon all our thinking; here too an attitude of reverent agnosticism is to be commended, while we may rightly shrink from the over-confident assertions of popular orthodoxy; here too the apocalyptic framework must be allowed to fall away before the minimum of positive knowledge at our disposal can be profitably assimilated.

We are back again at Christ's thought of God and His belief in the infinite value of every human soul. Of the rival doctrines of Universalism, Conditional Immortality, Everlasting Punishment, we shall say but little. Here dogmatism is singularly out of place. Yet one assertion may be dogmatically made. No doctrine of everlasting punishment can ever hold a place in the Modernist creed. Even were the evidence of the New Testament on behalf of the doctrine clear and unassailable, which it is not, the position would not be different. The truth of Christ's revelation of God as love is self-verifying, and no doctrine of age-long torment is compatible with such a faith.

On the other hand, it is clearly going beyond our information to assert categorically a doctrine of Universalism. If we choose we may say that no single soul will ultimately be lost whom Christ can save. Certainly it is true that if God is love His will

[15] *Ibid*, p. 202.

and purpose must be the attainment by each individual soul of its highest capabilities. But given freedom of choice, the soul's final refusal of God cannot be ruled out as impossible. And in face of such refusal, to quote Dr. Temple once more, 'there is nothing left that Almighty Love can do with such a soul except to bring it to an end.'[16]

Of the conditions under which life is lived after the putting off of the body we can, from the nature of the case, have no present experience. Of its quality, whether in heaven or in hell, whether in fellowship with God or in alienation from Him, something at least can be already known. We may assert that any life worthy of the name will give scope for the progressive development of personality, and for the more complete fulfilment of man's highest aspirations after God and goodness.

If, following a natural impulse, we venture upon the further elaboration of our picture of heaven, we shall do so bearing in mind the warning of Dr. Inge, who tells us that 'imaginative symbols tend to crystalize as rapidly as linguistic metaphors, and mythology is the result.'[17] The Christian to-day will go for his pictures of the after-life rather to the utterances of the great poets than to the flamboyant imaginings of Hebrew Apocalyptic, and concentrating his thought on heaven as being beyond all else fellowship with a Person, will declare himself at once incurably agnostic and supremely confident in face of death's adventure, being content to say with Tennyson:

> 'For tho' from out our bourne of Time and Place
> The flood may bear me far,
> I hope to see my Pilot face to face
> When I have crost the bar.'

or with John Masefield:

> 'Death opens unknown doors. It is most grand to die.'

[16] *Ibid*, p. 208.
[17] *Modern Churchman*, March 1922.

WHY WE BELIEVE IN JESUS CHRIST

By the Rev. J. F. Bethune-Baker, D.D., F.B.A., Lady Margaret's Professor of Divinity, Cambridge.

WHY do we believe in Jesus Christ?

I take it that this question, propounded at this Conference, has in view the great shifting of the grounds of belief among educated Christians of our own generation. We believe in Jesus Christ. We believe that our house is built on rock. But so much of our old building has decayed, there are so many wings of it that have crumbled away, and so many rooms in which we cannot live, that we feel we need to examine again the foundations of the central block, the rooms of which seem never to have been unduly crowded. Have our central convictions about Jesus Christ a solid foundation?

Of the many ways along which an answer to this question might be approached—and no one here will expect to do more than approach an answer—I invite you this morning to explore two only. Both of them are ways of actual human experience, the one the way of our knowledge of ourselves as we are, and the other the way of knowledge of the history of the world and Man in the past.

Memories of childhood, of our earliest prayers and hymns, would lead most of us to the one main reason for our belief in Jesus Christ—none the less a good reason for us because if we had been born of Moslem parents we should have had a similar reason for belief in Mohammed. Jesus was established in the environment in which we first came to consciousness, in a position mysterious and appealing. From Him and in Him first we caught the idea of the sacred in its most human and romantic form. We came to associate with Him all that is high and inspiring. Truth, Beauty, Goodness met in Him. Each is adorable, and in the Person in whom they meet we were taught to see God as by a mirror, the visible of the invisible. He became the centre of our religious ideas and experience. We were engaged once for all in a personal relationship to Him, the

historical person who lived in the world, was put to death in the flesh, but is still alive in the spirit, ever ready to help us in all things good. He was to be our example, and through Him the power to follow it would come. Our loyalty was pledged. We were enlisted to be Christ's faithful soldiers and servants to our life's end.

And though we found, unconsciously, before we knew the words, how many compromises were accepted, how far ideals were from being realised in the world which thus enthroned Him, yet we learnt how this faith in Jesus Christ had inspired and directed the lives of men and women to ends and achievements which were obviously high and noble, and given them the double courage both to endure and to dare. And we have all had, in some degree, similar experience of our own. Our sense of sin has at least one of its roots here, and the return to allegiance redeems.

I would not use this experience in any merely pragmatic way. I am not asking you to consider the heart's desire or human needs or hopes. I would accept whatever light may be thrown by new investigations and new hypotheses on the nature of man's personality and the processes by which it is shaped, however they be labelled. I am in no way concerned to distinguish sharply the objective and the subjective, the divine and the human. It is human experience, human awareness, perception, apprehension with which we have to deal: subject and environment. I am only concerned to say that if in the special experience to which I am referring Jesus Christ stands for the spiritual values which His life represents — and His life is His own personal experience — then the fact that this experience has been ever since continuously and persistently renewed again and again is very strong evidence that the truth about the world and man is to be found in this direction. Jesus does not stand as an isolated phenomenon in human life. Historically he was in line with Hebrew prophets and psalmists, and such men as could conceive of the world as coming into being by the action of the Spirit of God on already existing matter and, by successive stages, culminating in Man in the image of God after His likeness, from chaos to cosmos, from the green grass to man; and yet further, from their standpoint of experience in a world

which seemed to be all askew, could conceive of the coming of One who would put all right. And again historically there is an innumerable company of men and women who have been His spiritual kin, and in all varieties of conditions and in many different ways of life have convinced themselves that the real values, the inner or real meaning of life, the truth of things, is to be found where He found it. That is the way to win your soul.

My argument is that a massive array of human experience—the most real thing we know—supports the reading of the meaning of the world which we infer in its general character from what we know of the thought and life of Jesus.

The question is whether man's true constitution and nature is really represented by Jesus, and the argument is that the wide response which this representation arouses is a good reason for believing it to be true. The *testimonium animae naturaliter Christianae* has gained in cogency since Tertullian's and Augustine's time if it be taken in this sense. The experience of Jesus is on the highroad of the true course of man's life: it is not pathological.

Let us put this argument in another way. Let us take a characteristic and certainly genuine saying of Jesus: 'Whosoever would save his life shall lose it; and whosoever shall lose his life for my sake shall save [*or* find] it.' The core of the Christian gospel of life is there. The religious experience of Jesus is summed up in it. Yet I do not believe that it is true because Jesus said it, or on any authority from without. But, rather, because Jesus said it, I believe in Jesus. It is because saying after saying of His, action after action, His attitude to life and its experiences, joy and sorrow and pain and death, 'finds' me, if I may use Coleridge's word, that I believe that what he says is the truth of my own nature. In this respect He is the true Humanist. And because in this way I believe that His insight into the values of human life and the reality of things was true, I can use of Him in the third person such affirmations as the author of the Fourth Gospel puts in His own mouth—by what I hold to be a literary device that is also true interpretation of His significance and place in human history. He is the Way, the Life, the Truth; the Light of the World;

the 'Resurrection,' in the sense that to know Him is to know both God and Man: to be in fellowship with Him, in such wise that we share His spirit and have our lives directed by it, is to be living the true, the eternal, life.

If others of His own or other races and other tongues, before Him or independently of Him, discerned much of what we associate peculiarly with Him, that was no stumbling-block to early Christian apologists. The prologue to the Fourth Gospel, the Gospel of the Spirit, St. Paul in a measure, Justin at his best, and Clement of Alexandria—to name but a few—recognized the Divine guiding of the human race as a whole and manifestations of it in individuals. And it is surely no stumbling-block to us to whom the appearance of discontinuity argues simply gaps in our knowledge or defects of observation. The originality, the newness, we find in Jesus is that of one to whom the best that could be found elsewhere of insight and wisdom and reflexion on experience and soaring speculation and transcendence of the finite—the best of all there had been of seeing the infinite in and through the finite—seems to belong by native right, so that it is all His own, and it flows from Him spontaneously whatever the special problem, or occupation, or situation at the moment may be. It is just the natural expression of Himself. We have the sense that He lived sanely and securely in this sphere or on this plane, that though He belonged to His own age in His ways of picturing reality, and had no share in what is called modern knowledge, and stood aloof even from the practical activities of His own time and some of the permanent concerns and interests and deepest affections of normal life in the world as it was and is; yet in all these matters, too, if we could have His mind, His spirit, directed to them, there is no guidance we could trust as we could trust His.

This, I believe, is our main reason for believing in Him—the experience of life itself; and the reason grows stronger as that experience grows longer, so that we know a man's life has worth in the measure in which we can write as his epitaph 'He was beginning to be a disciple of Jesus,' whether he knew it or not.

The validity of this reason for belief in Jesus Christ is in no way impaired by our knowledge that we cannot trust as historical

in the narrower sense of the word the details of the picture of His life given us in our Gospels. Those who are familiar with the work of the last fifty years on the Gospels are for the most part agreed that real historical memories underlie them, and that they contain much real history and faithful record of teaching and incident. There is neither deliberate falsification nor conscious idealization. But we know how inevitably the personal element enters into statements of experience, and the presuppositions of those who are the subjects of the experience determine the account of it they give. And, besides, it is agreed that none of the gospels as we have them took form till the new Religion had been many years in being and Christians and local Churches wanted coherent accounts of the origin of their religion for their own edification or for others to read who wanted, or ought, to be informed. So there is no argument and no reasoning that can prevail against the view, which is widely current to-day among Christians, that some of our narratives, which have been regarded as plain records of actual incidents, belong not to the prosaic plane of history but to the poetry of Faith. If poetry is too vague a term, more exact expressions are to hand, ugly as they are—the aetiology or the aretology of already existing religious belief. Why do we feel towards Jesus as we do? How could He be what we believe He is? Or again, He is our Lord, the Son of God: let us praise and magnify Him as we ought. Some of our narratives are answers to these questions or expressions of this religious instinct. They shew us vividly the profound impression produced by the experience of which Jesus was the immediate subject, as He was also the centre of similar experience for some of His contemporaries and earliest followers. They shew us the conditions in which the new religion sprang up and the Christian Church came into being. It is real life in which it had its origin, and when we understand that it is a picture-book rather than a history in which some of the features of this experience are described, we can form a more intimate appreciation of it and the better enter into it ourselves, if we will, and relate it more surely to our own conditions.

Nor, again, is such a belief as I have indicated dependent on the theological system which was gradually built up on the basis

of traditional beliefs and customs, and the *data* of gospels and epistles invested, from the time when the collection was made, with infallible authority as transmitting both true history in detail and true interpretation of its significance.

We cannot grant the premisses. Infallibilities of all kinds are gone. Many a presupposition about God and the world and man that was pre-Christian enters into the scheme and was not Christianized by being made part of the structure of the doctrine of the Church. To many students of it to-day the outstanding characteristic of this theological system as a whole is the fact that the central Christian conviction that Jesus Christ, the Man-God and God-Man, was the revelation of reality, was not allowed free course in it.

I am not proposing to ask you to follow up in detail this line of thought to-day, or to weigh the value of our theological system in the past. We know that the whole system needs re-basing and re-interpreting in relation to convictions, intellectual and ethical, that guide the best life and thought of our time. So it is not to our traditional theological system that we look for reasons for our belief in Jesus Christ to-day. But the fact that it must be in our minds leads me to what seems to me to be as sure a ground of belief as the one we have considered.

Our whole attitude to Jesus to-day would be gravely affected if knowledge that has accrued, especially in recent years, did not justify belief in Him as Incarnate Son of God, very Man of very Man, very God of very God. I pause for a moment to emphasize the fact that Christian Faith is in One who was at once both very Man of very Man and very God of very God. It is as heretical not to believe that reality in its aspect of manhood was manifest in Him as not to believe that reality in its aspect of godhead was manifest in Him. No alternations of personality were allowed in the formal doctrine of the Church: He was one, and the One was human and divine. The tradition of the historical experience was strong enough to maintain itself so far. But its implications as regards Man's true relation to God were so remote from common experience and the ideas of the various religiosities and philosophies of the times during which Christian doctrines were in the making, that the duality excluded by the fundamental Christian conviction permeates

the whole ecclesiastical system. It is only this fundamental Christian conviction that our enquiry this morning has in view. In the light of modern knowledge, how can we regard Jesus in His personal life and being as revealing to us, not just here Man as he really is, and there God, but steadily and continuously the truth of God and Man? I can only attempt to indicate the answer which I am sure is in the minds of many here—the answer which many more have discerned and are waiting to hear, not from free-lances or groups in the Church, but from the Church itself.

There has come to our own age, mainly in my own lifetime, and largely through the patient labours and insight of truth-loving men of our own race, a revelation of Truth which as surely marks a new era in the history of human progress as did the emergence of Jesus. Though it may be long before all the implications of it are worked out, the vital truth, of which the term 'Evolution' is perhaps an inconvenient symbol rather than the best expression, is established. Defence of the Christian Religion which does not recognize this truth will not serve the Church of the future. What is needed is a gospel wholly permeated by it, in its history, its philosophy, its ethics—its whole theology which will also be its anthropology and its eschatology. In the new perspective in which we see the facts of life, does Jesus Christ still hold His central place?

What the new revelation shews us is that the world and everything in it, including Man, have come to be what they are in virtue of inherent powers and capacities, by processes that have been continuous and orderly through time, in computing which a thousand years is only as it were a unit. The highest resultant of the process, so far as we know, is Man, who alone is able, in some measure, to transcend and, as concerns himself at least, to direct the process. The evolutionary process is still going on, and what Man may become can only be imagined. He is clearly not yet so perfectly adapted to his environment, nor so mastered by it, nor so specialized, that further progress is precluded.

I have used the word 'progress.' A wrong use may have been made in the past of the idea of Progress and the indefinite perfectibility of Man. Recent protests against it may be as

salutary as they have been piquant. But the fact is established that the chart of man's history, if it shews him pursuing blind alleys at times, and, with all the odds apparently against him, learning his way very slowly, with leaps and misses and long periods of stagnation (and this is just what I understand our biologists find in their studies in lower organic life); and if this chart of man's history shews him never making progress except by struggle and suffering; yet it shews a sustained and persistent rise in the scale of life from the time when the variation occurred and the human being was differentiated from the common stock of man and ape. If our charts are large enough, we see that, although the lines which have risen high may drop or vanish altogether, always other lines begin to rise. Taking the history of the race as a whole, it shews persistency of effort, recuperation, and renewal as an inherent characteristic of Man. If our present civilization should indeed prove to be some such blind alley as those in which men lost themselves in the past, yet all the evidence available suggests that thousands of years hence some other civilization higher than our own will have arisen in its place. And this persistent urge in the race as a whole, through failure after failure; this striving after a good, the nature of which is imperfectly understood; this character of Man, which belongs to his very constitution and is as much his own as his body is his own, is best interpreted—for it is persons who are concerned—in terms of an eternal purpose informing and guiding the race to its highest good while never violating the inherent moral independence of free personality. In the moral world of persons there is no room for Omnipotence as irresistible force, nor any way but the way of free co-operation.[1]

Purpose in detail it is often beyond us to discern. Mr. Hardy's fascinating picture of the unconscious will of the universe, with its logical contradiction, is drawn in the light of experience. But we have to look from the chaos of atoms to the cosmos, from the amoeba to primitive man, from primitive man to the highest man who has yet come to be. And then, though the end may still be hidden from us, what we know of the past suggests that there is an end, a purpose to 'fashion all things fair' through men and their failures, and that it is in men them-

[1] See on this point, *e.g.* Dr. Oman's *Grace and Personality*.

selves that the consciousness is dim and the will weak. They could adapt themselves to it and be its expression if they would, for they are already its partial expression. We believe in Jesus Christ because He is to us the type of the perfect adaptation and expression.

I have to write this paper independently of the one we shall have heard on the question *Why we believe in God.* I assume that the conception of purpose will have figured in it, and the corollary that where purpose can be detected personal activity is implied. To recognize an eternal purpose in Man and his history is to see a Divine activity operating in him and a Divine end to be achieved not only in him but through him : so that he is the impersonation of the purpose, which lives in him and works through him, slowly adapting to the end in view, stage by stage, everything in him that does not serve it.

If we left God out of account, we should have no clue to the meaning of the facts of the universe and life as we know them now. With that hypothesis and the idea of Incarnation to guide us, they become coherent. Intelligence answers intelligence. Deep calls to deep, and deep responds. The whole world is incarnation in process : in man it becomes increasingly personal : and in the course of the process, ' in the fulness of the times,' in Jesus Christ the manifestation of God in Humanity reached its highest stage.

So with the evidence of the evolution of the world and man to guide us, we are led, no less surely than our forefathers were led, to belief in Jesus Christ, which we can express in their terms though many of our presuppositions are different from theirs. It seems clear to me that St. John in his doctrine of the Logos and the Spirit, and in such a saying as ' My Father worketh hitherto and I work,' and St. Paul with his idea of eternal purpose and the patience of God and the Christ in whom and through whom and unto whom all things were created, the Christ who is in process of ' being fulfilled,' were pointing to the truth of Evolution that has come to us.

If it be felt that this kind of belief in the Incarnate Son of God, who emerges in the process of human history and enters human life as the manifestation of the truth of Humanity, to be the *Christus Consummator*, the Type, the Example, the Inspira-

tion of Mankind, is belief in a Jesus Christ 'from below' and not in the Son of God who 'came down from heaven,' we must insist that it is not so to anyone who sees God in the process all through. Anyone who still holds to the dichotomies of Man and God, the natural and the supernatural, discovery and revelation, and the like, and does not see that the Christian doctrine of the Incarnation implies that the process of human life is at once and inseparably both human and divine, at once both 'from below' and 'from above,' and that it can never reach its goal till the divine is fully expressed in the human, must be left to the old orthodoxies and infallibilities which guided our forefathers to noble lives.

Meanwhile, the fact that after 1900 years we are beginning to understand that ruin threatens our 'Christian' civilization unless we can strengthen and develop the Christian factors in it, and that now for the first time in human history the ideal scheme of life that Jesus sketched is beginning to win its way on its intrinsic merits, confirms, I think, the main argument of this paper. The ideal of the Kingdom of God on earth, at once personal and social, is envisaged, no doubt, much more as 'the relief of man's estate' than as 'the glory of God.' Jesus Himself may be far less regarded to-day as the Saviour of mankind, because none of the doctrines of Fall of Man and Atonement and Heaven and Hell, which are generally known as Christian, are credible to-day. But His ideas and ideals as to the relations that ought to exist between man and man as a condition of human society are becoming socially effective as they never were while those doctrines reigned and the world was regarded as a perishing world disfigured by Man rather than as God's world, potentially and progressively, but only through man's free co-operation, His perfect organ :—the end to be as much Man's achievement as God's.

WHY DO WE BELIEVE IN JESUS CHRIST?

By Miss Maude Royden.

THE question 'Why do we believe in Jesus Christ?' is the more difficult to answer because it is first of all difficult to know exactly in what sense the phrase 'believe in' is to be interpreted. The question has often been put to me, personally, in a way which suggested that the questioner was rather anxious to discover me in a heresy than to learn what I really thought. The question 'Do you believe in Jesus Christ?' being answered in the affirmative, is followed by 'Do you believe in the divinity of Christ?' And this, again, by 'Do you believe in the deity of Christ?'

I confess at once that my philosophical and theological training is not sufficient to enable me to discover exactly what is meant by these distinctions between the divinity and the deity of our Lord. I content myself by affirming that I believe in his divinity, and I am then confronted with the astonishing assurance that I cannot possibly believe in it unless I believe also in the Virgin Birth. At this point I am obliged to pause. A study of other great religions shows me that miraculous birth has been claimed for many others besides that of the Founder of Christianity. Dr. Fosdick, indeed, tells us that Moses, Confucius, and Mohammed are the only great founders of religions for whom such birth was *not* claimed. It was claimed for Gautama Buddha, Zoroaster, Lao-Tsze, Mahavira, Pythagoras, Plato, and even Augustus Caesar!

When I am told that I cannot believe in Jesus Christ unless I am prepared to believe in a miraculous birth, I ask myself what ground anyone has for such an arbitrary bringing together of these two beliefs. One might set up in a row these persons for whom miraculous birth has been claimed and proceed to investigate whose claim was the best founded. It will be replied, of course, that evidence on such a subject is impossible. I think that can be pressed too far. Of course, anything in the nature

of scientific evidence is impossible, but I cannot see why some kind of historical evidence is not possible. Such an astounding event must, for those to whom it is a possibility, rest upon the character of the persons who proclaimed it, upon the possibility of their knowing what they were talking about, upon their motives in proclaiming it, the importance they attached to it, and so on. For instance, if we knew more than we do know about the character of St. Joseph, or even of our Lady, and if they proclaimed this belief as vital to the Christian religion in spite of derision or of slanderous misunderstanding, or if our Lord himself had done so, that would undoubtedly constitute historical evidence. Obviously historical evidence cannot be scientific evidence; but historical evidence is a possibility and is accepted. But who in their senses ever approached the subject of belief in Christ, in his Divinity or in his Deity, in that way? Who ever dreamed of setting up the various candidates for divine honours, and then asking himself about which of these there was the most reliable evidence as to miraculous birth? Those who believe in the miraculous birth of our Lord do so on grounds which have been stated by our President (Dean Inge), that a unique event may quite logically be held to take place in a unique way. In other words, if our Lord is indeed a perfect revelation of the mind of God, if he was indeed divine, it is quite reasonable to believe that the unique event of his entrance into human history must take place in a unique way. But that means that we believe in the Virgin Birth because we believe in the divinity of Christ, and not that we believe in the divinity of Christ because we believe in the Virgin Birth.

This brings us to our real ground for 'believing in Jesus Christ,' which is not any miraculous event in connection with his birth, but his own nature. It is, of course, the greatness of the moral stature, the beauty of the divine grace in Jesus of Nazareth, which makes us accept, believe in, worship him.

Here, however, a rather curious change has taken place in the way in which people accept or reject Jesus of Nazareth. Of his reality as a historical figure very few people now feel any doubt; of his greatness as a power in the world's history few people doubt either; but as to the moral perfection of the character, as to the beauty of his ethic and his teaching, there

is a certain questioning. Among ordinary people who are not scholars, who are hardly even students, there is now a difficulty in accepting the statement that our Lord was a perfect human being; and since I am convinced that our belief in the divinity of Christ is based on our discovery of his moral perfection, that seems to me a point to which it is necessary for scholars to address themselves. It has been brought home to me vividly because I often meet people who tell me that their great difficulty in spiritual life is their terrible familiarity with the Gospels; they are what has been called 'Gospel-hardened'; and they find it almost impossible to attain to any freshness of view about the personality and life of our Lord. I have suggested that it would be a good plan for them to ask themselves whether there was anything in our Lord's life which shocked them; whether there was anything in what he said, or was, or did which really, if they were perfectly honest with themselves, they would admit to be shocking; something which jarred on their taste or revolted their moral sense, or from which their judgment dissented.

I have now an extraordinary collection of the criticisms made by ordinary men and women with regard to our Lord's conduct and teaching, ranging from the most trifling to the really serious and difficult. Very few people, perhaps none, are so spiritually sound that they have never been outraged (if they would be frank with themselves) by our Lord's teaching or his conduct. Either such people lack imagination to realise how our Lord's words and acts would strike them if they saw him to-day, among their friends and in this twentieth century world, or they place an inhibition on their critical faculties, feeling that they must not criticize him. If they face the question, as a living practical reality of to-day, they will generally admit that there are things in our Lord's teaching, and even in his conduct or personality, which repel them. The most usual, of course, are such incidents as that of the Syro-Phoenician woman. Men who have a natural difficulty in believing that women can be better employed than in getting somebody's dinner ready are scandalized at the rebuke to Martha; and women themselves, who often have to be Marthas when they would infinitely prefer to be Mary's, are a little wounded by our Lord's apparent lack of sympathy with

their particular difficulties. Some are scandalized at our Lord's merciful attitude to sins of the flesh. Others, perhaps more commonly to-day, are more shocked at his denunciation of the Pharisee and the Scribe. People who believe that, by assuming that all is well we can ensure that all will be well, complain of his warning to St. Peter that he was going to fail: our Lord, they think, would have been better advised if he had been quite sure that Peter would *not* fail! The cleansing of the Temple has scandalized many pacifists. (Let me say frankly that I am a pacifist myself and I see the difficulty.) An earnest temperance worker and a devoted Christian once confessed to me in an outburst of candour that she 'did wish our Lord had not turned that water into wine.' Our Lord's message to Herod, 'Go, tell that fox,' shocks the polite, while the miraculous draught of fishes appals the vegetarian. Even some of the parables of our Lord have been criticized in the same spirit. I had from China only the other day a list of grievances against Christian teaching. One of them, it may surprise some of you to hear, was that the ethic of a man could not be very high who actually commended the conduct of the 'wise virgins,' who, although they may have been wiser, were certainly more unpleasant than the foolish virgins. A more beautiful parable, they said, would have condemned the wise virgins for not sharing their oil, even if they went short themselves. Not in far-away China, but in England and at this very conference, I have heard it said that the treatment of the elder brother in the parable of the Prodigal Son left much to be desired. That the Unjust Steward should be commended scandalizes many people, and still more the assertion that there is more joy in heaven over one sinner that repenteth than over ninety-nine just persons.

This difficulty goes much deeper than these perhaps rather trifling criticisms. There comes a point at which most of us ask ourselves whether the other-worldliness of Christ was altogether wise: whether the acceptance of his teaching about non-resistance (for example) would not make a man both despised and despicable. That kind of difficulty goes to the heart of our attitude towards our Lord's moral nature, and affects very deeply the question 'Why do we believe in Jesus Christ?'

I believe that there is a lack of spiritual soundness in all these criticisms. The attempt to find out why our Lord said some of the things that sound so harsh or so startling, or so unreal in this difficult and prosaic world—the effort to discover why he said them, without assuming beforehand that he must have been right—the frank acknowledgment of the possibility of his being wrong, without which one cannot really judge or criticize—the effort to reach his mind and understand why he acted as he did, for example, to the Syro-Phoenician woman, or why he gave such apparently impossible advice to people in general, has convinced me that there is always some lack of spiritual soundness in oneself that makes that criticism possible: that there is a lack of imagination, a failure in the sense of poetry, a stupidity which fails to perceive the point of wit or the edge of irony; or much more (I think) a fear that our Lord, if we accept what he said, asks more than we are prepared to give. A certain selfishness, a timidity, a short-sightedness has, in my experience, always been at the bottom of every doubt that I have felt about our Lord's moral perfection.

As I have tried to understand him, his moral greatness has soared out of the sight of my judgment, and I have arrived at the point at which I am willing to believe that those things which are still difficult and still obscure, which still to my insignificant and slovenly judgment remain incomprehensible, are as perfect as the rest: that the thing which troubles me, troubles me only because I cannot see far enough, nor am I courageous or wise enough to understand. It is extraordinarily difficult to speak about the character of our Lord without sounding quite insupportably pert; but since this is the way in which many of us have come to Christ, I can trust him to be indulgent and to forgive it. The beauty that outsoars our judgment, the moral sublimity that leaves us willing to suspend our judgment at last, this it is which forces one back to belief in the divinity of Christ, and leaves one unable to accept the kind of—dare I say, criticism? I know it was not intended as a criticism, and yet it seemed to me to imply a criticism—that was made in the papers and by some of the speakers on the subject of 'the Ethic of the Kingdom.' I cannot believe that a Teacher so great would commend to humanity an ethic of which it might be said with truth

that it is 'like undiluted oxygen, which men cannot breathe.' Neither can I believe that our Lord really left on one side, deliberately or not, the whole question of man's citizenship. Our Lord belonged to a race which was tormented by political problems. He lived in an age when the Roman government of Palestine was a harsh and cruel tyranny, among a people who indulged in sporadic efforts at rebellion. Such efforts took place in our Lord's own life. How is it possible to believe that, living at such a time and in such a country, he could give fundamental and eternal teaching without realizing that the most poignant tragedies in the human heart are those which concern the (apparent) conflict between his individual and his public duties? As soon as man, in the process of evolution, became 'a political animal' this difficulty arose. It is a human difficulty. Not to know, not to realize, that this is one of the most terrible of human problems, one which is so searching that sometimes it almost crazes the brain, was surely to be something less than even a great human teacher! For every one of us here knows it. We know how hard it is to decide whether the ethics of private life are possible—or how far they are possible—in public life. We have to decide between our ideals as Christians and our apparent duty as citizens. The difficulty arises in extreme form when war breaks out and Christian men have to decide whether they will be soldiers or not. That sort of difficulty goes terribly deep, and is essentially human, because man, being a political animal, must live in a society; and the moment he does so this conflict is set up in his nature. Again and again men have been broken by it, maddened by it, driven to despair. That our Lord should not have known that the principles that he was laying down must inevitably intensify that conflict and make more difficult still the question of the reconciling of individual and public duty, suggests a narrowness of heart, a dullness of imagination, which are inconceivable in so great a poet and a prophet. He came 'not to bring peace but a sword.' Surely that is exactly what he has done! He has made it a thousand times more difficult to decide where the private and the public right join issue, or if they ever do join issue; and if he did not know that, how could it be said of him that 'he knew what was in man'? Had Christ indeed sought only to give

us teaching which could apply to our individual spiritual life, would anyone have thought him worth crucifying? Would he not have lived to an honoured old age, like Gautama Buddha? —surely the greatest of all spiritual teachers that the world has known except Christ himself, but one who never brought upon himself that last and final struggle with the secular power, just because his teaching lacked the universal element which made it a matter of conduct in human surroundings, and not one of a monastic life in retreat from the world. I think it was the discovery that our Lord's teaching was more than individual that shocked the world into conflict with him. Like the teaching of a great scientist who makes us realize that the laws of nature run through the universe and affect not merely the atom but the farthest star, so was the discovery that the law of Christ runs through all life. I am always grateful to the Christian Scientists for inventing that glorious phrase 'Christ—Scientist.' Christ had no knowledge of modern science, true; but what a scientific attitude of mind! When he laid down a great spiritual principle, it was in the same way that the scientist lays down a great scientific law, knowing that it affects not only the atom but the universe, not only the spiritual life of the individual man, but his civic life, his national life, his international life, every relationship that he has.

I believe it was the discovery, partly conscious, partly unconscious, that our Lord's teaching, followed out, would inevitably claim the whole of human activity, that it would cover the whole of human life, and bring the believer again and again into conflict with the judgment of the world, that first of all chilled and finally infuriated those who received him with such joy at first. As long as our Lord's gracious message was one of consolation and of hope, the people received him gladly: but when they began to realize that this consolation and this hope were to be bought at the price of 'losing their life,' and losing it not only or chiefly in the physical sense, but in a sense so heart-searching that it terrifies to think of it; when people began to realize that, they walked with him no more.

Such an attitude, such an ethic provoked at once a passion of love—which is, in fact, more than love; which is worship—and an equally strong passion of hostility. It provokes our

hostility precisely because we are afraid; because there is in us an awareness that we cannot reach it, we cannot face it. We realize that only those can practise the Christian ethic who are like Christ. Now, therefore, we do not say 'we believe in the teaching of Christ,' but '*we believe in Christ*,' and his teaching is possible to us and will be practised by us only in proportion as we have the spirit of Christ.

Dr. Douglas White said the other day that if we saw a man who put up with indignity, outrage and injustice, without an effort to defend himself, we should rightly despise him, and I suppose there were few of us here who did not realize how much of truth there is in that. Yet we see Christ reviled, and reviling not again; treated with the most shameful indignity, suffering a hideous and agonizing death; and in that scene perceive a deathless majesty, a sublimity and a glory so great that we can only worship. Is not that because it is only possible to Christ to carry out the teaching of Christ? That is why he said 'I am the Way, the Truth, and the Life'—not only 'I show the way,' but 'I am the Way.' For only those who are Christ's can live up to the ethic of Christ. This is no excuse for failure; it is simply an explanation of why we fail. It is an explanation of the fact that we go on believing in Christ in spite of our continued individual and national failures to practise the ethic of Christ.

I have not attempted in this paper to distinguish between my belief in Christ as a man and Christ as God, and I have done this purposely, because I find that I believe that Christ was the perfect revelation of God because I have found in him a perfect human being; and I believe that most of us believe in the divinity of Christ for that reason, and feel, with Professor Bethune-Baker, that the two are one. I suggest that those of you who speak with authority would do a very great service if you would induce people to believe that this age-old difficulty about the divinity and the humanity of Christ is not so much solved by modern philosophy as that it has vanished. As long as people think of God and man as two separate things, divided by an infinite gulf, the difficulty must always remain; but when they think, as I believe the modern man and woman do think, of God as everywhere, transcendant and immanent, in all human

beings, and throughout and beyond the universe—when the gulf has disappeared, when there is no longer a final gulf between God himself and man, what becomes of the difficulty about the personality of Christ? I remember Mr. Archie Turner saying years ago, 'In a sense every star and every flower is an incarnation.' Surely in a still deeper sense every human being is an incarnation. Believing that, the nature of Christ ceases to be at any rate an intellectual or philosophical difficulty. I believe that in Jesus we have a perfect revelation of God; that no part of his being was shut out from God; that God was perfectly revealed there; and I suggest that we can only come to that conclusion when we have reached the conclusion that Christ is humanly perfect, and that it is only in this way that God is able to reveal himself to our human understanding.

THE ETHIC OF THE KINGDOM

By W. R. Sorley, Litt.D., LL.D., F.B.A.

'THE Ethic of the Kingdom' is quite a modern phrase; it was the 'Gospel (or good tidings) of the Kingdom' that Christ proclaimed (*Mt.* iv, 23). He did not come to promulgate a new code, but with the promise of a new life. The new life would indeed be a life of righteousness and the Kingdom a righteous Kingdom: they were essentially moral, therefore. But there was no suggestion that this idea of righteousness was entirely new: it is presupposed as already there and crying out for fulfilment (*Mt.* v, 17). Traditional ideas, no doubt, stood in need of correction; but, even in correcting them, Christ associated the new meaning and application which He gave them with the earlier teaching. 'Ye have heard that it was said of them of old time . . . but I say unto you' (*Mt.* vii, 21). These words mark a contrast but not a mere opposition. The lawgivers of old had forbidden offences; He pointed out that the offence lay in the heart, in the evil desires and will. Others before Him had said 'love your neighbour'; His life gave a new meaning to the word, and His disciples are bidden to love one another as

He loved them. And with this is connected the new duty which perhaps distinguishes Christian morality from all that went before it or which was uninfluenced by it in later times—'love your enemies, do good to them that hate you, bless them that curse you, pray for them that despitefully use you' (*Luke* vi, 27).

Accordingly the Christian Ethic is not so much a new system of rules, or a system at all, as a way of life; and in its central nature it is a new way of life, for Christ proclaimed that He Himself was the way. Not very long ago it was common to distinguish sharply the ethical side of Christianity from its theological or religious side. It was said that the Christian Ethic might be retained as a standard for what was best in human conduct but that all assertions or implications about God or the God-consciousness of Jesus must be discarded. This was offered as a sort of compromise with the liberal spirit; but the compromise has broken down. Whatever views may be held about the person of Christ, He can't be left out. The public—both intellectual and proletariat—that has thrown off its allegiance to Him has changed its attitude also to His way of life, and has adopted new standards or revived older and pre-Christian ones.

We must go warily if we try to make the Christian Ethic into a system or even to lay down the principles for such a system. For we have to express in very general terms teaching which was in the first instance nearly always addressed to particular persons in a given set of circumstances. We have to distinguish between the principle and its application, and then we may have to fit the principle to conditions which differ in some important ways from those to which it was originally applied.

Both in precept and in practice two things are involved: the principle upon which the right course depends and the special circumstances or conditions which determine the application of the principle. The interpretation of all popular and powerful ethical teaching ought to keep both things in view, and it will go astray if it loses sight of either. The interpretation of the Christian ethic has at times suffered from both of these sources of error. On the one hand appeal has been made to isolated texts, torn from their context, and they have been used as if they were universal principles applicable to every kind of cir-

cumstance. This kind of appeal was never justified. Christ Himself showed His disciples that different times called for different methods. The seventy were sent forth 'as lambs in the midst of wolves,' with the order 'Carry no purse, no wallet, no shoes' (*Luke* x, 4); but towards the end of His life a new occasion called for another method: 'And He said unto them, But now, he that hath a purse, let him take it, and likewise a wallet: and he that hath no sword, let him sell his cloak, and buy one' (*Luke* xxii, 36). Conduct may have to be varied to meet the varying issues of life; but every issue is to be met in the spirit of Christ and His teaching.

Reliance upon the isolated text is no longer so common as it once was, except amongst the critics of Christianity; more often one is apt to fall into the opposite extreme of setting inconvenient precepts aside as applicable only to bygone social conditions and ignoring the principle which they express. Strangely enough, this latter attitude receives support from a prominent school of New Testament scholars. It is held by these scholars that the whole of Christ's teaching was dominated by His belief in the speedy coming of the Son of Man in the clouds from heaven. This event was to happen very soon; it would bring to an end the whole social and political order of the world; and it would inaugurate the heavenly Kingdom. The moral teaching of the Gospels, it is inferred, consists merely of certain precepts which might help the disciples to bridge over the short span of time which separated them from the new dispensation and which would prepare them for it. It was simply an ethic for the interim period, and was indeed quite unsuited to any known social order such as that which we are accustomed to call Christian civilization.

Eschatology is thus made to throw its shadow over the whole of Christ's teaching, so that our bearings are lost in the fog. Is the shadow really there, over the teaching itself, or has it been cast by the devotees of apocalyptic literature? There are two questions involved, and we must consider each. Did Christ expect the speedy end of the present world? and was His moral teaching so coloured by this expectation that its application was only to the short transition-period before the second coming? Now, as regards the former question, I think that, taking the

record as it stands, it would appear that Jesus did expect this event and expect it to happen within a comparatively short period—within the life-time of some of His hearers. Even so taken, however, the terms in which He expressed this belief are remarkable. He expressly disclaimed any knowledge of the time when the event would happen: 'Of that day and that hour knoweth no man . . . neither the Son, but the Father' (*Mk.* xiii, 32). The confession of ignorance follows so closely upon the statement of His own expectation that we might read it as warning His hearers that the latter is not to be taken as having the 'authority' which they found in His teaching on other matters. This is a minor point, no doubt, but it is an additional reason for hesitating to agree with the eschatologists that the ethic of the gospels is of merely temporary significance.

Their view, it seems to me, is a misunderstanding which cannot be justified, though it may be explained. There is no trace of the temporary about the ethical *principles* in Christ's teaching. They are in line with the ethical teaching of Moses and the prophets, though they stress its spiritual meaning and give it a wider application; they are also in agreement with the better moral teaching of other civilizations; they are not pronounced as something peculiar to the present time. The end of the existing social order will give freer scope to the law of righteousness; but its validity is for every age. The Kingdom of God, he says, is within you; it is not dependent on or relative to any kind of political organization; but every good man and every good deed brings this kingdom nearer. A particular precept may be relative to the circumstances of the time; the point has been already illustrated from the words of Christ Himself; and it is possible that the eschatologists may be right in holding that certain precepts were valid for the period of transition only; but their validity for the time and circumstances implies that they have behind them principles valid for all time. What are these principles?

It is not hard to discover them and even to state them in modern terms. Their essence may, I think, be expressed in two assertions—the superiority of the life of the spirit over the life of sense and worldly desire, and the superiority of the life for others over the life for selfish interests. These principles were

not new in the sense that they had never been anticipated. But the teaching which embodied them did involve a radical change of the valuations which were current at that time and have prevailed at other times.

The principles of the Christian ethic are rooted and grounded in the religious conception of the world. God is spirit, and accordingly the things of the spirit are pre-eminent in human life as in the divine; and the brotherhood of men follows from the doctrine that God is the father of all. With these theological doctrines we are not at present directly concerned; but they give depth to the idea of goodness. According to Christ's own words its essence is summed up in the love of God and one's neighbour; and these two things are bound together—united in an attitude of the soul which feels itself both the offspring of God and akin to all its fellow-men.

From this also follow two characteristics of the new morality expressed in the foregoing principles. It is inward and it is absolute. Its inwardness is emphasized repeatedly: it is out of the heart—from the soul of man—that both good and evil flow. 'Not that which goeth into the mouth defileth a man, but that which cometh out of the mouth' (*Mt.* xv, 11); and it is the same with that which sanctifies him. External customs and precise rules of behaviour are all relegated to a secondary place. The aim in view is not a reconstruction of society, a building of new institutions. It is a re-birth of the human soul, its redemption from evil desires, its restoration to the good which is its birthright, and its growth towards perfection. If the record says nothing about some of the goods or values which our own time or other times may be inclined—and often rightly inclined—to rate highly, the explanation of their absence may be found here. The healthy soul will itself discover these values—such as those of science and of art—in the course of its own progress and when the environment of life makes the attainment of them possible. Direct reference to them would not have been understood by the peasants or fishermen of Galilee to whom the Gospel was first preached. They could understand warnings against lust or pride or contention; they could even be brought to understand that the coming of the Kingdom would not be through political revolution, but by being born into a new spirit

of personal purity and service; but there were many things which they were not prepared to hear then and which had to wait upon the future.

Nevertheless the principles are there and can be applied to each new field of human endeavour. In the Gospels they are laid down and applied to ordinary life in an absolute way which strikes one as, to say the least, uncomfortable. One must forgive the offender not once or twice or seven times, but unto seventy times seven; one must give to the asker, must not seek power or prominence for oneself over others, must even yield to the buffets inflicted upon one by the evil man. The blessing is to the persecuted, the poor in spirit, the meek. There are no limits to the sacrifice of comfort—even of life itself—that may be demanded. The careful balance between self-interest and the public welfare, at which the worldly moralist aims, has no place in the new way of life: he that saveth his life shall lose it. On the other hand, he that truly hungers and thirsts after righteousness shall be filled and, in losing his life, shall save it.

Is there any difference between this view and asceticism? Asceticism has played a notable part in most religions—in the Christian among the rest—and the ascetics have been foremost in vindicating the superior worth of the spiritual values. These may not always have been conceived in the same way, and the life of the ascetic often contains too scanty a recognition of the social side of morality; he is occupied too exclusively with saving his own soul. But he shows that the spirit of man can rise superior to the attractions of sense and worldly desire; his mortification of the flesh, his suppression of the desire for place and power, are in the interest of things which he regards as more excellent and are a demonstration of the power of man's spirit to abstain and to control. Any morality which is worth the name needs this power of abstinence and of self-control; the lower must yield to the higher. Asceticism, however, has usually a further feature than this. It looks upon the life of sense and life in the world as mere obstacles in the way of attaining goodness. As such they must be suppressed or swept from his path by the seeker after the best life. They are not fields open to the culture of morality, activities which may be transfused with the spirit of goodness and made conducive to the realization of

the perfect life. They are simply antagonistic to goodness and should be extinguished or—if that is not possible—reduced to the vanishing point. Therefore the ascetic of this kind mortifies the flesh, kills desire, and flies from the haunts of men or secludes himself with others like-minded in a monastery where, apart from the world, he may lead a purely religious life. What he gives up may be attractive and tempting; but it is regarded by him as something in itself evil. The body is the bond which unites him to this evil thing, and he must keep his body in subjection till his soul is released from it: the meditation of the ascetic man is of death, not of life.

There is something in this view which is alien to the Christian idea of morality. The Christian ethic enforces the superiority of the spiritual life to that of sense and worldly desire; it recognizes that these latter need restraint, and may even have to be sacrificed entirely to higher claims. Herein it agrees with the ascetic view. But it does not hold that the lives of sense and the world are in their own nature evil, that they are nothing more than obstacles to goodness, or that they are incapable of being penetrated by and transformed under the rule of higher aims. Christian morality requires constant discipline of the lower and less valuable factors in life by the higher. It may demand the same sacrifice as the ascetic practices. Family and friends—not to speak of the natural desires of the human being—may have to be relinquished at the call of duty. But the Christian ethic does not regard these things as evil in themselves. They have their place in the normal moral life. Through them the spirit of love, which is the essence and end of the law, may be made manifest. But neither the world nor man is perfect, and occasions often arise when the lower values conflict with the higher, and then the service of what is highest requires a man to part with his cherished objects of affection or with life itself. The preparedness to make the sacrifice is part of the Christian's duty. What the ascetic preaches he also must be ready to do. And it may be that this duty falls upon him with an additional sting, for, whereas the ascetic looks upon all these things as evil, requiring only to be driven out of his life, the Christian knows that he is called upon to sacrifice that which may itself be of genuine value. This is the greater sacrifice, to give up some-

thing that in itself is worthy for the sake of that which is of greater worth, instead of merely fighting against that which one holds to be evil.

The two views are certainly akin : they agree in their regard for the highest and in their call for self-discipline : and on many occasions they issue in the same practical attitude. There has always been a strain of asceticism in Christian thought. But the Man of Sorrows himself did not choose sorrow for its own sake. We find Him at table with His friends and taking part in a marriage feast; and His critics accused Him of indulgence at the same time as, with double-edged tongue, they blamed His forerunner for abstinence. 'John the Baptist came neither eating bread nor drinking wine; and ye say, he hath a devil. The Son of Man is come eating and drinking; and ye say, Behold a gluttonous man, and a winebibber, a friend of publicans and sinners' (*Luke* vii, 33, *Mt.* xi, 18). They would not have the Christian mode of life either way, and similar criticisms have often been repeated. To these the answer holds now as then, 'wisdom is justified of all her children.'

There is another subject on which one meets with a variety of interpretations, and that is the question of non-resistance. On the one hand the precepts to resist not evil (or the evil man) and to turn the other cheek to the smiter are plain enough, and they have been regarded as forbidding the Christian to use physical force under any conditions. Yet this interpretation is not consistent with the Master's advice on one occasion to sell one's cloak and buy a sword, nor is it consistent with the example He set when He drove the money-changers out of the temple. The advice to buy a sword has obviously in view an occasion different from those with which he was habitually concerned. Some of the disciples expected that the kingdom was to be restored to Judah by a successful revolt, and Christ had to disabuse their minds of this belief and convince them of the true nature of His kingdom and of the only means by which it could be established. The victory could not be achieved by force. It is, however, quite another matter to assert that the use of force is on all occasions unlawful. Nor does the precept of non-resistance, even when taken in its full generality, involve that assertion. The orders not to resist evil, to turn the other cheek, to

give to the asker are all of them directed against the spirit of self-assertion. They do not direct us to give away *our neighbour's* property, or to turn *his* cheek towards the aggressor, or to stand idly by when he is cruelly attacked by an enemy. The good Samaritan is commended for succouring the man whom he found wounded on the highway. Had he come upon the scene a few minutes earlier, would he not have been justified in countering the blows intended to cause these wounds?

There are other misunderstandings of a similar kind—as that wealth is of its own nature evil or that care devoted to ordinary business is somehow wicked. These all, it seems to me, grow from the same root as the asceticism which looks upon the normal activities and affections of men as evil. 'How hardly shall they that have riches enter into the Kingdom.' It is not said that wealth of itself is evil, but that it tends unduly to occupy the affections and divert men's hearts from higher things. Those who have experience of riches will recognize the truth of the saying—unless indeed they exemplify it. 'Take no thought for the morrow,' we read in our Authorized Version. The words are arresting, but they go far beyond the text, and they would indeed be hard to reconcile with the lesson of diligence conveyed in the parable of the Talents. 'Be not anxious or over-solicitous as to the morrow' are what the words really mean. In all the care and energy which mundane affairs may require, anxious solicitude is to be avoided. These things are all secondary, and have their final value in contributing to the one thing needful—love of God and one's neighbour.

If it be asked whether these ethical principles can be proved, the answer must be that they cannot be proved, as the logician understands proof, from premises self-evident and certain. It is possible to put forward a different valuation of life—equally unprovable, however—from which a man cannot be driven by mere force of logic. But, short of this, the Christian principles do comprehend consistently valuations which almost everyone admits. Almost everyone—at least in what may be called his better moments—will allow that the satisfactions of the senses and of worldly ambition are of only secondary value, and that beyond them is an ethically higher region of spiritual activities and interest. Almost everyone will allow that selfishness is a

vice. Follow out these valuations consistently, and you reach the principles of the Christian ethic—the supreme value of the spiritual life and of the love of one's neighbour.

The objection is more to the point that the Christian ethic sets up an impracticable ideal or one unsuited to the complexities of modern life. Suppose for a moment that all men were guided by the Christian spirit in their conduct and their institutions, we should scarcely recognize the old order in the changed conditions of life. Armed conflict and preparation for it between the nations would be at an end; the class-war would cease; trade would no longer be a hustle to get in front of one's neighbour. Perhaps we may not even desire a new order such as this in which contention for power and profit shall have ceased to inspire men. Trained as we have been in the struggle of life, we may think that life itself would lose its zest if the struggle were over. If God's will *were* done on earth as it is in heaven, should we not find life insipid, colourless and boring? The question is not altogether unreasonable. There are some people who are never happy except when righting a wrong, some perhaps who are never happy except when doing a wrong, and others who care neither to right the wrong nor to do it but who are fascinated by the great drama of evil. Certainly human nature has been fashioned by the moral conflict, and if the conflict were settled by the complete triumph of good, the existing range of activity would be restricted; but, on the other hand, men would be fitted for ends to which they are at present unequal. There would still be differences of temperament and of talent; each nation would continue to have its own characteristics and opportunities; varieties of endeavour and satisfaction would remain; and work would still have to be done in arranging spheres of labour and distributing its returns—although men would have ceased to quarrel about it.

But we need not linger over millenarian dreams. The Christian ethic was intended for the guidance of imperfect men in an environment which was not altogether sympathetic to their faith. Its particular precepts were addressed in the first instance to a conquered and subject people who were so ignorant as to be unaware of their material helplessness and so blind as not to realize the power of the ideas which were the heritage of their

race. Our civilization is immensely more complicated than the simple social conditions of the early disciples. Christian ideas have been operative to some extent in its formation; but the forces which moulded it have, in large measure, been neither Christian nor moral. The world (it is said) is run on different principles from those of the Christian ethic—in national affairs each country looks after its own interests and prepares to defend them; in commerce and industry it works on the competitive system, that is, it depends upon individual greed and not upon brotherly love; and the activities of ordinary life, outside commerce and industry, are ruled by a similar competitive spirit and by a preoccupation with interests which are foreign to the Christian scheme. Consequently (it is suggested) anyone who followed the Christian life consistently would have to stand outside all these mundane affairs.

This suggestion appears to me to result from the same doctrine as that from which flow asceticism and the other aberrations to which reference has been made already—the doctrine that there is something intrinsically evil in the physical life and the activities based thereon. It is not supported either by the precept or by the example of Christ. The Christian ethic seeks to moralise ordinary life instead of flying from it. There are trades and amusements which it condemns and from which it stands aloof; but neither trade nor even amusement as such comes under its ban. The life that is animated by it will not cease to develop the resources of nature or the capacity of man, while it will do so, not by cut-throat competition, but by a struggle for excellence.

In what I have said I have tried to bring out the essential principles of Christian morality and to clear away some misunderstandings due to neglect of these principles. But I have not attempted to tone down its exacting requirements. The Christian way of life is a narrow way; and it is a narrow way, not because it is hedged about by orders and prohibitions, but because it requires an attitude of mind and will in which sensuous and selfish desires are dominated by the spirit of love.

WHY WE ARE MEMBERS OF THE CHURCH OF CHRIST

By the Rev. R. G. Parsons, D.D.

THE question propounded, 'Why we are members of the Church of Christ,' in the context of the programme, suggests an attempt to state what, as Modern Churchmen, we mean when we, with our fellow Churchmen, affirm our 'belief in One, Holy, Catholic, and Apostolic Church.' We are well aware that a number of people with whom we find ourselves in considerable sympathy in matters of literature, art, social reform and moral ideals have no use for a Church at all—at any rate for themselves, even if they may concede that it may possibly be useful for others. Often, indeed, they are hardly willing to concede even this, for they find in clericalism and ecclesiasticalism an atmosphere which seems to befog the minds and benumb the energies of those who breathe it. Clerics, still more clerically-minded laymen, and ecclesiastical assemblies strike them as animated by a spirit of suspicion towards all that is fresh and alive and interesting, and an excessive respect for tradition and convention; a spirit exclusive, introverted, self-defensive, the expression of the herd-instinct in its religious aspects. Sectarian jealousies, bitter controversies flaring up about the lesser matters of the law, concerning which authoritative certainty cannot in many cases be reasonably expected, even if it were desirable; the over-confident defining of the essentially indefinable; the all too ready solution of intricate and baffling moral problems; the ugliness, unimaginativeness and formality of much that passes for Christian worship—such appear to be the unattractive characteristics of organized religion in general in the eyes of a number of our contemporaries, who would profess and call themselves Christians but cannot become members of any visible, organized Christian society. They may find themselves, on this matter or on that, in sympathy with one or other of the churches, but they can feel loyalty to none. Sometimes willingly, sometimes regretfully, they remain Christian free-lances.

It is, of course, true that the faults which have brought about this estrangement are not all on one side. We may detect among the free-lances failings which have contributed to the estrangement, no less than those of the members of the Church. There

is a certain lack of moral and intellectual courage and persistence, a certain unwillingness to commit oneself definitely to a position and all that it entails, which poses as 'broadmindedness'; there is a selfish individualism which mistakes fastidiousness for freedom, and shirks the jars and discomforts inseparable from every effort after spiritual fellowship and co-operation among any large number of human beings; there are prosaic utilitarian, and practically secular ideas concerning the nature of Christianity which result in an inability to appreciate the mystical, sacramental, and supernatural elements operative in all full and vital regligious experience; there is an idealism which would make the best the enemy rather than the helper of the good. And we may detect the presence of these characteristics among not a few of those who criticize the Church from outside, co-existing with much that is attractive, sincere, and true in their attitude.

Against this background of mingled good and evil among those who in some way believe in and belong to the Church of Christ, visible and organized, here on earth, and those who hold aloof from all membership of any part of that Church, we need to think out and to formulate with candour the basal reasons which justify us in continuing to profess our belief in the Church as one of the essential verities and vital necessities of the Christian Religion.

First, then, what is the Church of Christ? What can we confidently believe about it? Secondly, why is membership in the Church essential to a true and full Christianity? Thirdly, what is the specific duty and function of those who call themselves 'Modern Churchmen' within this membership?

I. What is the Church of Christ? What can we learn from the acts and teachings of Jesus Himself as to His ideal of the Church? Who constitute to-day that society which represents and is the Church of Christ's ideal?

In the eyes of His contemporaries, Jesus was anything but an ecclesiastic. Not only did they regard Him as a layman, an unofficial teacher, without the training and authorization of a proper Scribe or Rabbi, and wholly unconnected with the priestly class, but He came into acute conflict with the ecclesiastical authorities of the Jews, and it was a combined effort of Pharisees and Sadducees, the two great ecclesiastical parties of

His day, which brought about His crucifixion. He may have been regarded as a prophet, indeed, albeit a false prophet. When He made a higher claim before the rulers of the Jewish Church, they rejected it as blasphemy. We are struck with the absence of anything savouring of the style and interests of the ecclesiastic in the records of His teaching: it is impossible to think of Him as a cleric. He promulgated no clearly-defined dogmas. He left behind Him no precisely-articulated code of morals. He elaborated no organization. Can He be rightly held to have founded a Church at all?

It is a commonplace of Gospel criticism to state that the only two passages in the Gospels where the word *Ecclesia* occurs belong to that stratum of the Synoptic traditions, *i.e.*, the material peculiar to 'St. Matthew,' concerning which we have least ground for confidence that it contains early and reliable information. Critical scholars of eminence, such, for example, as Dr. Headlam, can nevertheless state weighty reason for holding that there are no adequate *a priori* grounds for refusing to believe that our Lord could possibly have used such language as is attributed to Him in these Matthaean passages. Leaving aside the detailed criticism of these passages, for our present purpose we may put the matter thus: Our Lord clearly was convinced that He was commissioned to proclaim the good news that the kingdom of heaven, the reign of God, was at hand; that this reign of God would begin to be established from the moment that men and women really believed that the Universe was controlled by a Spirit who is fatherly, self-sacrificing love, and responded to that Divine Love with an answering devotion which implied, as a necessary element in its genuineness, a devotion to their fellows as true and loyal as their care for themselves. He also clearly realized that in order that men and women might rise to the full possibilities of this simple and sublime yet supremely difficult ideal state, they needed to be endued with power from on high, the power of the Spirit, the very life-breath of the Heavenly Father Himself. And from the beginning to the end of His ministry He was confident that He was divinely commissioned to be the agent of this glorious consummation: first by revealing in His own personality the character of the Heavenly Father, as only a life of perfect sonship could, thus incarnating the perfection of the Divine Love

in a human life and a human experience of service to God and men; and then by the completeness of His own self-sacrifice in loyalty to this His unique Messianic claim and conviction, to prove its victorious and immortal power over sin and death. Thus was He to become the Saviour through whom the Divine life might enter into and transform the lives of men, and bring them in spirit and in truth into the kingdom of heaven, that reign of God which He was anointed to proclaim and to establish and make real for men. And for the fulfilment of this purpose, which in itself implied the bringing into existence of an ideal community in which the King of Love alone should reign, He deliberately chose and trained a little band of selected disciples to form the actual and historical nucleus out of which and by means of which the ideal community should come into being, the little flock to whom it was the good pleasure of the Father to give the kingdom.

A religious community is, therefore, not only an integral element in Jesus' ideal, for which He lived and for which He died, but also an essential instrument in its realization. The company of His disciples, bound together by loyalty to Him as their Head, and inspired through the power of His triumphant self-sacrifice, was to become the new Israel, the true People of God, to be the divinely selected and divinely trained agency for the bringing of all His people under His blissful reign. However weak in itself the actual evidence of the written Gospels may be for Jesus' own use of the word '*Ecclesia*' in reference to the little community which He was so carefully training for its high purpose, we should be inclined to believe, nevertheless, that it was most unlikely that He did not from time to time apply to it the word long used among the Jews for the religious assembly of God's chosen people, the word translated into '*Ecclesia*' in the Greek version of their Scriptures. At any rate, we find that a little group of selected disciples was the special care of our Lord during the latter part of His ministry: that after His crucifixion it became the hearth in which burned the fire of conviction that He, the Crucified, was nevertheless the Christ, risen, exalted, alive from the dead; and that this little community, thus inspired, was all that He left behind Him upon earth, and that to it we owe our knowledge of Him and His gospel of the Kingdom of Heaven. It called itself *Ecclesia;*

but whether it did or did not owe to Him its name, which does not matter very much, it owed to Him its nature and its existence. To bring it into being He had taught and suffered. St. Paul is not only theologically and mystically but also historically right when he declared that 'Christ loved the Church and gave Himself for it.'

II. To be a Christian means to believe in Christ: to believe in Christ means to share His Spirit and to co-operate with His purpose. An integral part of that purpose was the creation of a community which was to be agency inspired by His Spirit for bringing mankind to love His God and Father with all its powers and to love one another as each loves himself. We cannot therefore, however modern we may be, rightly claim the title 'Christian' unless in some very real and vital sense we belong to and devote ourselves to the community of those who, through belief in Christ, are seeking to bring about the reign of God. All who so seek belong to that community, the one and universal Church, provided they prove that they are seeking the Kingdom of God by the reality of their devotion to the good of one another in the furtherance of the purpose which they are all seeking to realise. Otherwise their membership is but formal and nominal.

The conception of the Christian Church which we have arrived at is one which includes all those who profess and call themselves Christians, whatever may be the particular organized body to which they happen to belong. The fundamental convictions common to them all, which distinguish them from Hindus, Buddhists, Mahommedans and all the rest, are derived from the position of centrality in their lives, and their thoughts about God, the Universe, and man which they assign to Jesus Christ, and the supreme authority which they claim for His spiritual and moral teaching. From Him are derived the specifically Christian conceptions of the character of God as the self-giving, self-sacrificing Father of Love, and of the Divine Sovereignty as energizing, not by power nor by might, but by that Holy Spirit manifested in divine perfection in the Person of the historical Christ, and through Him imparted to mankind. This, I take it, is the fundamental characteristic of Christianity, the root of the matter. It is not an easy thing to believe; when stated in its naked simplicity it strikes a large part of the world

as an incredible paradox. To believe in it and to live by it calls for the sublimest faith that human nature is capable of; and it is to strengthen and propagate that faith thoughout the human race that the Church of Christ exists. And it is because we believe that Christianity alone of all the religions of the world has really put these first things first that we belong to the Church of Christ.

But the greatest tragedy in all religious history is that the Christian Church itself has become divided into a chaos of separated sects, which do not manifest to the world in their dealings with one another that self-giving, self-sacrificing love which is the hall-mark of Christ's disciples. It is not the divisions in themselves which constitute the tragedy, but the spirit which caused them, acquiesces in them and accentuates them. Christians have become so immersed in the working out of theological and ecclesiastical deductions from their common major premiss that they have obscured the nature of that premiss itself. But things are not quite as bad as they were. On all sides there are signs of a healthy realization of the scandal of our divisions. Churches divided from one another by strong convictions, by theological differences which it is idle to minimise, and by varying traditions of worship and life crystallized by centuries of separate existence, are at length discovering that if they would vindicate for themselves the common name of Christian, the first thing they must do, and do all the time, is to treat other churches as they would that other churches should treat them. This seems an elementary truism. But we have been forcibly reminded that in the sphere of ecclesiastical controversy we have not yet discarded the methods of intellectual savagery. And—I must be painfully plain—the use of these methods of barbarism has not been confined to anti-Modernist forces only. Every party and school of thought has rebukes to impart and rebukes to receive. Let us see to it that in imparting them we do not enjoy ourselves over-much, and they will be all the more effectively received. It is perhaps forgetfulness of this truism which has justified the common statement that controversy converts no one. And the truism applies to our treatment of other religions as well as to other sects of our own. As this changed attitude in ecclesiastical controversy spreads it will work miracles, because it is a venture of that faith which Christ pro-

mised us would move mountains. Of course the mountains will resist, the high places of prejudice and pride will not in a moment be cast into the deep waters of oblivion. But whenever we see Catholics helping Protestants, or Protestants Catholics, Conservative Christians being strictly fair and accurate in their dealings with Liberals, and Liberals with Conservatives, then we experience the presence and the power of a Community in being which can transcend our little man-made distinctions because it is minding, not the things of men, but the things of God.

A Roman Catholic Church was recently burnt down under distressing circumstances in a poor part of a great industrial town. The leading Anglican clergyman of the place—a loyal and convinced Anglican — proposed that all the Christian Churches in the town should subscribe towards the rebuilding. There was of course an uproar : the mountains of prejudice reverberated with Protestant fury. But who can doubt that they were shaken? A Roman Catholic Cardinal receives with courtesy ministers from what is to him a schismatical and heretical church, in order to discuss with them in an atmosphere of friendship and mutual respect the questions that divide them. Once more the mountains thunder with angry voices, both Catholic and Protestant. But who can doubt that they are being shaken? And however much the ecclesiastical stalwarts may roar from their various high places, the *anima naturaliter Christiana* of the simple believer is strengthened, and the holy and humble men of heart bless the Lord.

Yet we must not minimise our differences. Christian charity forbids us to do so. If we, for instance, as Anglicans believe that we have had entrusted to our care, by the heritage we have received from our forefathers, in the course of that peculiar national history of ours which we believe is not wholly purposeless in its ordering, certain principles about the formulation of belief, worship and organization which are of value not only to ourselves but to all Christian people, it would be treachery to treat them as things that do not really matter. We need not be ashamed of their distinctiveness. We need not sneer at them as merely Anglican, provided always that we are ready to learn from others and to assimilate what they in their distinctive inheritances may have to offer for the good of the whole Christian commonwealth. And perhaps those who, in our own and other

churches, bear the name of Liberal or Modern Churchmen have particularly to be on their guard against the temptation to be less scrupulously fair and sympathetic towards traditional Christianity than they are towards the ideas put forth in the name of modern science and philosophy.

III. And now, a brief indication of the significance which, as Modern Churchmen, we attach to the famous 'notes' which historical Christianity uses to signify its conception of the true Church of Christ: One, Holy, Catholic and Apostolic. The Church is one: in spite of its divisions it remains one, one not only in some vague, elusive emotion which we falsely call 'spirit,' but one in fact, one Body. That corporate unity has not been really destroyed by the divisions of Christendom: it has been grievously impaired by the unchristian ways in which we have treated those divisions. If and when churches, which differ greatly among themselves, do to each other as they would other churches should do to them, then we find that corporate unity alive and working. There is arising before the minds of Modern Churchmen a richer ideal of unity than that of mere uniformity, an ideal which is a legitimate extension of the Pauline idea of the unity of the body and its members. We are learning to develop this idea from its original application to individual Christians as members with differing functions and contributions, and to apply it to Christian groups as also constituent members of the Body. It takes five fingers to make a hand, and fingers are useful to the body only when attached in proper association as a hand; the hand is a group of members of the body, yet it is also a group-member of the body. So, also, the Christian denominations consist of individual members of the Body, but also constitute group-members of it. I would suggest that instead of treating certain denominations, whether Protestant or Catholic, to which individual Christians feel they could not themselves belong, as therefore not of the Body—as though a finger, unable to imagine itself functioning if attached to a foot, were to say that therefore the foot was no true limb at all—we should learn a lesson from science and regard Church history biologically, as the development of a living organism, having within it the inherent power of evolving new organs to enable it to deal with changes in its environment, which in its earlier and less differentiated state it would have been incapable of facing.

Some of these organs may in time become mere survivals; but there is no saying how many new 'denominations' may not be needed by the Church before its history is ended. What we are concerned to secure is the harmonious co-operation of them all; and the Ideal and the Spirit of Christ are ours already to secure that co-operation if we will. We have but to be true to the Oneness which is ours already.

And the Church is Holy. It is separate from the world: in it, but not of it. The ideal of love as self-sacrificing service, in which Christ constituted His Church, is essentially not of this world; it runs counter to the merely 'natural' processes of physical evolution, as Huxley saw, though perhaps others had seen it long before. Yet this apparently opposing, or at any rate indifferent, environment may well be believed to be the God-ordained setting for the creation of a community of spirits responsive to His love. For the Christian ideal of love is a supernatural excellence which can be wrought and moulded into its perfection only through struggle, loss and pain. So God loved the world. So, too, must the world learn to love God. In its devotion to this ideal, a scandal and a folly to the wordly-wise, is enshrined the Holiness of Christ's Church.

And it is Catholic. This noble word needs rescuing from the mean uses to which it is being put. 'Where Christ is, there is the Catholic Church.' Where Christ is, nothing mean, partial, exclusive, partisan can stand and flourish; the petty prejudices of rival organizations become transformed into the mutual respect and forbearance of fellow-subjects of the same kingdom, serving it in different ways and in different degrees, becoming all things to all men, that all men may find their true selves and their God-given salvation in its service. History shows us that a type of church organization, faith and worship was evolved by the Early Church which can rightly claim to have been a true development of the inherent Catholicism of the primitive community. Episcopacy, Creeds and the Sacramental System all aimed at conserving that solidarity down and across the ages which is ideally necessary for the Christian Church. I do not think it can fairly be said that modern investigations have lessened the value and veneration for these ancient achievements of Christianity which has always characterized Anglicanism, in common with the Latin and Eastern Churches. When

freed from unhealthy developments, and commended by well-founded arguments, they are meeting with an increasing respect from numbers of loyal members of bodies which have discarded some or all of these traditional institutions. But loyalty to facts as they are compels us to acknowledge that Christ's Kingdom has been enlarged, in a great number of ways, by the devotion of Christian groups which have neither a ministry commissioned by historical succession linking it with that of the Ancient Church, nor definite creeds, nor a fully-articulated sacramental system. The Catholicism of the future will have to co-ordinate both these sets of facts, and be careful to ignore neither, if it is to be true to its name.

Finally, the Church is Apostolic. From the first it has centred in men who were called and sent with a given message to deliver. In every generation and in every land it has been and must be a missionary Church, an agency whose primary function is to convert. The Church does not exist in order to square its message with the changing fashions which prevail from day to day, but in order to bring into fruitful combination with its own unchanging principles the ever-widening discoveries which the mind of man is making in its search into the eternal verities of God. It may and ought to confess its own errors and misunderstandings in its past efforts to do this; it is bound to re-state its convictions in terms which are intelligible to those whom it is its duty to convert, be they present-day European materialists or metaphysical Hindus, or the backwoodsmen who are to be found in every country. It must remove unnecessary obstacles, and lay on men no heavier burden than it is convinced Christ laid. But it can never forget that that burden was a Cross. In art, in science, and in morals stern self-sacrifice, denial of self in devotion to that which is greater than self, is the way of dying which alone leads to life. That is Christ's essential gift to mankind from God, incarnate in its archetypal glory in Himself, imparted by the indwelling power of His Spirit. And it is the good news of this essential gift of God in Christ as the means of establishing His Kingdom that the Church is commissioned to proclaim. Whether it is popular or not, whether men hear or whether they forbear, that is its message. If it is untrue to that, nothing can make it Apostolic; but if it be true, it bears within itself the secret of eternal life.

The great need of Christendom to-day is the revival of a loyalty to the Christian community as a whole which will transcend the all too easy and natural loyalties which are merely parochial, congregational, denominational or national. The separated Christian communions need each other, because of their differing characteristics. Is there one of the great outstanding types of Christian Church, whether Catholic or Protestant, which has not something of real constructive value to contribute to the furtherance of that Reign of God over all the affairs of men and nations which is the fundamental need of a world which is threatened with ruin because it has forgotten to put the God whom Jesus revealed first, and in obedience to that vision to deal with the baffling problems that confront it? Is there any thoughtful Christian in any communion who is wholly satisfied with the type of Christian life, thought and worship he has inherited through it? Are not the most earnest and loyal Christians in every denomination looking outside their own Church, as well as within it, for that which will supply their spiritual needs? And instead of bewailing this, and talking about the breakdown of loyalty, of ecclesiastical anarchy, and so on, should we not welcome it as a sign of the return to a saner and more Christian attitude towards Churchmanship and all it involves?

After all, our theological and ecclesiastical differences must surely look a great deal smaller from the throne of Heaven than they do from the plains of earth. Does our Lord worry so much about them as we do? Does He, the same yesterday, to-day and for ever, Jesus of Nazareth who is also the eternal Word and Wisdom ordering all things by the influence of that love which is the heart of God, really see so much importance in, shall we say, the Apostolic Succession, or the different modes of Baptism, or the correct form for consecrating the Eucharist? Are these the things which He taught us were to be the things of first importance, by which men should know who were His disciples? Or does He tolerate and even welcome our differences of interpretation and practice, provided they are made the means of manifesting in a more excellent way that love for one another which was to be the response of His love, God's love, to us? In the manifestation of that all-embracing charity is revealed the true *consensus fidelium*, and to its divine authority the world must bow if it would find its salvation.

WHY WE ARE MEMBERS OF THE CHURCH OF ENGLAND

By the Rev. T. F. Royds, B.D., Rector of Haughton, Staffordshire.

I.

WE are members of the Church of England probably because our parents were. But that is merely a glimpse of the obvious. In this paper I shall assume that, having come to years of discretion, we have taken a look round and deliberately decided to stay where we are.

It is no part of my business to find reasons why Bishop Gore or Bishop Knox are members of the Church of England. They are both representative Churchmen in their way, and well able to speak for themselves. My task, as I understand it, is to consider why Modern Churchmen, as such, believe the Church of England to be their true home. If they are not satisfied with it, is any other Church likely to suit them better? I pass over the Orthodox Church of the East, because membership in it is not a practical question for most Englishmen. Nor would it be relevant to attempt a detailed examination of Roman claims, because I am not directly concerned with Reunion. But in view of the present condition of the Church of England, it is necessary to examine briefly the basis of our Protestantism.

The Roman Catholic lives in a different world and worships a different God. I am not, of course, referring to such men as Tyrrell or von Hügel. If they were alive and with us to-day, we should all regard it as a privilege to extend the right hand of fellowship to them. But I believe that many of us would far rather be honest atheists than worship a God who, in more senses than one, is under the thumb of the Roman priesthood. And submission to the Pope is a light thing compared with submission of the whole man to the intellectual and religious standards of the Middle Ages. For this means, not the self-abasement of man before his Maker, but the prostration of the higher half of a man before his lower half. Moreover, belief in an infallible man is less pernicious than belief in an infallible book, because

according to a recent calculation the Pope may have accepted the evolution of man by about 2050 A.D., but the Book of Genesis can never be re-written by a scientific Pope.

It is true that, externally, we have links with Rome which are absent elsewhere. All competent historians know that our ministry and sacraments are as valid as those of Rome, whereas those of the Free Churches are not. But we do not believe that the efficacy of sacraments depends upon apostolic succession, or on correct words and actions; or that our Lord cannot be as really present at a Quaker meeting as in the Mass. The Church of England as a whole is not committed to anything that implies sacramental magic. But the Church of Rome is. As a Roman Catholic once remarked to me: 'You see, you haven't got Christ on your altars, and we have.'

Our idea of God and how God works places a great gulf between us and Rome. There is no such gulf between us and the Free Churches. We may say, with certain mental reservations, that Mr. Dummelow worships the same God as Dr. Peake. And, of the two, Dr. Peake is nearer to us Liberals than Mr. Dummelow. When we use his commentary, we do not stay to ask to what denomination the contributor belongs. If we have reason to believe that he is a good scholar, that is enough. But when we handle a book that bears the *Nihil obstat* mark, we know we must be on our guard and verify references. For the writer breathes an alien atmosphere, to us unreal. However honest he may be in intention, he cannot escape the influence of that authority which has enslaved his intellect, and brought mendacity to such a fine art that truth and falsehood are smoothed level.

Rome, then, is impossible for us, because, if we may trust her own words, change is impossible for her. We believe in freedom and progress. And further, we believe not in uniformity but in comprehension. We belong to the Church of England because we believe that the foundations of the Reformation were well and truly laid; that the great majority of the English people have no wish to be deprived of their Protestant heritage; and that it is not merely our right, but our duty to stand by them in the ancient Church of their fathers. We have no quarrel with those who desire a place beside us in our Church, but we feel

bound to resist those who claim to be the only rightful heirs of the original English Church, or who join it in the hope of helping to destroy its independence.

If our Church were now to submit to Roman domination, it would mean that the main stream of English Christianity would pass over to the Free Churches, and the National Church would become an exotic sect, out of sympathy with the nation which it helped to form. Such a Church, disestablished, disendowed, and anti-Modernist, would be no home for us. Whither then should we fly? At present, fortunately, the question is hardly a practical one. Our diocesan bishops have, with remarkable unanimity, pleaded for toleration and comprehension. And Bishop Gore, at the head of the moderate and loyal Anglo-Catholics, has made an appeal to extremists which commands our hearty sympathy.[1] But it is significant that *The Guardian* of May 22nd, which published the Archbishop of York's large-minded and large-hearted address on Unity, reported on the back of the same page an Anglo-Catholic Congress at which a speaker classed Modernists and Protestants together as 'hidden foes, who break bread with us in the House of God, and against them we must fight.' Such utterances are natural enough from the extremists of that party, who have good reason to fear the progress of Modernism. Their mentality is Roman, and we know what Rome thinks of us. As late as 1864 the Pope in his *Syllabus Errorum* condemned toleration and sanctioned persecution. A kinder spirit is abroad to-day; but it is the spirit of Cardinal Mercier at Malines:

> 'Those who have the good fortune to possess the true grace can intercede for those who are less happily gifted.'

II.

From Rome we turn to the other Protestant Churches of this country, whose general attitude to truth is obviously much nearer to our own. We are sometimes suspected of Unitarian leanings; and assuredly we need not court popular applause by speaking ill of a Church which possesses so many eminent scholars and truth-seekers. But Unitarian worship leaves a Trinitarian cold and unsatisfied. We will not deny the name of fellow-Christian

[1] *The Anglo-Catholic Movement To-day*, 1925.

to any who try to live the Christian life; but we cannot regard Unitarianism as the religion of the New Testament, or as an expression of Christian thought and worship at its highest and best. We recognize that there are many ways of stating the doctrine of the deity or divinity of our Lord; but we believe the Church of England is right in insisting on its centrality, as against saint-worship on the one hand, and bare theism on the other.

Here the Church of England and most of the Free Churches are at one. Their differences are not vital, but mainly matters of organization and discipline. As every parish priest knows, church and chapel may be mixed in the proportion of about two-thirds of the one and one-third of the other in the same individual. Family tradition or class loyalty may decide which predominates. No one, I suppose, would accuse the Roman Church of being a class Church; but the charge has often been levelled at the Church of England, not always without reason. But at the present day it is far truer of the Free Churches, which belong almost entirely to the middle and poorer classes, and have not quite outgrown their reputation for mixing religion with party-politics and class-warfare. There is among Englishmen an inveterate tendency to disparage their own national institutions, but the Church of England clearly has first claim on all who are not ashamed to be patriots. She is the mother of the sects, and the natural centre of English Protestantism. She has the ancient parochial system and endowments, the parish churches, and the Book of Common Prayer, all of which are assets of immense value. They give her resident ministers almost everywhere, something like a monopoly of architectural beauty, and protection against the perils of extempore prayer.

About the Establishment there is more room for difference of opinion. Where the demand for Disestablishment comes from within, it may mean a desire to tyrannize over minorities; where it comes from without, it may spring from jealousy, or an inferiority-complex. Those who support it from the highest motives, as many unquestionably do, should count the cost of an inevitable alliance with the Church's bitterest foes, who would not be slow to seize their opportunity, and would rejoice to see her wounded in the house of her friends. Meanwhile, the rest of

the world would look on and misunderstand. To some of us at least the Establishment, so far from being a hindrance to freedom and spiritual work, is an additional reason for membership. We believe that it makes for a freedom which is more real and effective than that of the so-called Free Churches. It has helped to preserve justice, tolerance and comprehension among High, Low, and Broad Churchmen for over three hundred years. In any Church it is easy to be wise with the wisdom of old men; in none is it easy to speak boldly as young men ought to speak. But it is easier in the Established Church than in any other to enter with head erect the great temple of truth which the master-minds of all ages have helped to build. Our charter of liberty may be found in the Archbishop of Canterbury's Charge of 1911.[2] It is 'the unfettered study of Holy Scripture.'

Again, although our Church is as rich as any in that wisdom which enables the elderly Christian to remain satisfied with what little he learned when he was young, assuredly Modern Churchmen need not be ashamed of their spiritual ancestry. In the address referred to above, the Archbishop of York speaks of Liberalism as a new influence in the nineteenth century. We have all heard of Westcott, Hort, Stanley, Maurice, Kingsley, Robertson of Brighton, and many others; but—*vixere fortes ante Agamemnona*—we claim descent through them from the Cambridge Platonists of the seventeenth century, and in some measure from the Reformation divines generally. For the Reformation was more than a *Protest*; like Modernism, it was a *process*—the inevitable result of assimilating the New Learning. If the domestic troubles of Henry VIII had not given the Church her opportunity, she must have found it under Elizabeth. But there was no breach of continuity, any more than between the twentieth century Modernist and the pre-Darwinian Traditionalist. The continuity of the present Church of England with the pre-Reformation Church is an historical fact of considerable importance. Freeman speaks of their 'absolute identity.' It may be worth while therefore to say a word about continuity.

It is no more true to say that a new Church was founded at the Reformation than to say that when a man changes his opinions and his clothes he loses his identity. Certainly no one intended

[2] *The Character and Call of the Church of England.*

o found a new Church, and nothing was actually dissolved except the monasteries.[3] Up to 1570, the eleventh year of Elizabeth, the Church was still actually one. And then the breach came, not because the Papists were turned out, but because Pius V excommunicated the Queen, and gave her crown to the King of Spain. The Papists then had to choose between the Queen and the Pope, and of course they chose the latter. Chief Justice Coke, writing as near the time as 1605, says :

> 'Before the Bull of Pius V . . . wherein her Majesty was excommunicated and deposed, and all they accursed who should yield any obedience to her, etc., there were no Recusants in England, all came to church to the same divine service we now use; but thereupon presently they refused to assemble in our churches, or join with us in public service, not for any conscience of anything there done, against which they might justly except out of the Word of God, but because the Pope had excommunicated and deposed her Majesty and cursed those who should obey her.'[4]

English Roman Catholics are the descendants not of *Ecclesia Anglicana*, but of these Dissenters or Recusants of 1570. It is they and not we who are the real schismatics. One of them, the Jesuit Father Humphrey, wrote in 1885, with the *Imprimatur* of Cardinal Manning :

> 'We are a new mission straight from Rome. . . . The Church of England is the dead branch . . . we are the new shoot from the parent stem, which has taken its place. In this fact of our not being descended lineally from the pre-Reformation Church, but derived straight from Rome, I see the finger of God, and rejoice day by day with all my heart.'[5]

Our own Romanizers must take their choice of rejoicing with him or with us—they cannot have it both ways. Continuity with

[3] For evidence see Lord Selborne's *Defence of the Church of England against Disestablishment*, 1888, and Dr. Maynard Smith's Appendix to the Bishop of Gloucester's Primary Charge, 1924.

[4] Archdeacon Oldham, *Why We are Churchmen*, 1894, p. 72. Directions for dealing with Recusants are given in the Canons of 1604, still to be found in most parish churches. In No. 66 every minister being a teacher is bidden to 'labour diligently with them from time to time, thereby to reclaim them from their errors.' In No. 114 every Parson, Vicar or Curate is bidden to number them, including those 'popishly given (who though they come to the Church, yet do refuse to receive the Communion) . . . distinguishing the Absolute Recusants from half Recusants,' and to present their names to their Ordinaries every year 'before the Feast of the Nativity next ensuing, under pain of suspension to be inflicted upon them by their said Ordinaries; and so every year hereafter, upon the like day, before the Feast of St. John Baptist.'

[5] Oldham, *op. cit.*, p. 91.

the unreformed Church of England is one thing; continuit with Rome is another. No one now pretends that there was a independent Church of England, as distinct from a Church i England, before the Reformation, in spite of the well-know use of the titles *Ecclesia Anglicana* and *Seinte Eglise d'Angle terre* in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries. But of sub mission to papal jurisdiction, the one supreme test of union wit Rome to-day, Bishop Creighton wrote:

> 'This principle the English Church never accepted: for a time i submitted; it always remonstrated; at last it repudiated.' [6]

III.

I have insisted at some length upon our true pedigree because the notion that certain sixteenth century iconoclast founded a new Church is by no means extinct, and is sedulousl kept alive by Rome. The twentieth century is not bound t follow the example of the sixteenth; but as I read the signs o the times—and, incidentally, the letters in *The Times*—I se no sufficient reason for attempting to form a new Church now I believe such a step would alienate a large number of sem liberal semi-conservative people, to whom a breach of continuit would almost spell excommunication. And those of us who are incumbents of ancient parishes, with lists of rectors stretchin back over six centuries or more, could not lightly be false to ou local apostolical succession. We may recall the advice of Sir Thomas Browne: 'You must not forsake the shippe in a tempest because you cannot keep down the windes.'

The Church of England, like the Authorized Version of the Bible, bears the hall-mark of the Elizabethan Age, but her roots go much deeper. She became Protestant only that she migh be true to the purer Catholicism from which she sprang. No Modern Churchman is blind to her faults; but as I am boasting of her excellencies, I will call two witnesses from other countries, Dr. Dollinger and M. Guizot. The often-quoted words of the first are not yet out of date:

> 'It may still be said with truth that no Church is so national, so deeply rooted in popular affection, so bound up with the institutions and manners of the country, or so powerful in its influence on national character.'

[6] Oldham, *op. cit.*, p. 68.

Nor are those of M. Guizot in a letter of 1860 to Mr. Gladstone:

> 'I believe that of all the Christian Churches it is that in which the spiritual régime is best reconciled with the political, and the rights of divine tradition with those of human liberty.'

t is not surprising that Bishop Lightfoot and many others have een in the Church of England 'the central hope of Christen- om.'

But the final test of all Churches is to be found in our Lord's ords: 'By their fruits ye shall know them.' The Christian eligion is a larger thing than the Churches, none of which is ore than a partial expression of it. What sort of fruits does the hurch of England produce? Does she create an atmosphere avourable not only to Truth, but to Beauty and Goodness as ell? She is said to suffer from vagueness in her teaching. udged by episcopal utterances she is certainly vague. Appar- ntly bishops are often compelled to say nothing in beautiful anguage, or to say something in language so wise that it can ffend nobody, or so dark and perplexed that the wayfaring an shall err therein. But a bishop who is not a statesman will ucceed no better in the twentieth century than in the seven- enth. And if dogmatic statements are too clear and definite, ey fail to be comprehensive. Moderation itself is a vague ing, but moderation is an essential note of the *Via Media* of e Church of England. Moderate men act as a reconciling edium between Anglo-Catholics and Evangelicals; they are e sweet stuff that holds the sandwich together. We recognize em in the opening words of Keble's Advertisement to *The hristian Year*:

> 'Next to a sound rule of faith, there is nothing of so much consequence as a sober standard of feeling in matters of practical religion: and it is the peculiar happiness of the Church of England to possess in her authorized formularies an ample and secure provision for both.'

This is the language of a temperate man who expects a oderately good dinner every day: it is not the stuff of which ints are made. Here we are often told that Rome is supreme. all depends upon what we mean by a saint. There is an nearthly beauty about that type to which the Pharisee and the ypocrite pay their sincerest flattery; but when we take the *nitatio Christi* with us among the little pitfalls of ordinary life, is apt to fail us. The average Englishman requires a saint

that he can not only admire, but imitate. His ideal is summed u in virtue rather than holiness, and the Church of England ca supply his need better than the Church of the Latin races.

It is the same with Beauty as an absolute value. The Fre Churches as a whole do not give Beauty its due place in archi tecture or worship. The hand of Puritanism lies heavy upo them. And there seems to be some subtle psychological con nexion between Catholicism and bad art. Certainly the chea and tawdry finery that is too often seen in foreign churche contrasts very unfavourably with the simple dignity of th typical English parish church, remote alike from the nuditie of Puritanism and the crudities of neo-Catholic aestheticism.

'By their fruits ye shall know them.' It is not for merel intellectual or aesthetic reasons that we are members of the mos tolerant and comprehensive Church in the world. There is stil I believe, a painting at the Vatican, Vasari's *Strages Huguenot torum*, commemorating the massacre of S. Bartholomew; crime which was due not to the sudden madness of a mob, bu in Lord Acton's words, to 'the permanent and incurable perve sion of the moral sense wrought by a distorted piety.' Inte lectual error is a lesser evil than a perverted conscience. 'I the light within thee be darkness, how great is that darkness. It was with intimate knowledge of the real character of Rom that Richard Bagot wrote to *The Times* twenty-six years ago.

> 'The greatest misfortune England could suffer would be to become a Roman Catholic nation.'

And so we stretch out affectionate hands to our grown-up daughters, the Free Churches; but we are members of the Church of England, because she enables us, as fellow-workers with the truth, to bring out of our treasure things new and old; to be loyal to the faith of our fathers, and to face new problems that were never raised for them. In the Church of England, Catholic, Protestant, National, and Established, we can best be true to the spirit of the great prayer, 'that all who profess and call themselves Christians may be led into the way of truth, and hold the faith in unity of spirit, in the bond of peace, and in righteousness of life.'

THE BIBLE AND MODERN CHURCHMEN

By the Rev. Canon M. G. Glazebrook, D.D., author of *The Faith of a Modern Churchman.*

THE possession of a sacred book, whether in Greece or in India, in Palestine, in China, or in modern England, has always proved both a blessing and a snare. A blessing, because it sets up a standard of belief and practice, giving a sense of permanence, an ideal of life, an answer to some of the riddles of the universe. A snare, because the permanence is often misunderstood, the ideal stereotyped, the riddle put aside as needing no further attention. A snare, also, because, while conditions of life change and knowledge grows, men still claim to find the ideas of their own time in their ancient books. Philo the Platonist thought he found the lore of his master in the books of Moses; the early Christian fathers traced the Trinity in the tale of Abraham; the mediaeval doctors found the Papacy in St. Matthew; the geologists of the early nineteenth century recognised their new ideas of creation in the first chapter of Genesis; the slave owners of the same age found a justification of slavery alike in Genesis and St. Paul's epistles. The fact is that men who approach a great book in such a spirit can always find there what they bring. But they pay a price for the privilege. For the practice of allegory and typology, and other desperate methods of interpretation, to which men have recourse when they are determined to find the new wine in the old bottles, is disastrous alike to the intellect and the character. Swift's *Tale of a Tub* is hardly a caricature of some nineteenth century commentaries on the Old Testament.

The interpretation of a sacred book presents the old problems of permanence and change, of identity and difference, which have been the puzzles of philosophers since philosophy began: and it is only by recognizing the same paradoxes in the spiritual as in the material world that we can hope to assume a right attitude towards the inspiration of the past. That is the justification of our modern historical treatment of the Bible.

We have given up the attempt either to fit our growing thought into the Procrustean bed of the past, or to prove that the ancient writers had all our knowledge, and really meant what we now believe to be true, though their words belie it. A more philosophical and a more satisfying view is that which compares the relation of the sacred book to the developing thought of subsequent generations with the relation between the seed and the ever-changing but still identical tree which grows out of it.

Consequently, in trying to answer the question why Modern Churchmen value the Scriptures, I shall have to devote what may seem a disproportionate space to one aspect of the subject. For the answer divides itself naturally into two parts. There are reasons, and very important reasons, which we share with all other Christians; and there are those which are in some degree proper to ourselves. The former class of reasons are so important that they may not be left unmentioned, but so familiar that a very slight reference is enough to carry conviction.

1. The Bible is a great literature, possessing the permanent value which belongs to all the great classics. Its wide range offers us the same kind of delight as we find in Homer and the Niebelungen Lied, in Herodotus and Froissart, in Plato and Cicero and Epictetus. With all the charm of noble style it exhibits human nature—the nature of a wonderful people—in all its moods and phases, in every variety of incident and thought and passion.

2. The Bible presents us with life-like pictures of human society in many different forms—the nomadic, the tribal, the monarchical, the theocratic. Without analysis, without definition, it shows us how they all work for good or evil.

3. The Bible gives us portraits of noble men and women, so vivid that they become our familiar friends. Moses and David, Samuel, Elijah and Isaiah, St. Peter and St. Paul, Ruth and Rebekah, Hannah and Martha and Mary, all are reckoned among our intimates—endeared to us by their faults as well as their virtues, friends whose presence and memory enrich our daily life.

4. The Bible shows us good men at their prayers—good according to many different standards, from the Arab Sheikh to

the King of Judah; from the psalmist who prayed that he might wash his feet in the blood of his enemies to Stephen who died saying, 'Lord, lay not this sin to their charge'; from the prophet who called down fire upon a company of fifty to the disciples who learned to pray 'Our Father, which art in heaven.' The whole book is permeated with prayer, and reminds us that prayer is a primal instinct which binds together all sorts and conditions of men in the consciousness of a divine presence.

5. The historical books of the Bible present some of the most moving scenes in all literature. And these are not merely picturesque tales, but records of events which are turning-points in the history of mankind. They have another claim upon our gratitude. For they are like splendid tapestries hung in some great hall behind the throne of a king. Each of them forms a fit background for the figure of a hero or prophet upon whose words they are an illuminating commentary. Without the *Book of Kings*, Amos and Isaiah would be but half understood; without *Nehemiah*, Trito-Isaiah would lose his meaning for us; without the story of the *Acts*, we should read much of St. Paul in vain.

6. No book is so rich as the Bible in memorable sayings which appeal to the permanent elements in human nature, and therefore remain true and precious through all generations. Many of them are such brief phrases as Tennyson finely describes:

> 'Jewels five words long
> Which on the stretched forefinger of Old Time
> Sparkle for ever.'

It seems almost impertinent to select a few for illustration, but I must venture:

I will not let thee go unless thou bless me.
Shall not the judge of all the earth do right?
My father, my father, the chariot of Israel and the horsemen thereof.
The high and holy one that inhabiteth eternity.
The sacrifices of God are a broken spirit.
The darkness and the light are both alike to thee.
The Kingdom of God is within you.
Blessed are the pure in heart.
Charity never faileth.

Polished by perpetual use, these jewels shine ever brighter as the generations succeed one another.

7. The writers of the Old Testament, though their purview was limited to their own people, within those limits regarded history as providential. Through the many-coloured fabric of their narratives the reader traces ever the golden thread of a divine purpose: and he who has taken that idea to heart has made a great step in philosophy and religion. The writers of the New Testament advanced far beyond their predecessors. Thy saw in the life of Christ the fulfilment of past hopes and the end of history. No doubt many of the particular proofs which they deduced from prophecy were fallacious; but errors in detail do not discredit their main contention that a purpose runs through the ages, which remains one of the chief elements in an intelligent faith. This conviction, so often repeated in both the Testaments, is one of the permanent treasures of our thought. Again, the end of the world has not come, as they expected. But the last 1,900 years have proved the disciples right in believing that the coming of Christ marked the end of one age and the beginning of another. He must be dim of sight who does not recognize, in the central figure of the Gospels, the principle, the power, the inspiration which have transformed the world, and are still transforming it; who does not in his heart echo the words of St. Paul, 'God was in Christ, reconciling the world to himself.' For in the pages of the New Testament that wondrous personality is presented with a vividness which compels conviction.

The treasures in those seven groups lie upon the surface of the Scriptures. They are open to all, and are shared by all Christian readers. But the last of them is closely related to a group of treasures which lie below the surface, of truths which are only of late years being fully explored. For purpose is manifested not only in the outward events of history, but in those inner developments of human thought and faith and hope which, according to the point of view, are described as discovery or as revelation. The record of these processes is presented in the Bible with a direct simplicity, an absence of comment or explanation, which is almost epic. Indeed, I would venture to say that the Bible is the epic of Mansoul. But that phrase needs a little explanation.

I said just now that the paradoxes of permanence and change, of identity and difference, are found in the spiritual as well as the material universe. Let us apply that statement to the nature of man, to his character, his needs and aspirations. In one sense human nature has remained unchanged since the dawn of history. Man, as the records present him in all times and places, shows essentially the same needs and instincts and desires. He craves for some communion with God—a God who reveals himself in some sort through the voice of prophets or through material signs. He feels that sin separates him from God, rendering him liable to suffering or loss. And so he craves for reconciliation, which he seeks to attain in a thousand different ways. He feels the impulse to worship a mysterious power which is in all and through all and over all: but very various are the paths along which that impulse takes him. He is conscious of some sort of kinship with the divine, and seeks to maintain it by rites which are crude or refined according to the degree of his spiritual progress. Closely connected with his claim to be akin to the divine is the sense of his own value—a sense, dim or clear, of personality. Seeing how imperfectly existing society meets the claims of personality, he has visions of a better order. Generally the vision lies in the past, as a thing lost and regretted: but in some advanced communities it appears as an ideal for the future, an aim to be striven for and attained. Modern speech, of course, has no words dim and vague enough to express early man's consciousness of these instincts and desires. But, whether dim or clear, these elements are real all through history, from Abraham to St. Paul.

The secret of the Bible, if I may use the phrase, is that it recognizes, as no other book does, all these elements of man's nature; shows them in their diverse manifestations as he passes from stage to stage; shows them in their substantial unity, despite all varieties of form; and shows at last how all these needs and impulses and aspirations find satisfaction in that historic life, human and yet divine, in which reconciliation is perfect because kinship is manifest, in which personality is freed from all the limitations of matter, and therefore society becomes brotherhood, and worship the happy greeting of a father. The

Bible shows us all this, not by way of any formal statement, nor through any analysis, but dramatically. It shows us men in all stages of development seeking the satisfaction of their needs and aspirations in various ways, advancing step by step to higher conceptions, methods, and standards, till at last they reach a level from which the vision of perfection blesses their eyesight.

When I spoke of the Bible as the epic of Mansoul I was thinking of the *Aeneid* in particular. The hero of that great poem sets out from ruined Troy to seek his destined home. His course is devious, delayed by winds and waves, deflected by dangers and mistakes. He pauses here and there, fancying he has found a resting place: but soon he discovers that his true home is elsewhere. He appeals for guidance to various prophets, who point him onward in the right direction, but not to the final goal. At long last he reaches Latium, where true satisfaction is to be found. But that consists not in a mere sense of completion: it is the beginning of a new life which presents a new series of developments. For, in reaching Latium, Aeneas has set his foot on the threshold of Rome, and Rome is the promise of the greatest empire the world has ever seen.

In like manner, as the Bible shows us, the soul of man, urged by a great yearning to know God, to worship him, to be one with him, has followed a devious course and dwelt in many temporary resting places; has been spurred on by trials and failures, urged and guided by prophets; and at last reached its home in the knowledge of Christ. That home is in a true sense final, and yet it is the pledge of a large development. For the Christian Church, Christian civilization and Christian philosophy are but the unfolding of what is contained in His divine personality—an unfolding to which each century gives new and richer meaning.

Unlike Aeneas, Mansoul has followed more than one path at the same time, leading to the same goal. In a book which I wrote some years ago I tried to trace several of them, answering to the sense of sin, the craving for atonement, the impulse to sacrifice, the need of priesthood. To-day I would rather trace, though but in outline, the most important of all. The most urgent need of Mansoul, which presses upon him at all times, is to find God. He can never be content without some con-

ception of the divine nature. When one has been formed and accepted, he is content to rest in it and to believe it final: but then the teaching of experience proves it inadequate, and some prophet points him onward. The process of revelation, as exhibited in the Bible, is a dialectic continued through the ages, in which new experience raises new questionings, to which the prophets give new response. This process is set forth, not by systematic exposition, but in a series of dramatic pictures. I invite you to walk with me through this gallery, and note how it presents the successive conceptions of God which the human spirit has received as revelations.

To the patriarchal age—the earliest which the Bible records—God appears as the Lord of the clan, its guide and champion, the companion of its wanderings and the protector of its territory. An affable deity, who assumes a human form, converses with his favourites, corrects their faults, and makes formal covenants with them. But his power is limited to the territory held by the tribe: for he is but one of many gods, each of whom bears a like relation to some other people. That is why he is called by a proper name—Jehovah.

The story of Moses and the Exodus incidentally offers a larger conception. Jehovah is more than the protector of a wandering clan. He has a fixed seat upon Sinai, where clouds and lightnings indicate the terrors of his might. He visits his people, delivers them from the Egyptian oppressor, guides them through the desert, and leads their armies to victory in Canaan. Henceforth he is the lord of Canaan, where he rules his people, accepts their sacrifices, and inspires their oracles.

The settlement in Canaan raised new questions. Jehovah was lord of the wilderness, to whom the firstlings of the flocks were offered. What was his relation to the life of agriculture? Was he lord of the harvest also? The civilized people whom the Israelites had conquered worshipped their native Baals with solemn rites in great temples or on mountain-tops, and paid them a tribute of corn and wine and oil. In the minds of the Israelites, Jehovah did not so much displace as absorb these deities. He added their attributes to his own, and accepted the more elaborate worship which they had claimed. The outcome of this syncretism soon appeared. For when the Israelites

wished to represent their conception in visible form, it was the image of a bull that they set up in their temples. A bull! Type of strength, but also of violence: of an uncertain temper which must be soothed by offerings. Such was the god whom Israel adored in the age of the Judges!

The image of the bull and some of the attributes remained for centuries. Yet they soon ceased to satisfy man's longing. Already in the age of Samuel it is taken for granted that Jehovah condemns certain breaches of the moral law. This truth was emphasized by Nathan and Elijah, who condemned kings in the name of Jehovah when they were guilty of murder, of adultery, and of robbery. Still man's conception of God was imperfectly moralised. The great prophets, from Amos to Ezekiel, have again and again to combat the popular belief that Jehovah cannot resist the bribe of rich offerings: that in return for gorgeous worship he is bound to grant them victory and wealth.

Throughout two centuries the prophets were slowly building up a nobler conception of God. He is just, they taught, loving to his people, pure and holy, far removed above the earth and its inhabitants. So it became impossible to picture him as one among many gods. Slowly but surely his power was thought to be extended over all the world, and the images of other gods faded away. When we reach the middle of the sixth century we find Deutero-Isaiah making mock of the heathen deities, and celebrating Jehovah as the sole creator of the world and ruler of mankind.

A noble and uplifting conception! But not one in which Mansoul could permanently rest. For in the first place it implied that Jehovah was concerned with Israel as a nation, but not with individuals; so that it offered no scope for personal religion. It made Jehovah a partial ruler, who treated Israel as a son but other nations as slaves or enemies. And though it included the idea of a purpose in Israel's history, it left the history of mankind as a whole to be a riddle without an answer.

The first of these defects was remedied by the exile. The captive Israelite who was exiled in Babylonia, a waif among the wreckage of numerous conquered nations, was forced to reconsider the basis of his religion. On a foreign soil the law forbade

him to sacrifice to Jehovah. He could not feel that he and his few companions represented the nation whom Jehovah loved. Yet he could not, like David of old, transfer his allegiance to the gods of the land. If he was to have a religion at all, it must be based upon a relation between God and the individual soul. Jeremiah's thirty-first and Ezekiel's eighteenth chapter, which first formulated the new problem and offered provisional solutions, sowed the seed of that personal religion which finds such moving expression in the psalms of the fourth and third centuries. The psalter, which reflects the spiritual life of the post-exilic age, shows a crucial change in the conception of God. The people who could use the 51st, the 90th, and the 139th psalms in their worship had learned to regard God as one who hears and answers the prayers, and directs the fortunes, of each individual worshipper. They had not yet learned, however, to believe either that God would grant them a life beyond the grave, or that he had any purpose for mankind as a whole. It was in the third and second centuries that their conception of the divine nature was enriched by these attributes. There is no record of any prophet who taught the doctrine of immortality. The doctrine suddenly appears as generally accepted in the third century. I need not point out how greatly that enlarged the idea of God's providence for the individual. A parallel enlargement took place in the second century, when the writers of Apocalypses, from Daniel onwards, began to trace a purpose running through the whole history of mankind. We can hardly exaggerate the importance of the change which made the whole world the sphere of providence.

But unhappily the apocalyptic writers, maddened by the persecutions of the second century, exaggerated the tribalism of their ancestors. Though they saw purpose in all history, it was only the dreadful purpose of fire and sword for all who were not members of the favoured people. To them Jehovah, though creator and ruler of all, was the God of Israel and the enemy of the human race.

So, after all these questionings and discoveries, Mansoul had not yet found a home in which it could rest. For tribalism is the denial of fatherhood : the need of destroying the mass of mankind is the confession of impotence : and nothing less than

fatherhood and omnipotence could satisfy man's craving. The way of advance to a complete conception was blocked by the *odium humani generis* which Tacitus attributed to the Jews, and the Jews themselves attributed to God.

Here was a crucial problem—a real *dignus vindice nodus*. As in former cases the problems of Mansoul had been solved by the revelations of prophets, so in this supreme instance One greater than the prophets came to the rescue. Jesus taught His disciples to see in God the father of all men alike, who maketh his sun to shine on the good and the evil. He showed that all men were in a real sense sons of God, endowed with a real kinship to him, and therefore brethren to each other. And what He taught, He showed in His life. For Him, the Roman centurion and the Samaritan were brethren, to be pitied and relieved no less than the Jew. For Him, God was wholly the Father, and in Him the Father was manifested to men. So the long Odyssey of Mansoul was ended. He had found God—had received a revelation of God which was final and complete. For in the person of Christ, as well as in His words, God stood revealed as the all-father, all just, all merciful and loving, the source of man's life and the end in which man finds rest.

That is final, as the arrival of Aeneas in Latium was final. But it was long before the implications of the great event could be unfolded and understood. The first disciples could not grasp the full meaning of Christ's revelation. While they accepted it as divine, as the means of salvation and the source of inspiration, they still tried to confine it within the bounds of Jewish formulas. The apostles needed much persuasion before they could allow that the Gospel was meant for the Gentiles. They needed much thought and experience before they could even begin to frame a conception of the nature of Christ. Their first efforts are recorded in the New Testament, chiefly in the pages of St. Paul and St. John. They called Him Prophet, Messiah, Wisdom or Word of God. Those terms are milestones on a road which the soul must travel for many miles further before it could attain to a satisfying conception. So the New Testament, while it testifies to the measureless importance of Jesus, encourages us by example as well as by precept to pursue the path which leads to a fuller understanding.

If there were time I would fain follow out this line of thought, at least with reference to the doctrine of the Trinity. But it is the less necessary because much of which I should have said has been admirably expressed by Mr. Bezzant. So I content myself with pointing to one important conclusion from the argument. We value the Bible as the record of the way in which Mansoul has been guided in its search for the living God and has attained the perfect vision which is given through Christ. But our interest is not only collective; it is also individual. Each of us may find in the Scriptures that which corresponds to his own experience. Embryologists tell us how man's bodily frame goes through a series of mutations which repeat in brief the development of the human race. Something like this is true of the mind. The child thinks as did the race in its infancy: the boy's mind reflects the ages of barbarism: and so on. That is one reason why children love the legends of *Genesis*, and boys the wild tales of *Judges* and *Samuel:* for there they find their own crude conceptions reflected as in a glorifying mirror. The developing thought of Israel helps them in their own development. Are not we ourselves conscious that in the prophets and the psalms we have found stepping-stones to higher things? We may read the Scriptures as a record of our own religious history, writ large (to use Plato's phrase) in the literature of a wonderful nation, glorified by the genius of poet and prophet. And then we may turn to recognize the same divine guidance as granted to the race and to the individual soul, not only in the past, but in the present and the future. Of that guidance the Scriptures are at once the record, the instrument, and the promise.

WHY WE VALUE BAPTISM AND CONFIRMATION

By the Rev. H. D. A. Major, D.D., Principal of Ripon Hall, Oxford.

THE Christian Sacrament of Baptism is fringed with controversy. Controversy began in the late second century over the Baptism of Infants. Its clarion notes resound in the searching question of the fiery Tertullian: 'Why does not an age which is innocent hasten to the remission of sins?'[1] In the next century the validity of baptism by schismatics was hotly disputed. Early in the fifth century Pelagius scandalized the Western Church by denying the damnation of unbaptized infants. I do not propose to deal with any of these disputes. I wish rather to treat Baptism from the point of view of a Modern Churchman, and to leave as far as possible the dead to bury their dead.

There are two kinds of Baptism mentioned in the New Testament. 'Yes, of course,' someone will say, 'Baptism into the Name of the Lord Jesus, which is referred to in the *Acts* and the Pauline Epistles, and Baptism into the Name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost, which is referred to in the last verse but one of St. Matthew's Gospel.'

But these are not two kinds of Baptism, but the same kind of Baptism but with two different formulae. The formula into the Name of the Lord Jesus being used in the earliest days when the Church's converts were being drawn from Palestinian Jews and the Jewish proselytes of the Dispersion, and the Triune formula being used in that later period when the Church was beginning to gather in converts direct from Greek and Roman and Asiatic paganism.

Dean Rashdall in his valuable book *Christus in Ecclesia* points out that down to the ninth century, as shewn by the decision of Pope Nicholas I (858-867 A.D.), Baptism in the name of the Lord Jesus was still valid (p. 54). He also points out that

[1] *De Baptismo*, 18.

there is strong ground for believing that the original form of our Lord's 'marching orders,' as the Duke of Wellington called them, did not contain the Trinitarian formula, but ran: 'Go ye and make disciples of all the nations in My name, teaching them to observe all things whatsoever I commanded you.'[2]

If this be so, then we have no direct command of our Lord to baptize. This is supported by St. Paul's statement to the Corinthians written some thirty years or more before St. Matthew's Gospel: 'For Christ sent me not to baptize, but to preach the Gospel' (I *Cor.* i, 17)—a text by his knowledge of which Voltaire won a wager of £500. The author of the Fourth Gospel, when he writes: 'Jesus baptized not, but his disciples' (iv, 1, 2), seems to be indicating obliquely, after his fashion, that baptizing with water was permitted but not expressly commanded by our Lord. The Baptism which originated with Him was of another kind and quality. It was Baptism with the Spirit. It is this kind of Baptism which is characteristically and essentially Christian. It is this fact which justifies my opening statement that there are two kinds of Baptism in the New Testament, namely, Baptism with Water and Baptism with the Spirit.

Baptism with water is very ancient. It existed long before Christianity and long before Judaism. It is not only very ancient, but also very widespread, as any student of Comparative Religion is aware. I remember being told when in New Zealand that a pagan ceremony of baptizing infants was in existence among the Maoris long before the advent of Christian missionaries to those islands. The idea underlying Baptism by water is cleansing—cleansing from ceremonial defilement or cleansing from moral guilt—a washing of the soul as well as of the body. Certain pagan moralists protested against this practice as detrimental to morality. Even the Castalian Spring which flowed from Delphi's sacred chasm could not, so the higher morality of Greek religion taught, cleanse the soul from moral guilt. This is clearly stated in the Pythian response to suppliant pilgrims:

[2] See F. C. Conybeare in *Hibbert Journal,* Vol. i, No. i, and J. R. Wilkinson, Vol. i, No. iii; also Professor Kirsopp Lake's Inaugural Lecture delivered before the University of Leiden (1904)—published by Parker's, Oxford—and the criticism of it by Bishop Chase in the *Journal of Theological Studies.*

> 'To the pure precincts of Apollo's portal
> Come, pure in heart, and touch the lustral wave:
> One drop sufficeth for the sinless mortal;
> All else, e'en Ocean's billows cannot lave.'[3]

John the Baptist, the New Testament example of the baptizer with water, declared that baptism in order to be effective must be preceded by repentance, an act of moral conversion. Furthermore, the Baptist taught, according to our records, that this water-baptism was but a preliminary to Baptism with the Spirit, which would be conferred by the Messiah. The Baptist describes this baptism by the Spirit in a metaphor drawn from the Oriental harvest-home. The Messiah, he says, shall baptize you with a purifying wind and with fire. The wind blowing over the threshing-floor separated the dust and chaff from the grain, and then, the grain having been garnered, the fire consumed the refuse. The Messiah's Baptism, in the Baptist's view, would unerringly separate between good and bad in Israel, and gather the good into the Kingdom of God and consume the evil. It was to be a Baptism of Judgement.

The Baptist died a martyr's death: the Messiah died on the Cross. The Christian Church came into existence, and we find from primitive records both in the Pauline Epistles and the *Acts of the Apostles* that Baptism with the Spirit had become the most impressive religious experience of that Church. It is not easy to explain how, and furthermore there is really no need to do so. The fact is unquestionable. The baptizing Spirit was felt to be the Spirit of Jesus in the hearts of those who believed in Him: it was regarded as given in fulfilment of His promise, and also in accordance with Old Testament prophecy: 'And it shall come to pass in the last day, saith God, that I will pour out my Spirit upon all flesh' (*Joel* ii, 28; *cf. Acts* ii, 17). This Baptism with the Spirit became a characteristic of the primitive Christian Church. Its reception was preceded by repentance, and the acceptance of Jesus as the Christ: but it was accompanied in many cases by ecstasy and the impartation of the extraordinary gifts of the Spirit (*χαρίσματα*) such as speaking with tongues. Two ceremonial acts were connected with it:

[3] *Pythian Response*, translated by J. E. Sandys.

(1) Baptizing with water into the Name of the Lord Jesus; and
(2) the laying on of the Apostles' hands.

These acts did not in all cases, even in Apostolic times, confer Baptism with the Spirit. In the case of Cornelius, it is recorded that the Baptism of the Spirit preceded Baptism with Water. In the case of Ananias and Sapphira it was presumably never conferred. Nevertheless, the tendency was to identify the two, and to regard Water-Baptism and the Laying on of Hands as conferring Baptism with the Spirit in all cases. This was natural enough. The *ex opere operato* or mechanical view of religious rites is infinitely older than the Christian religion. It is a fundamental conviction of primitive magic. At one time it was the universal human belief. If it be a feature of mediaeval Catholicism, that is not because it is Christian, but because it is pre-Christian. This is what Rudolf Sohm means when he says 'The natural man is a born Catholic.'

No doubt this magical view of Christian rites existed in the Apostolic Church. It could hardly be otherwise considering the character of its membership. Some have contended that it is explicit in St. Paul's teaching. When St. Paul writes that to the Greeks he became a Greek that he might gain Greeks, he undoubtedly refers to his efforts to present the Christian religion in a Greek form, and the form he chose was that of the Greek mystery religions. It is much disputed how far St. Paul carried his Greek transformation of the religion of Jesus. I find myself in this matter in agreement with Harnack's verdict in his *Mission and Expansion of Christianity*. He writes:

> 'Paul was the first and almost the last theologian of the early Church with whom sacramental theology was really held in check by clear ideas and strictly spiritual considerations. After him all the flood-gates were opened, and in poured the Mysteries with their lore. In Ignatius, who is only sixty years later than Paul, they had already dragged down and engulfed the whole of intelligent theology' (E.T., vol. i, p. 230).[4]

[4] Loisy's essay, 'L'Initiation chrètienne,' in his *Revue d'Histoire et de Littérature religieuses* goes somewhat further. I cite but one sentence from it: 'The Christianity of Paul has its mystical rites, its efficacious symbols, its sacraments, which, however, are not to be considered in contradiction to the principle of justification by faith, seeing that, as in the mysteries, they are rather its natural form and indispensable expression.'

But this is the practical issue for us: Even if a magical sacramentalism could be deduced from St. Paul's teaching, it would not prove that view to be valid. The Spirit of Truth on which Christians rely to guide them into all truth must lead them beyond the erroneous beliefs of primitive Christians. For instance, very few modern Christians can view the Old Testament as St. Paul viewed it, or believe with him that physical death came into the world as the result of human sin. Suffice it to say that the authorities of the primitive Church, by the care with which they administered Baptism by Water, by the rigorous preparation they insisted on, and by the solemnities with which they surrounded the rite, did all that they could to make Baptism with Water identical with Baptism with the Spirit.

For Christians to-day the great sacrament is the Eucharist or Holy Communion. For the primitive Christians the great sacrament was Baptism. For them it is the Sacrament of Regeneration or the New Birth: the Sacrament of Divine Adoption whereby the Christian becomes the child of God: it is the Sacrament of Spiritual Resurrection and of Mystical Union with Christ: it is the Sacrament of Cleansing from Sin: it is the Sacrament of the ever-abiding, enlightening, energizing Spirit: the Sacrament by which men enter the Church of Christ which is His Body. So wonderful was its power that people were baptized for the dead: so terrible its responsibility that the Emperor Constantine and a number of St. Chrysostom's contemporaries postponed Baptism until their death-bed. It is thought by some modern commentators that the foot-washing of the disciples by Jesus in the Fourth Gospel is a parabolic narrative which deals symbolically with the forgiveness of sin after Baptism, but I may not dwell on this now. St. Paul's Epistles abound with references to Baptism; and in the Fourth Gospel (which I interpret as endeavouring to check the progress of a materialist sacramentalism in the Church) Baptism is certainly dealt with in a dialogue between Jesus and Nicodemus. This we must pause to consider.

The three peaks of theological development in the New Testament are the Epistle to the *Ephesians*, the Epistle to the *Hebrews*, and the Johannine writings. Neither within nor outside the pages of the New Testament do we meet with any

interpretation of Baptism superior to that in the Fourth Gospel. There we have it presented primarily as Baptism with the Spirit. This Baptism makes the baptized conscious of a new relation to God: they are His sons, His children, 'born from above,' 'not of man, but of God.' The key-note of the Fourth Gospel is that Jesus is the Word of God incarnate, and that as many as receive Him as such, do themselves receive the right (ἐξουσία) to become children of God. Such are born from above (ἄνωθεν): born of the Spirit: to such it is given both to see and to enter the Kingdom of God (*cf.* i, 12-13 and iii, 3*f.*).

In the dialogue with Nicodemus, while the Spirit is mentioned often, water is only mentioned once (iii, 5), and it is possible that here it is an interpolation. In any case, *Water* with this writer is probably the symbol for the Spirit (*cf. Jn.* vi, 38, 39, '. . . rivers of living water. But this he spake of the Spirit'; and *cf. Isaiah* xliv, 3). The writer seems in this dialogue to be deliberately correcting the teaching of current sacramentalism, and to be saying to his contemporaries: 'Baptism is Baptism with the Spirit, by which we become conscious that we share in that Divine nature which we recognize in all its perfection in Jesus.'

Now this is the master-light in which the Modern Churchman views Baptism: it is the sacrament of Divine Sonship. He does not regard Baptism as *creating* that sonship, but as witnessing to it, *declaring*, *proclaiming* it in the most impressive fashion, and also as furnishing those conditions and that environment by means of which this Divine Sonship may be realised. The Thirty-nine Articles describe the Sacraments as *signa efficacia*, *i.e.*, symbols which are effective to realise what they symbolize. Baptism assists and promotes the realization of the Divine Sonship which it symbolizes. It is with this idea dominant that the Modern Churchman administers the rite of Baptism, and explains it in teaching the Catechism to the baptized. Baptism does not, in his view, confer some germ of life: it solemnly witnesses to a vital fact, namely, that the person baptized is a child of God: it insists upon the duties and obligations which go with this privilege. Baptism admits the person baptized to a society, the earthly family of God in which his *status* as child of God is recognized, and in which he is placed

in an environment where he will receive the education and training due to his status. His parents and god-parents recognize his divine nature and undertake to train him accordingly If he be an adult, he affirms these obligations and takes them on himself : if he be an infant, others undertake that he shall be duly instructed in them, and when he comes to years of discretion shall take them upon himself.

Thus for the Modern Churchman it is a *status* or privilege which is conferred by Baptism, not a change of nature. The Spirit of God or the Spirit of Christ, which is the Spirit of Divine Sonship and Human Brotherhood, enters in increasing measure into the personality which becomes conscious of the status which Baptism has conferred and strives to realise it in conduct and character. Thus Baptism most truly confers regeneration—a New or Second Birth—on those who receive it. The first time we are born, we are born into a human family, its privileges, relationships, duties, environment; the second time we are born it is into a Divine Family, with its privileges, relationships, duties, environment. The first birth for which the creative providence of God has prepared us is a wonderful thing; but even more wonderful ought to be our Second Birth.

There is nothing magical, mechanical, or materialistic about this interpretation of the Sacrament of Baptism, and there is nothing irrational or immoral in it, unless it be irrational to declare that human beings are children of God, and immoral to try and help them to live as such. This interpretation is no invention of Modern Churchmen. It is the interpretation of the Old Broad Churchmen. It is worked out fully in a remarkable Catechism which Robertson of Brighton prepared over seventy years ago for the instruction of his candidates for Confirmation. It is to be found in Stopford Brooke's *Life and Letters of F. W. Robertson*, Appendix iii. I venture to cite several of his questions and answers (p. 246) :

Q. What is Baptism?
A. The authoritative declaration of a fact.
Q. What fact?
A. That I am God's child.
Q. Why, then, do you say that I am so *made*, in baptism?
A. Being *made*, I mean—*declared to be.*
Q. Explain what you mean.

A. As soon as a king dies, his successor is king. Coronation *declares the fact,* but does not *make* him king. He was one before, but it corroborates, declares, affirms, seals the fact by a recognised form used for that purpose.

Q. Tell me some of the prevailing opinions on this subject.

A. The Roman Catholics, and those who hold their views on this subject, believe that at baptism a magical change takes place in the infant: that he is changed from a child of wrath into a child of grace. For instance, as in the *Arabian Nights,* on the pronunciation of certain words human beings were changed by magicians into the forms of beasts and birds, etc.

Q. In what other way is this rite regarded?

A. Dissenters, Evangelicals, etc., hold that grace may, or may not, be given at baptism: it is a *perhaps.*

Q. What results from this?

A. Uncertainty—self-consciousness—education on a wrong basis.

This interpretation of the Baptismal rite avoids the sacerdotal magic which the typical Catholic interpretation involves, and it is richer in moral and spiritual content than the older Evangelical interpretation.

I do not propose to deal further with these two interpretations. They are dealt with fully in the Gorham Judgement. All three interpretations are legitimate in the Church of England. But I must be strictly honest. While the interpretation I have given is, I believe, the only interpretation which the modern-minded Churchman can give to the sacrament of Baptism, I cannot claim for it the ecclesiastical authority which can be claimed for the Catholic interpretation. I believe the Modern Churchman's interpretation to be true to the facts of human nature and the Christian religion: I believe also that there is support for it in the Fourth Gospel: but I see little support for it in the Church history of the second, third, and fourth centuries. It is not until I come to Pelagius and his followers that I find it clearly enunciated for the acceptance of the faithful. The writer of the article 'Pelagius' in the *Dictionary of Christian Biography* thus summarizes the Pelagian teaching on this point:

> 'Baptized infants received the sacred rite not for the forgiveness of their sins, but that they might attain spiritual sonship and become partakers of the Kingdom of Heaven' (vol. iv, p. 293).

This interpretation of Infant Baptism was rejected under the influence of St. Augustine. Now there are many things in which

St. Augustine was right and Pelagius was wrong in that controversy (for instance, the Pelagian denial of the human need of Divine Grace), but surely in the light of our modern knowledge Augustine was wrong and Pelagius was right in his interpretation of the Sacrament of Baptism.[5]

Viewed in the light in which the Modern Churchman presents it, the Sacrament of Baptism is an immensely important religious rite. Would that we had a revised Baptismal Service which would not only liberate us from making such a monstrous assertion as 'that all men are conceived and born in sin,' but would also give us what we believe to be the real significance of the Baptismal rite in brief, plain, practical, inspiring terms. If the celebration of the Sacrament of Baptism has with us sunk in many cases into privacy and insignificance, it is due in no small measure to the character of our Baptismal Service, which, although it contains much which is beautiful and helpful, yet nullifies it by antiquated jargon which seems quite unreal, and some of it even repulsive, to modern Englishmen.

The Service of Confirmation the Modern Churchman regards as the completion of Baptism. It is the custom in some Church circles to speak of it as a separate sacrament. This is to misconceive it. If it be regarded as the completion of Baptism, it is the justification—and the only justification—of Infant Baptism. The Church administers the first part of Baptism to the unconscious infant on the express understanding that he shall be brought up to realise its significance. When evidence is forthcoming of this realization and the willing acceptance of it, then the second part of the rite—namely, Confirmation—is administered. If this view of Baptism in relation to Confirmation were consistently taught in the Church of England, many Baptists would, I think, cease to object to Infant Baptism as practised by us. It would then be seen that the Church of

[5]A noted Pelagian, Bishop Julianus, wrote about 418 A.D. : 'We do not baptize for the purpose of freeing from the claim of the devil, but that those who are the work of God may become His children, as pledges of His love, that those who have come forth from God's tuition may be still further advanced by His mysteries, and that those who bear the work of nature may attain to the gifts of grace, and that their Lord who made them good by creation, may make them better by renovation and adoption!' (Aug. *Opus Imp.*, v. 9).

England rite has the double advantage of admitting the infant to the Christian Church with the clear declaration that it is a child of God and should be brought up as such, and with a corresponding promise by its parents and guardians that they will undertake this duty; and, on the other hand, it provides that full membership of the Church shall only be granted as the result of a course of Christian education and the full and willing acceptance of Christian privilege and responsibility by the person admitted.

May I add one word more, that while I am a strenuous advocate of a revised Baptismal Service, I see no need for any revision of our Confirmation Service, which appears to me to be admirable. I do, however, gratefully accept the enrichment of it by a special concluding charge to the confirmed such as is supplied by the Grey Book Service. For admission into the Anglican Communion of adult communicants from other bodies we require a separate and special service.

It is sometimes supposed that Modernists think lightly of the Sacraments. This is far from being the case. Whilst the Modernist would not dream of denying salvation in its fullest sense to Quakers and to others who do not use the Sacraments, he believes the Sacraments to be immensely helpful for the great majority of human beings if rightly used. He perceives the dangers which may adhere to them from materialistic, mechanical, and magical interpretations, to which they are peculiarly prone, and so he is urgently anxious that there shall be nothing of a sub-Christian character about them. They are capable of an interpretation and use which is spiritual, moral, rational—Christian in the highest sense—and it is extraordinarily necessary to-day that our teaching about them should never, as it so easily may, fall below that level. If it does, we not only discredit the Sacraments, but we discredit Christianity itself. The true view of sacramental acts is set forth by Bishop Jeremy Taylor in the following sentence:

> 'For no rational man can think that any ceremony can make a spiritual change without a spiritual act of him that is to be changed; nor that it can work by way of nature, or by charm, but morally and after the manner of reasonable creatures.'[6]

[6] Dedication to *Holy Dying*.

THE EUCHARIST

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IT is my task in the present paper to state why Modern Churchmen value the Eucharist.

Modern Churchmen can be grouped together, not because they have reached agreement as to an extensive system of dogma, but because they share a common outlook. They claim to be members of the Church Universal, which includes all whose faith is drawn from Jesus the Christ. They would justify this claim by their endeavour to be worthy, in act and thought, of the Master whose revelation they accept and whose Person they adore. Further, the Modern Churchmen assembled in this Conference belong to the Church of England because they believe that our national Church at the Reformation preserved what was best worth keeping of the historic development of Christianity, while it then rejected religious conceptions, alien from the thought of Christ, which were producing grave moral evils. But they describe themselves as *Modern* Churchmen because they believe that, through the Holy Spirit, the revelation of Christ is a continuing process. They therefore accept all the assured conclusions of modern scholarship and modern science and are ready, so far as is necessary, to apply them to modify traditional doctrines of the Christian Church. It is not to be expected that, with such a basis of unity, there can be complete unanimity. But God has given us alike our spiritual aspirations and our capacity to reason about them. We are built to a common pattern. Our reason is akin to the Universal Reason, the Logos of creation. As we apply it to the problems of faith and purge our conclusions of error by the interplay of mind upon mind, we not only separate essentials from non-essentials, but we also find with regard to essentials an increasing measure of agreement. The growth of knowledge during the last century has done more to alter our ideas, alike with regard to the physical Universe and with regard to Christian origins, than all previous changes in thought since the Christian era began. It has been amazingly rapid. None the

less, the consequent attempts to reformulate the Christian faith have not led to chaos. The faith of a Modern Churchman is already alike coherent and substantial. In this scheme of faith the Eucharist has a definite place, and it is for me to-day to try to estimate the significance which it has for us all.

Naturally I begin by indicating the way in which traditional ideas with regard to the origin and development of the Eucharist have been altered by the growth of knowledge through literary criticism and historical research.

The origin of the Eucharist is, of course, to be found in the meal which Jesus took with His disciples on the night before His death on the Cross. Of that meal we have four accounts, which differ considerably from one another. They are due to St. Paul, St. Mark, St. Luke, and the unknown author of St. Matthew's Gospel. With our modern views of the Bible we no longer attempt to smooth out differences so as to reach a vague harmony. We carefully investigate discrepancies in our sacred records to discover how far they may be due either to defects of oral tradition or to modifications of that tradition which made it accord with practices existing when the records were compiled. Men both repeat inaccurately what they have heard and also read back the present into the past.

The earliest account of the origin of the Eucharist which has come down to us is that given by St. Paul in his First Letter to the Corinthians. He says, somewhat enigmatically, that the account which he gives he had 'received from the Lord.' Undoubtedly when he wrote, some twenty-five years after the Crucifixion, the Eucharist was a fixed rite of the Christian community, and St. Paul believed that Jesus had said at the Last Supper 'This do in remembrance of Me.' St. Mark, writing ten or fifteen years later, omits these words. The omission is surprising in view of the close personal association between St. Mark and St. Paul, and it suggests that he had received, and preferred, another tradition. His preference seemed to have little significance so long as St. Luke was believed to have accepted St. Paul's statement. But modern textual criticism, based purely on a study of existing manuscripts and their relative values, has reached the conclusion that in St. Luke's account of the Last Supper there has been an

interpolation. According to this view, the Evangelist did not originally state that Jesus said 'Do this in remembrance of me.' Some early scribe noticed the discrepancy between St. Luke's narrative and that of St. Paul. He thereupon inserted the two sentences (*Luke* xxii, 19 *b*, 20), 'This do in remembrance of me. Likewise also the cup after supper, saying This cup is the new testament of my blood, which is shed for you.'

The conclusion that none of these words were in the original statement was reached by such sober scholars as Westcott and Hort in their famous edition of the Greek New Testament.[1] It is now accepted by the majority of competent scholars. When we accept it we cease to be perplexed by St. Luke's double mention of the Cup, which had always puzzled thoughtful readers of his narrative and for which ingenious but fantastic explanations have often been given.

'St. Matthew's' narrative of the Last Supper is obviously dependent on that of St. Mark, though the later evangelist does not slavishly follow the earlier. Both, however, omit the words 'This do in remembrance of me'; and the first evangelist adds 'for the remission of sins' in describing 'the new covenant.'

As is well known, the Fourth Gospel records, not the Last Supper, but the washing by our Lord of His disciples' feet. If, then, we take modern scholarship as our guide, we reach the conclusion that no evangelist thought it necessary to state that Jesus said 'Do this in remembrance of me.' By their silence the first three evangelists seem to suggest that these words were not spoken by our Lord. The argument from silence is not wholly satisfactory. Dr. Rashdall,[2] however, in his epoch-making Bampton lectures on the Atonement ten years ago, concluded against the genuineness of the words and clearly pointed out the significance of the conclusion, as follows:

> 'If we set these words aside, there is nothing to suggest that our Lord had the intention of founding an institution or permanent rite of any kind. Whatever exactly happened at the Last Supper, the idea of perpetually commemorating that supper or of investing with a new significance the Jewish offering of cup and bread at the table was the work of the Church, not of its Founder.'

One or two subsidiary questions may be asked and answered.

[1] Dr. Sanday in his *Outlines of the Life of Christ* gives a detailed account of the process of interpolation.

[2] *The Idea of Atonement in Christian Theology*, 1919; p. 59.

Was the Last Supper the Passover meal? Most modern scholars agree with St. John, as against the other evangelists, that it was not. Probably it was the religious meal, kept after sunset by strict Jewish families on the eve of great festivals, in which the father of the family solemnly blessed the cup and the bread. Professor Bacon[3] says:

> 'At the evening meal—not the passover supper which would have presented the closer symbol of the slain lamb—Jesus assumed His usual part as dispenser of the food. But on this occasion He made the loaf a symbol of His body. Its destruction should not be dissolution, but a stronger union of the brotherhood by as much as the sacrifice made for its sake was now greater.'

What did Jesus actually say and do at the Last Supper? Opinions will always differ. But those who regard the primitive text of St. Luke as the best-attested narrative would give the answer somewhat as follows:

> 'Jesus said: With desire I have desired to eat the passover with you before I suffer, but I say unto you, I will not eat it until it be fulfilled in the Kingdom of God. And He received a cup, and when He had given thanks he said: 'Take this and divide it amongst yourselves: for I say unto you, I will not drink from henceforth of the fruit of the vine until the Kingdom of God shall come. And He took bread and, when He had given thanks, He brake it and gave to them, saying: This is My body. But, behold, the hand of him that betrayeth Me is with Me on the table.'

If the critical enquiries to which I have directed your attention are sound, you will justly conclude that in our Lord's words and actions at His Last Supper there is but a frail foundation for the elaborate sacramental practices and teaching of developed Catholicism. How are we to account for the rapid growth of sacramental worship, and of magical ideas associated with the consecrated elements, in the Church during the first three centuries? The answer is given by modern investigation of the religious environment in which early Christianity was shaped. Until comparatively recently accurate knowledge of contemporary paganism was scanty. It was generally assumed that official polytheism satisfied the masses, while the more cultured classes, in so far as they were not mere hedonists, had agnostic Stoicism as their creed. But modern research has made it clear that, when Christianity began to spread, religious enthusiasm and devotion in the Graeco-Roman world were

[3] *The Beginnings of the Gospel Story*, p. 204.

mainly associated with the mystery-religions.[4] These were a group of cults of Eastern or Egyptian origin which in the course of time developed a strong family likeness to one another. The most important had become markedly sacramental, with rites of initiation and purification supposed to have been in each case derived from, or peculiarly acceptable to, the patron-divinity of the cult. Through such rites it was believed that the favour of the protecting divinity might be gained. The mystery-religions stimulated a religious devotion which was genuine if at times, to our notions, repulsive. Some, and ultimately probably all, the great mystery cults promised to the initiate a new birth to a blessed immortality. The defect of all these cults was that their sacramentalism was essentially unethical. Sacramental grace depended on correct ritual by priests on whom sacerdotal powers had been duly conferred: it was not the Divine reward of righteousness. The sacraments, in fact, worked mechanically *ex opere operato*: in other words, they were magical. It must not, however, be supposed that the mysteries did nothing to foster obedience to the moral law. Some of them, especially after the general religious revival in the ancient world which took place during the second century, had a wholesome moral influence. But the fact remains that human nature is such that magic and morality consort ill together. The verdict which Dr. Angus[5] passes on the mysteries is both weighty and guarded:

> 'They lent themselves too easily to externalism by an exaggerated importance of ritual; they awakened a religious exaltation such as has rarely appeared in religious history, but with which ethical considerations were not of primary interest; they confused the physical symbol and the religious experience.'

Now a new religion spreads, not primarily by winning the irreligious, but by gaining religious men and women from other faiths. At first Christianity gained most of its Gentile converts

[4] The best accounts of the mystery religions available for the English reader will be found in Dill: *Roman Society from Nero to Marcus Aurelius;* Kennedy, *St. Paul and the Mystery Religions;* Angus, *The Mystery Religions* and *Christianity*. The best account of Mithraism, the mystery-cult which in the end was the chief rival of Christianity, is to be found in the monumental researches of Cumont. Cumont's small book, *The Religion of Mithra,* has been translated into English; so, too, has his valuable *Oriental Religions in Roman Paganism.*

[5] *The Mystery Religions and Christianity,* 1925, p. 245.

from the God-fearers of Judaism, the proselytes of the synagogues of the Dispersion. Speedily, however, as the cleavage with Judaism became sharper, its converts came in increasing numbers from adherents of the mysteries. But when men change their faith they do not abandon all their old ideas. Many of these ideas they retain in the new setting, and this is especially true of ideas that have strong emotional associations. It is not therefore surprising that by the beginning of the second century we find definite indications of the influence of the mystery religions in Christian writings. By the middle of the third century magical conceptions of Baptism and the Eucharist had gained a firm place within the Christian system, and, as a necessary corollary, a rigid sacerdotalism had replaced the New Testament conception of the priesthood of all Christian believers. In the third century, says Dr. Angus[6]:

> 'The typical ecclesiastic, Cyprian, stands not far apart from any Mystery-priest when he seriously chronicles stories of the deadly efficacy of the elements of the Supper both upon a little girl who had not reached years of moral discrimination and upon adults. One woman who surreptitiously took the elements 'received not food, but a sword,' causing internal convulsions. A guilty man found that the elements received from the priest turned into cinders in his hand.'

The extravagant sacramentalism of the Middle Ages is known to all: the abuses to which it necessarily led are equally familiar. The Reformation was an ethical recoil which *inter alia* repudiated the ideas of the mystery-cults as it turned to the purer religious faith of the New Testament. It was no accident that the Reformation won the Nordic races of Europe while it failed with those where the Iberian strain is still dominant. Among the latter magical sacramentalism is far older than Christianity —how much older our present knowledge does not allow us to say. Belief in such sacramentalism decayed among educated men and women of the northern races when it was exposed to the atmosphere of free enquiry which the Renaissance brought into Western Europe. Unless some era of intellectual decay overtakes our civilization, causing us to repudiate our Renaissance heritage, it is safe to say that typical Latin sacramentalism will not dominate English religion. Should it dominate the Church of England, that Church will cease to be the Church of the English people.

[6] *Loc. cit.* p. 256.

There are, of course, some who contend that St. Paul's teaching in the New Testament was shaped by pagan sacramentalism. He was certainly familiar with the language of the mysteries which he uses with freedom. The influence upon his thought of these forms of faith was definitely greater than we should expect from what we know of his life-history. But I believe that a careful exegesis of the revelant passages, such as Professor H. A. A. Kennedy[7] has made, shews that St. Paul's sacramental teaching is ethical at the core. He did not teach that in the Eucharist there is a magical communication of the glorified body of Christ to the worshipper through the medium of bread and wine. Could he have anticipated the later history of the Christian Church and the place which his letters were to have among its authoritative documents, he would doubtless have taken measures to guard his teaching from misunderstanding and the Christian faith from corruption. The most unfavourable verdict that can fairly be reached has been given by Dr. Inge[8]: though St. Paul 'was ready to fight to the death against the Judaizing of Christianity [he] was willing to take the first step, and a long one, towards the Paganizing of it.' With this verdict we may associate the judgment on the whole matter given by Dr. Glover[9]:

> 'There is a growing concensus of opinion among independent scholars that Jesus instituted no sacraments, yet Paul found the rudiments of them among the Christians and believed that he had the warrant of Jesus for the heightening which he gave to them. Ignatius speaks of the Ephesians "breaking one bread which is the medicine of immortality and the antidote that we should not die"—the former phrase reappearing in Clement of Alexandria. That such ideas should emerge in the Christian community is natural enough, when we consider its environment—a world without natural science, steeped in belief in every kind of magic and enchantment, and full of public and private religious societies, every one of which had its mysteries and miracles and its blood-bond with its peculiar deity. It was from such a world and such societies that most of the converts came and brought with them the thoughts and instincts of countless generations which had never conceived of a religion without rites and mysteries. . . . The Christians readily recognised the parallel between their rites and those of the heathen, but no one seems to have perceived the real connection between them. Quite naively they suggest the exact opposite —it was the daemons who foresaw what the Christian rites would be, and forestalled them with all sorts of pagan parodies.'

[7] In his book *St. Paul and the Mystery Religions*, already mentioned.
[8] *Out-spoken Essays*, First Series. Essay on St. Paul.
[9] *Conflict of Religions*, Fifth Edition, p. 158.

I have now prepared the way for the valuation of the Eucharist which a Churchman must make in the light of modern knowledge. In other words, we are in a position to state why Modern Churchmen value the service. May I say at the outset that, in my opinion, acceptance of the conclusions which I have put before you, while it affects the significance, does not lessen the value of the rite. The traditional importance of the Holy Communion in our liturgy remains undiminished; and Modern Churchmen do, in fact, value the Sacrament more highly than the older Evangelicals. But our modern knowledge makes crude rationalizations of Eucharistic doctrine, such as transubstantiation and analogous theories, more obviously impossible.

Let us consider in order that we may dismiss a typically crude argument advanced by exponents of naïve theology who deny that Modern Churchmen can sincerely value the Eucharist. It is sometimes argued that, if Jesus did not say the words 'Do this in remembrance of me,' we have no reason to believe that the use of the words 'This is my body' will have the result of converting the bread of the Sacrament into the body of Christ. The answer to this objection is that we have no reason to believe that such conversion ever takes place. Let us assume that St. Paul's account of the Last Supper is correct. Would any of those seated at the table with our Lord have believed that the bread became His body, when He in the body was present before them? Surely not. Christ's giving of Himself was spiritual. The breaking of the bread was the symbol of the breaking of His body on the Cross, the symbol of Christ's gift of His own life that His Spirit, through the agency of those whom he inspired, might redeem the world. Moreover, if Jesus said the words 'This do in remembrance of me,' he certainly did not say that, if the Last Supper was repeated by His disciples, the bread which was used should become His body. No such conditional promise is either expressed or implied in either of the four accounts of the Last Supper which have come down to us.

A second objection is more plausible. We are sometimes told that if it be true that the Eucharist was established by the Church and not by its Founder, if its significance was heightened by St. Paul in an age when non-ethical sacramentalism pervaded

religion, and if moreover crude magical ideas were speedily associated with the material elements used in the rite, then it were better to eliminate the rite from Christian worship. But is such an argument, with its resemblance to the remorseless logic of the undergraduate, really satisfactory? *Abusus non tollit usum:* the abuse of a good thing is no reason why we should abandon it. The breaking of bread, varied though the significance attached to it has been,[10] preceded the organization of the Christian Church. From the very earliest times Christians have shared a common meal in which they have sought to reproduce the circumstances of our Lord's Last Supper with His disciples. Why should we break with our past, especially when all must admit that the Holy Communion has quickened true devotion to Christ in countless numbers of His followers? It is true that unethical sacramentalism is demoralizing, but we have no cause to abandon religion because magic is its bastard sister. If, as we all believe, there is a God, Creator and Ruler of the world, to Whom the spirit of man can have access, it is certain that He manifests Himself in space and time and that material things can be channels or instruments of His revelation of Himself. The widespread conviction of humanity that God can thus be approached sacramentally, though it has often been combined with fantastic rites and puerile theories, witnesses to an instinct in men which needs to be purified but not destroyed. Surely St. Paul was right in perceiving that there was a type of sacramental worship which is in no sense magical because it is ethical, based upon the belief that God in Christ gives Himself sacramentally to those who seek to do His will. Surely, moreover, in such an idea there is nothing foreign to the teaching of Jesus. As Professor Kennedy has well said,[11] true sacramentalism 'is no excrescence of primitive superstition, but corresponds to a permanent demand of the human consciousness, the demand that the visible and tangible should be a seal of faith to that which is unseen and eternal.'

We turn now to the Eucharist. We value it. So also we value solitary prayer; or words from a good man who, as we

[10] See, for example, that earliest surviving Christian manual of worship, *The Didache*, in which there is no hint of magical sacramentalism.

[11] *Loc. cit.*, p. 263.

say, pours out his soul; or quiet meditation when the sunshine gives glory to the beauty of nature. Why? For an answer we say haltingly in every case, 'We feel better for it. We get peace and joy. We are nearer God.' The basis of our valuation is undifferentiated religious experience. Those who have not had the experience, who have never felt the thrill of pure religious emotion, will wonder at our enthusiasm. Yet we have seen, felt, known the presence of God. Because there are circumstances, places, writings, men who give us what our souls need, who lift us though it be but for a moment above ourselves, we value them. They are channels or instruments of the grace of God. There are some who would have us rest content with what I have called undifferentiated religious experience and not try to analyse it. But man is so made that he must try to understand his experience. He always seeks to give reasons for his likes and dislikes, and above all to explain the nature of his richest emotions. If good reasons are not forthcoming, bad ones will have an undisputed reign. Now it is a fact of Christian experience that the Eucharist is a type of worship in which men and women throughout the Christian centuries have felt that they were led to Christ and inspired by Him. They have expressed it by saying that His Real Presence was with them in the rite. We have then to explain a psychical fact. The problem before us is psychological.

The solution offered us by transubstantiation was obtained by jumbling together physics and metaphysics. The distinction between the substance and accidents of a piece of matter is for us meaningless. For the belief that inanimate matter can be endowed with spiritual qualities there is no scientific evidence. The contention can be tested by the usual scientific procedure of experiment and observation. A Catholic praying before a wafer which he wrongly believed to have been consecrated would gain precisely the same spiritual satisfaction as if his belief were true. One sometimes finds the suggestion in Anglo-Catholic apologetics that some good people have a spiritual *flair* which at once enables them to perceive on entering a church whether the consecrated elements are there 'reserved.' We must be tender when superstition is mingled with devotion; but we may confidently affirm that this fancied *flair* would not sur-

vive such an experimental test as could easily be devised. I repeat—the problem before us is psychological.

This was perceived by our Reformers as soon as the scientific spirit, reborn at the Renaissance, began to influence religious doctrine. The Reformers had no psychological terminology, but none the less they expressed themselves with admirable clearness and good sense. From the authoritative documents of our Church we can quote: 'A sacrament is an outward sign of invisible grace.' 'To such as rightly, worthily and with faith receive the same, the bread which we break is *a partaking of* the Body of Christ.' 'Transubstantiation overthroweth the nature of a sacrament and hath given occasion to many superstitions.' Hooker[12] developed the Anglican point of view with his accustomed lucidity. He enquired whether, when the Eucharist is administered, 'Christ be whole *within man only*, or else His body and blood be externally seated in the very consecrated elements themselves.' And he answered that 'the bread and the cup are His body and blood because they are causes instrumental upon the receipt whereof the *participation of* His body and blood ensueth.' Therefore, he said, 'the real presence of Christ's most blessed body and blood is not to be sought in the Sacrament, but in the worthy receiver of the Sacrament.' Furthermore, the Sacraments 'are not really, nor do they really contain in themselves, that grace which with them or by them it pleaseth God to bestow.' And, two final quotations, '*the soul of man* is the receptacle of Christ's presence.' 'What should induce men to think that the grace of the Eucharist must needs be in the Eucharist before it can be in us that receive it?'

Our own *rationale* of the Eucharist will not differ essentially from that of Hooker. We would say, with the Elizabethan divine, that God comes to those who have prepared themselves to receive Him. He gives Himself to the worthy recipient of His grace. He does not limit Himself to any particular mechanism, nor does a mechanism exist by which He is of necessity received by an unresponsive soul. We add to this fundamental belief the psychological fact that when men truly join together in common worship their religious enthusiasm is

[12] *Ecclesiastical Polity*, Bk. V, Ch. lxvii (2).

quickened. The whole is then greater than its parts. By the process of 'suggestion' mind acts upon mind. Spiritual emotion is caught; developed and strengthened; returned. One man whose thought is centred on our Lord is inspired by one aspect of His personality. Another catches his inspiration and joins it to his own perception. And a third adds his reverent love to the common stock of emotional insight which all share. Christ is felt by all to be the Way, the Truth and the Life to a degree which far transcends the separate understanding brought by each worshipper to the service. As our Lord put it: 'Where two or three are gathered together in my name, there am I in the midst of them.'

It is on the psychological truth embodied in this saying that we build our doctrine of the Eucharist. Some will immediately ask: Has, then, the Sacrament no distinctive place in Christian worship? We answer that it most certainly has, because of its associations. The power of 'association' in connection with mental processes, and especially those of an emotional nature, is emphasized by all psychologists. And in the Eucharist all our worship is deliberately associated with the climax of the Revelation of God in Christ. Our Lord was not only a great religious teacher, a good and pure man: He gave His life that, drawn by love to Him, His followers might enter the eternal Kingdom of His Father. Who shall exhaust the meaning of the gift, or measure the redemptive power of such innocent suffering? In the Eucharist it is before us. All the associations of the service bring the Lord's sacrifice to our minds. We commemorate the Lord's Supper. We share a meal like that last meal which Jesus shared with His followers. The bread is broken, and we think of the suffering body on the cross. The wine is shared from the cup at which all drink, and we think of the life ('the blood is the life') given by the Christ for the redemption of mankind. The whole service presents to us, as no other Service can, alike the spirit in which Jesus went to His death and the meaning of that death for His followers. It is an outward and visible sign of the spiritual grace which came, and still comes, to those who fit themselves to receive it, from the Incarnation which was fulfilled in the victory of the Cross. If the Christ is present wherever two or three are gathered

together in His name, can we deny His presence—His Real Presence—when worship has such associations? Do not all the circumstances of the Eucharist make for the enrichment of our understanding of the nature of the Spirit of Christ? We receive Him sacramentally just in so far as, by the purity of our hearts and the intensity of our devotion, we are ready for His coming.

Yet we must insist that the operation of the sacrament is a psychological process. God in giving Himself does not disdain to use the normal influences of 'suggestion' and 'association' which are potent in the everyday life of men. We cannot admit a dualism of natural and supernatural. The so-called laws of nature are God's laws, expressions of the uniformity of His action; and psychological 'laws' express the way in which men receive from one another, and from the Holy Spirit, their thoughts and emotions.

If we abandon, as I contend we must abandon, all magical views of the Eucharist, we must explain it by such scientific knowledge of human mental processes as we possess. As we do this we shall not depreciate the value of the Sacrament—that were impossible—but we shall the more persuasively commend it to thoughtful men and women. We shall also avoid erroneous doctrines and practices based upon them, which are dangerous to true religion. In particular we shall give no countenance to the view that Christ comes only, or especially, at the moment of the consecration of the elements. As Dr. Carnegie Simpson[13] has truly said:

> 'It is a greater thought that He is present in the entire Sacrament than that He is located in the elements which are but part of it; that He is in it from the beginning than that He comes at the moment of consecration; and what is more important than either of these points —that He is here not as the offered oblation but as the Celebrant. This is the greater doctrine of the Real Presence.'

If we keep a true understanding of the Eucharist, we shall re-affirm the objection of our Church to reservation of the consecrated elements. This objection finds expression in our Articles of Religion; the practice is precluded by one of our rubrics[14]; after the Reformation it was unknown in our Church

[13] *Church Principles*, 1923, p. 107.

[14] The Archbishops of Canterbury and York on May 1, 1900, formally stated that 'the effect and one of the objects of this rubric were prohibitive of reservation.'

until recent years. The commonly-used phrase 'Reservation of the Sacrament' is a misnomer. As Dr. Simpson says, 'the part is not the whole.' I would add that you can no more reserve a psychological process than you could reserve an exploding shell.

Dr. Carnegie Simpson is a High Church Presbyterian, but his namesake Canon Simpson[15] of St. Paul's puts the same point of view with admirable cogency:

> 'The spirit of the Anglican Articles and Prayer Book is only satisfied by a rejection of all theories employed to justify the use of the consecrated elements for purposes other than reception. Such uses imply a practical identification of the elements with the Person of Christ, who must necessarily be wherever His natural Flesh, or His natural Blood is—and this is essentially Transubstantiation.'

I would add the words of Hort,[16] the greatest English theologian of the 19th century, whom some of us claim as the founder of English Modernism:

> 'The fictitious and constructive offering up of a phantom body and phantom blood is a degradation of the Holy Communion to the unreal mimicry of a sacrifice which, if real, would now be heathenish. It is the nemesis of destroying the relation between the earthly elements and the heavenly life.'

How frequent should be the service which Hort has called 'our highest act of Communion'? Naturally if we take a magical *ex opere operato* view of the sacrament and assume that it works notwithstanding the spiritual lethargy of the recipient, we shall claim that participation in it cannot be too frequent. But, if we take a view which is doctrinally sound because it is psychologically reasonable, we shall be more cautious. We cannot always live on the heights. The latent danger in all worship is that it may be dulled by repetition, made stale by custom. A service which requires solemn preparation cannot for the majority of people be a daily—or, I would add, even a weekly—habit; and there are other modes of worship, typified by our morning and evening prayer, in which men at a lower spiritual level can join and from which they can get a spiritual quickening to which we can assign no limits. Our Church was wise to set before her adult members the duty of partaking of the Eucharist at least three times a year, and to leave each in-

[15] *Prayer Book Dictionary*, p. 793.
[16] *The Way, the Truth, the Life*, p. 214.

dividual free to determine how much more often he ought to approach the table of the Lord.

No one regrets more than I do that recent developments of Anglo-Catholicism within the English Church have involved us once again in sacramental controversies. The Eucharist is so beautiful, so satisfying to the deepest spiritual needs of the Christian, that controversy with regard to it is peculiarly distasteful. None the less, as the great German mystic Eckhart[17] wrote :

> 'A man never gets to the underlying truth if he stops at the enjoyment of its symbol.'

And with this I would combine Hort's great saying :

> 'Progress in theology does not consist in mutilation but in purification.'

Modern Churchmen, by their insistence on a true doctrine of the Eucharist, can powerfully aid that religious revival in England for which all should work and pray. We need to purify and, in purifying, to develop and enrich the doctrine of the Eucharist. Let us remember, in the first place, that human life at its best finds expression in fellowship : an isolated life is a sterile life : and the Eucharist is the sacrament of fellowship in Christ. Secondly, let us bear in mind that we shall never rightly understand our place in the scheme of things save through some view of the Universe which makes it a unity. The Eucharist is the effectual symbol of a unity of humanity based on God as revealed in Christ. But it is representative of a still wider unity : a witness to the truth that all Christian life is sacramental, that the power of God is expressed and that His grace can be received through countless earthly vehicles. We are children of earth, the fruit of her womb, and also children of God : yet between the two facts there is no opposition. The earth which bore us reveals the God who made us that our souls might rest in Him. Signs and vehicles of the Divine presence are all around us. To isolate our highest act of Communion is to neglect the truth that 'the earth is the Lord's and the fulness thereof.' Let us cling to St. Paul's extended sacramental faith : 'All things work together for good to them that love God.'

[17] *Meister Eckhart,* F. Pfeiffer, trs. C. de B. Evans, 1924, p. 186.

SUPERSTITION

By the Rev. Alfred Fawkes, M.A., Author of *Studies in Modernism*.

(1) The word δεισιδαιμονία, translated Superstition, occurs twice in the New Testament,[1] each time in a bad sense. As commonly used, Superstition signifies (1) *credulity* regarding the supernatural; (2) *irrational* fear of the unknown or mysterious; (3) *misdirected* reverence; or a religion, or practice, or particular opinion based upon such tendencies. The revival of superstitious beliefs and practices is a real danger in modern life. For this revival is an anachronism: these beliefs and practices, which are universal among primitive people, presuppose the unconnected world of miracle and magic, and die out by inanition in the related world of law. But few of us, though we repeat its formulas, think in terms of law; the scientific outlook, even in what is nominally a scientific age, is rare.

No more disastrous words were ever written than 'thou shalt not suffer a witch to live.'[2] For generations they made men afraid where no fear was, and deluged the world with blood. Not that all the effects attributed to this fictitious cause were fictitious. The witch was often a poisoner, and given to criminal practices of various kinds: this is probably why St. Paul classes sorcery, with murder and uncleanness, among the works of the flesh.[3] Again, suggestion is powerful. If a credulous person is persuaded that he has been bewitched, he easily develops the symptoms which he associates with bewitchment. While, if poison is called in to the help of the charm, the effect will be sudden and striking. There is no doubt, says a philosopher, that an incantation may be fatal to a flock of sheep; 'provided that a sufficient quantity of arsenic is also administered to them.'

(2) The climate of Democracy is favourable to superstition. In Religion in particular, 'The Master of *Superstition* is the

[1] *Acts* xvii, 22; xxv, 19.
[2] *Exodus* xxii, 18.
[3] *Galatians* v, 20.

People,' says Bacon; and 'in all *Superstitions* Wise Men follow Fooles.' Its causes are, he tells us,

> 'pleasing and sensuall Rites and Ceremonies; Excesse of Outward and Pharisaicall Holiness; Over-great Reverence of Traditions, which cannot but load the Church; the Stratagems of Prelates for their own Ambition and Lucre; the Favouring too much of good intentions, which openeth the Gate to Conceits and Novelties; the taking an aim at divine Matters by Human, which cannot but breed mixture of Imaginations; and lastly Barbarous Times, especially joyned with Calamities and Disasters.'

Might not the words have been written to-day? And,

> 'Superstition without a vaile is a deformed Thing. For, as it addeth deformity to an Ape to be so like a Man, so the Similitude of *Superstition* to Religion Makes it the more deformed.'[4]

We have fallen behind Bacon: to-day the mob mind is courted and deferred to. Few of us have the courage to say out what every educated man knows to be true, or to deny what every educated man knows to be false. This moral and intellectual invertebrateness is the sleeping sickness of the Churches; their refusal to say plainly that the truth is the truth, and a lie a lie. Veracity is the first virtue of a religious teacher: and the second; and the third. Gladly as one would avoid controversy, it has become necessary to insist upon this, because, like 'crabbed age and youth,' Truth and Superstition 'cannot live together.' Superstition, like Diotrephes, 'loveth to have the pre-eminence'; the Church of Diotrephes is an intolerant church.

> 'It is sheer nonsense,' says its organ among us, 'to pretend that the two parties—the Catholic and the Protestant—can be reconciled. When the Catholic influence prevails in the Church of England there will be no toleration for Modernism, and the extreme Evangelical will be far happier with his Free Church brethren.'[5]

Here we have more, very much more, than a difference of opinion. Were this all, we might say with the poet,

> 'For modes of faith let graceless zealots fight.'

Wise men do not greatly concern themselves with 'modes of faith.' Not that they are indifferent, but that they are secondary. And they are transient: it is a maxim of the canonists that 'common opinions are born and die.' But it is another thing

[4] Bacon: Essay xvii.
[5] *Church Times*, July 11, 1924.

when we are faced by a party propaganda carried on under cover of religion, supported by every rhetorical art and characterized by all the unscrupulousness of faction. Then, on the one hand, we must resist evil; and, on the other, the natural right of self-defence comes in.

We have lately had an example of this propaganda of reaction which it would be foolish to forget. This party has, it seems, set up a censorship in the Church; the Bishops, whose distinctive office it is to teach, are forbidden to question the opinions of the English Church Union; we are to take our theology from an Anglo-Ultramontane Tennessee. A sermon by the Bishop of Birmingham has been submitted to and 'carefully considered by the Theological and Liturgical Committee of the Union.' This body—a body, needless to say, unknown to the law: the matter, you see, has a grotesque as well as a serious side—this body has reported upon it. Its report has been forwarded to the Archbishop of Canterbury and published in the *Times* (August 13, 1925).

Its language—one regrets to have to say it—is studiously insolent and offensive, and recalls that of an age when such epithets as *putidus* and *mendax* were the staple of religious controversy. Persons of education do not now express themselves in this way. For its substance the only word is disingenuous. The Bishop's statements are carefully staged, their qualifications suppressed, the conclusions drawn from them by his self-appointed censors are attributed to him, the personal attack is camouflaged by a declamatory profession of zeal for the interests of religion and of souls. We need not question its sincerity. But the motives even of good men are commonly more mixed than they suppose. The parade of learning is curiously without the first condition of learning—disinterestedness. We are reminded of the attacks of the Jesuits on Scaliger. *Conjugium vocat; hoc praetexit nomine culpam*—the most repulsive form of libertinism is illicit intercourse with ideas. Two instances may be given. (1) The undoubted connection between St. Paul's doctrine of the Eucharist and the Mystery Religions was seen at first, as most new theories are, out of perspective. Hence a certain reaction, which has been carried—as reactions are apt to be carried—very much too far. It is probable that a middle

position best represents the facts. Such is that taken by M. Guignebert, of the Sorbonne, in his *Christianisme antique*. 'The Hellenism of the Apostle was not his leading feature. He was a Jew first and a Greek second; but it must not be forgotten that he was a Jew of Tarsus' (p. 105), where the mystery religions were, so to speak, 'in the air.' The question is one of shading; rhetoric is out of place. It is difficult to think that the author of the Epistle to the Corinthians, who thanked God that he had baptized none of them, was what is now called a Sacramentalist —here we may refer to Dr. Glover's *Paul of Tarsus* (p. 163), and, for the sense in which the Sacraments can be said to have been instituted by Christ, to M. Loisy's *Autour d'un Petit Livre* (ch. vii), and to M. Guignebert's *Evolution des Dogmes* (ch. xiv). But this is not to say that the Mystery Religions did not influence the development of the sacramental belief and praxis of the early communities. They did; and we can scarcely doubt that in such passages as I *Cor.* x, 16-21, and xi, 26-30, St. Paul, consciously or unconsciously, had them in mind. The 'Either—Or' dilemma is a fallacy; these hard and fast lines exist for thought, not in nature. Things are neither this nor that; but both or neither, or something between the two.[6] Such vestiges of the Mystery Religions as are found in St. Paul's writings are, of course, in germ only; it is an anachronism to read into them the formulated dogma of the later Church. Much more is this the case with the words of Christ. There is nothing statutory, it has been said, about them. Neither is there anything metaphysical. Metaphysics are the tares of religion—a later, human, after-growth: not, indeed, to be prematurely plucked up, but, equally, not to be confounded with it. A distinguished French historian, M. Albert Houtin, writes to me: 'I am surprised that the theologians of the English Church Union should admit so easily the authenticity of the Ignatian Epistles and of the Fourth Gospel. They would do well to read the works of M. Delafosse, in particular his important article on the Pauline Epistles in the *Revue de l'histoire des religions* (November, 1924). Historically, Christianity is a

[6] For this whole subject, see Bousset's Commentary on the Corinthians, in Weiss's *Schriften des N.T.*, vol. ii, p. 119*ff*, and Loisy's *Mystères païens et le Mystère Chrétien.*

mystery religion. The question is, when did it become so? Under the influence of St. Paul, or in the second century? The latter conclusion is, I believe, that indicated by the facts.'

Magic, the supposed art of controlling the spiritual influences by which we are surrounded, and making their action subserve our ends, is defined by Reinach as 'the strategy of animism';[7] and its relation to sacramentalism, *i.e.* the *ex opere operato* theory of the sacraments, has been discussed at length by Professor Kirsopp Lake.[8] He contrasts the Graeco-Oriental, or magical, and the Jewish, or legal, conceptions of religion; we should roughly describe them to-day as the Catholic and the Protestant. They are seldom found in a state of isolation. Most of us incline by temperament, or culture, or both, to one or the other, but the line between them cannot be sharply drawn. No form of Christianity, for example, dispenses either with the goodwill of the Giver, or with the dispositions of the receiver, of the Sacrament, though Catholicism reduces the latter to a minimum: unless an *obex* be placed, like a log of wood on a railway track, the rite works automatically. The theologians of the E.C.U. need not quarrel with Dr. Lake's conclusion that 'to many uneducated Catholics the Sacraments are merely Christian magic': not a few of those whose Catholicism is not a newly-acquired possession, but an inheritance, admit, and deplore, the fact.

Two considerations suggest themselves. (1) How many of those who have read the E.C.U. Report have also read the Bishop's sermon, which was printed in full in the *Church of England Newspaper* of June 19th? Perhaps not one in a hundred. Does not this shew the worthlessness—a stronger word might be used—of such attacks from any but a sectarian point of view? 'Blame not before thou hast examined,' says the Son of Sirach; 'understand first, and then rebuke' (ch. xi, 7). Only those who have read the sermon are in a position to discount the false perspective in which it is made to appear in the Report. (2) Both in form and in substance the Report closely resembles the personal attacks on the Bishop which for some months past have been a weekly feature in the *Church Times*. Whether this is a case of coincidence, or quotation, or an at least

[7] *Orpheus*, p. 32.
[8] *The Earlier Epistles of St. Paul*, ch. vii.

partial identity of hand, is matter of opinion; but the resemblance is unmistakable. 'The voice is Jacob's'; the relationship between the two indicated is that for which περιχώρησις is, I believe, the theological name. Now it is scarcely too much to say that, from the point of view of religion, the so-called religious press has become an all but unmixed evil. When we consider the part played by it in the Church of to-day, we are tempted to add a sixth wound—'*Journalism*'—to Rosmini's famous 'Five Wounds of the Church.' For in the Church this press is a power. No Bishop, no Primate, no theologian speaks with half its effect or authority. Woe to the stubborn Mordecai who refuses homage! 'When Haman saw that Mordecai bowed not down, nor did him reverence, then was Haman full of wrath.' And not in England only. Haman is the common plague of the Churches. At the time of the Vatican Council the party of the *Univers* captured Catholicism. In vain the wisest and best men in the Church protested; in vain Newman denounced it as 'an aggressive and insolent faction'; its victory was final and decisive. '*Nous sommes tombés*,' said Lacordaire, '*sous la direction de quelques esprits sans mésure, sans science, et sans charité.*' This party could not be better described, 'Whom resist.' The Church of England is not the same thing as the English Church Union; nor the Church as the *Church Times*.

(3) Superstition is the shadow cast by religion. In the early stages of civilization this shadow is large; at mid-day it becomes imperceptible; as evening draws in it resumes its original proportions, and, as it lengthens, religion is dwarfed and declines. In its grosser forms it is a thing of sheer horror. 'They offered their sons and their daughters unto devils,' says the Psalmist, 'and the land was defiled with blood.'

In its milder form, it takes the shape of what Matthew Arnold called *Aberglaube*, or extra-belief; *i.e.*, belief which goes beyond what is verifiable. In this sense, we cannot entirely rid ourselves of it. Is not, for example, the eschatology even of the New Testament a mixed magnitude?

> 'The very source and fount of day
> Is dash'd with wandering isles of night.'

But, find it where we will, *Aberglaube* is not religion. Religion

is verifiable, and does not consist in unproved or unprovable things. I remember, indeed, a key-saying of that great religious teacher Baron von Hügel: 'If (said he) you are looking for a *pure* Gospel,' meaning by pure one without admixture of the human element, 'you will never find it.' Such a Gospel has never existed; for the environment of the Gospel is human, and men are—men. Let us, then, recognize our limitations, and not ask for better bread than is made with wheat. It would be innutritious. Who, for example, would exclude the poetry of religion? As long as it remains poetry, and does not impose itself as dogma, we need not follow Plato in the laboured austerity of his Republic, a state in which the lives of the citizens must have been dull beyond words. This is why our first impulse is to judge superstition leniently. It is, we think, the excess of a good thing—religion: we have known excellent people into whose religion it entered largely; and surely it is better to have too much religion than, like most of us, too little, or none at all. The Pragmatist, who claims to be a philosopher of sorts, speaks well of it; it marks an advance on an earlier state of things.

> 'Force first made conquest, and that conquest law,
> Till Superstition taught the tyrant awe.'

But let us finish the quotation:

> 'Then shared the tyranny, then lent it aid,
> And gods of conquerors, slaves of subjects made.
> She, from the rending earth and bursting skies,
> Saw gods descend and fiends infernal rise;
> Here fixed the dreadful, here the blest abodes;
> Fear made her devils, and weak hope her gods;
> Gods partial, changeful, passionate, unjust,
> Whose attributes were rage, revenge, or lust;
> Such as the souls of cowards might conceive,
> And, formed like tyrants, tyrants might believe.'[9]

(4) Does Superstition satisfy the test of the Pragmatist? Does it, as we say, 'work'? Yes, and no. But no, rather than yes. It has, no doubt, done good indirectly; it is well that tyrants should be taught awe, and mobs restraint. And ideas can only reach the masses in a materialized form. A philosophical religion has little driving power; the uneducated are untouched by it. Nor they only. Temperament neutralizes

[9] Pope: *Essay on Man.*

education. 'This *is* a religion!' exclaimed Newman, man of genius as he was, when he found himself a Catholic: in Protestantism he saw no more than a stripped altar and an empty shrine. 'Up, make us gods that shall go before us!' was the cry of Israel at Sinai. Better a seen idol than an unseen God.

> 'A state of scepticism and suspense may amuse a few inquisitive minds. But the practice of superstition is so congenial to the multitude that, if they are forcibly awakened, they regret the loss of their pleasing vision. Their love of the marvellous and the supernatural, their curiosity with regard to future events, and their strong propensity to extend their hopes and fears beyond the limits of the visible world, are irresistible; and so urgent in the vulgar is the necessity of believing that the fall of any system of mythology will probably be succeeded by the introduction of some other mode of superstition.'[10]

In these words, the most philosophical that Gibbon ever wrote, we have the explanation of the strange recrudescence of superstition which characterizes our time. In England—and a similar situation is found on the Continent—the downfall of the received religious tradition has broken down the sheepfolds and scattered the sheep. I do not think, much as we may regret it, that the type of religion for which the Churchmen's Union stands attracts, or is likely to attract, the masses. Its influence is rather permeating than propagandist: it presupposes too much knowledge and requires too sustained an effort of thought to be popular; a popular religion will always be corrupt. Why do people become Roman Catholics? I say 'Roman,' for I will not enter upon more contentious ground; and what, in particular, is the secret of what has been called 'the subtle attraction which this Church exercises over a certain type of "intellectual"'? Well, I should answer, with Sohm, that 'the natural man is a born Catholic';[11] and, with Browning, that 'mankind is ignorant.'[12] And, if we think that folly and ignorance are confined to what we call the uneducated classes, we deceive ourselves. It may seem a paradox to speak of 'intellectuals,' of however unintellectual a type, as uneducated; education is not an easy word to define. But the persons of whom we are speaking are, with few exceptions, absolutely incapable of weighing evidence, and extraordinarily ignorant of the facts.

[10] *Decline and Fall:* Gibbon, chapter xv.
[11] *Outlines of Church History,* p. 35.
[12] *The Ring and the Book.*

They do not know why Catholicism, while politically and socially important, is, as a form of thought, a survival; and their prejudices against it are easily replaced by a set of stronger, and equally or more irrational, prejudices in its favour. There is no great reason, indeed, why such people should become Roman Catholics. But, equally, there is no great reason why they should not. It is a sort of toss-up: and, when they do, 'Who wonders, and who cares?'[13] For their assent is what Hobbes calls 'insignificant,' *i.e.*, meaningless; and rather verbal than real. But the path of such assent is slippery. This is why, as the observance and custom of religion decline, not only 'another Gospel which is not another,' but baser superstitions of every sort and kind flourish—spiritualism, occultism, fortune-telling, faith healing, and the like. For the difference between the scientific or modern, and the pre-scientific or mediaeval, conception of religion is not that the latter finds its expression in the revival of exploded beliefs and the restoration of obsolete ceremonial, but that it is a return to a past stage of civilization. In his recent address to his Diocesan Conference, the Bishop of Durham laid stress on this:

> 'If the revival of long abandoned usages which is desired were brought about, the former effects could not follow, unless at the same time there could be revived in the minds of the people the beliefs and assumptions which gave these practices their meaning and potency. The crude demonology, the childish literalism, the abject fear, the preposterous science, the debased sacramentalism, scarcely superior to the fetish worship of Africa—these lie behind the exorcisms, unctions and benedictions of the Church in the early centuries and in the Middle Ages.'[14]

(5) Superstition takes different shapes and is found in widely different forms of religion: their common quality is that they are throw-backs, or reversions, to the past. Our Twenty-eighth Article speaks of Transubstantiation as having 'given occasion to many superstitions'; Selden says of the Puritans that 'if there be any superstition truly and properly so-called, it is their observing the Sabbath after the Jewish manner';[15] and the same must be said of the eccentric form of Bibliolatry now current in America under the name of Fundamentalism, which

[13] Browning: 'Bishop Blougram's Apology.'
[14] *Hibbert Journal*, April 1925.
[15] *Table Talk*, cxxxii.

appears to rest on the belief that one man's opinion is as good as another's—surely the most palpable superstition of all! The general answer to such extravagances is that religion is part of civilization as a whole. It is, therefore, relative; and lies, like the other virtues, in the mean. It may err, then, by defect or by excess; but the latter error is the more dangerous. For the excess of religion is not, as we are apt to think, the excess of a good thing: religion, when it degenerates into superstition, is a very bad thing, and ceases to deserve the name of religion at all. [At the time of the German *Kultur-Kampf*, Dean Stanley said to Bismarck, 'The conflict goes back to the days of Hildebrand.' 'Hildebrand?' was the answer; 'to the days of Agamemnon and Calchas.' So far from being an impiety, the fierce invective of Lucretius[16]—*Aulide quo pacto, Triviai virginis aram* etc.—recalls the warnings of Scripture against such a religion—'which I commanded it not, neither came it into my mind.'[17] Alas! the record even of Christianity is bloodstained:

> 'The cultivation of one part of religion to the exclusion of another seems often to exact a terrible retribution both in individual characters and in Churches. There is a Nemesis of believing all things, or indeed of any degree of intellectual dishonesty, which sometimes ends in despair of all truth; there is an extasy of religious devotion which has not unfrequently degenerated into licentiousness. And in the same city, and in the same Church, in which the streaming eyes of saints have been uplifted to the image of Christ hanging over the altar, there have been "Acts of Faith" of another kind, which are not obscurely connected with those ardours of divine love, in which the voice of pity and of every other human feeling is silenced.'[18]

So wrote Jowett fifty years ago. The words might be those of a psychologist of to-day.

(6) Stress has lately been laid on what is called the 'Numinous,' or the 'Irrational,' in religion This element is prominent in its earlier stages; primitive men lived in an atmosphere of fear. This curious reversion to primitivism is part of the current reaction against rationalism, in the philosophical sense of the word. The reaction in question lies outside the main stream both of religious thought and of secular progress; it is the

[16] Lib: I, 84 pp.
[17] *Jeremiah* vii, 31.
[18] *Sermons on Faith and Doctrine*, p. 307.

period of unrest through which Europe is now passing which gives it a temporary vogue. We may borrow Mr. Gladstone's phrase, and call it 'the latest fashion in religion.' Religion, for the time being, is in difficulties—partly self-made, partly due to circumstances—and its apologists, like drowning men, clutch at straws. Nothing will come of it; this straw-clutching in religion is one of the most irreligious of the signs of the time.

Even in Germany, the home of scientific theology, a certain reactionary movement is no new thing; and Pattison, who describes it as 'a German Puseyism'—a throw-back 'to the conservative Catholicism of the sixteenth century'—tells us that 'in the clumsy and inconsistent Realism of Luther's teaching as to the Sacraments' there is something to make it plausible.[19] We are, of course, familiar with a similar movement here. In both, the core of darkness in religion is made central. Dr. Brilioth, whose *Studies of the Oxford Movement* is probably the best and most detached account we have of that enigmatic episode in English Church history, observes that it was the key to Tractarian piety.[20]

Newman himself, at a time when Calvinism, now happily no more than a memory, was a power among us, wished that English religion were much more gloomy, much more fierce, and much more bigoted. We cannot now even imagine such a state of mind. And certainly the conception of God as *Numinosum*, *Fascinosum* and the rest of it, has an unmistakably unchristian colour. To find it in Scripture we must go back to the story of Uzzah, upon whom 'the Lord broke forth' (II *Samuel* vi, 9); or to the theophanies of the patriarchs—the wrestling of Jacob, 'the fear of Isaac,' or Abraham's vision of the 'smoking furnace and the fiery torch.'[21] 'Lest the Lord break forth upon us'[22] was the haunting terror of Israel in the desert; 'No hand shall touch him; but whosoever toucheth the mount, whether it be beast or man, it shall not live.' We are in the region of folk-lore. The Deity is pictured as a wild beast, who must be kept in confinement under bolt and bar, or as a centre of malevolent force which it is death to approach.

[19] Essay xvii.
[20] p. 216.
[21] *Genesis* xxxii, 30; xxxi, 53; xv, 17.
[22] *Exodus* xix, 22. 13.

(7) It has been held that in Christianity the conception of the 'Numinous' centres in the Mass:

> 'The dramatic symbolism of the liturgical acts of the celebrant, the archaic use of the Latin tongue, the aesthetic appeal of the ceremonial, and the still murmur of the consecratory prayer.'

One recalls the longing of Browning's Bishop to

> 'lie through centuries
> And hear the blessed mutter of the Mass
> And see God made and eaten all day long;
> And feel the steady candle-flame, and taste
> Good strong thick stupefying incense-smoke.'[23]

To some temperaments this conception of religion is attractive; to others, in particular to the great majority of Englishmen, it is repellent and provocative. If they identify it with Christianity they will have no use for Christianity—this is the danger inseparable from the Catholic propaganda, Roman and Anglican, which is so vigorously and, one must add, so recklessly pressed upon us; if they identify it with any particular form of Christianity, they will have no use for Christianity in this form. In England, at the present time, fanatics—and, even more, the opportunist politicians, clerical and lay, who, without the excuse of fanaticism, play into the hands of fanatics—will do well to bear this in mind.

(8) The accentuation of the liturgical and sacramental side of worship among us, which finds expression in the proposed Revision of the Prayer Book, has become excessive. The intelligence of the nation has been alienated by it; and to people at large it seems to specialize and isolate religion, to place it out of touch with experience and with life as a whole.

Few things have probably done so much to empty our churches as the substitution of the 'Sung Mass,' or 'Choral Eucharist,' for the accustomed Morning Service. By reason of their 'outward and visible sign' the Sacraments have been peculiarly exposed to parasitic growths and superstitious developments. 'The Sacrament of the Lord's Supper was not, by Christ's appointment, reserved, carried about, lifted up, or worshipped,' says our Twenty-eighth Article—though I know it is out of fashion to quote it. Nor is there any point in the dis-

[23] 'The Bishop orders his tomb at Saint Praxed's Church.'

paraging contrast often drawn between what is described as 'the Lord's own Service' and Matins. For those who accept the doctrine of Transubstantiation and that of the Sacrifices of Masses, the Mass, no doubt, stands on a unique level. But the Articles, which we of the clergy have subscribed, lay down that the former 'is repugnant to the plain words of Scripture, and overthroweth the nature of a Sacrament'; and describe the latter as 'blasphemous fables and dangerous deceits.' For us, the Lord's Supper is neither a miracle nor a sacrifice, but a communion; and it implies communicants, as Baptism implies a person, or persons, baptized. In each case the *esse* is *recipi*; the essence consists in the Sacrament being received. Failing reception, any value which attendance at the administration of either Sacrament may possess is indirect and suggestive, not sacramental.

And, 'I am sure,' says the Bishop of Gloucester, in his Primary Charge,

> 'That, for the ordinary congregation on Sunday morning in most Churches, the traditional custom of the Church of England is the best. The morning Service has greater variety and conveys a larger amount of instruction; it is simpler and easier of comprehension. I certainly know many country parishes where the introduction of the Holy Communion as a substitute for Matins has alienated great bodies of people.' [24]

(9) It will seem to some that this conception embodies a 'low' view of this Sacrament; and, no doubt, 'there is a *Superstition* in avoiding *Superstition*, where men think to doe best if they go furthest from the *Superstition* formerly received.'[25] But the beliefs in question are a foreign body in the Gospel; and the more we recognize the importance of retaining their religious values, the clearer it seems that these values must be retained in other combinations and under other forms. The Mediaeval Sacramental system was a creation of the human spirit in which good and evil were strangely mixed. It encircled the Christian from the cradle to the grave with a mysterious net-work of heavenly protection. This was its strength. Its weakness was that this protection was embedded in matter and mediated through a priesthood. Perhaps the strangest construction ever

[24] *The Church of England*, p. 93.
[25] Bacon's Essay, xvii.

put on a well-known Pauline phrase occurs in a letter written by Newman in 1848 to a convert friend[26]:

> 'To feel yourself surrounded by all holy arms and defences, with the Sacraments week by week, with the priests' benedictions, with crucifixes and rosaries which have been blessed, with holy water, with places or with acts to which Indulgences have been attached, and "the whole Armour of God"—what can one desire more than this?'

This material conception of religion was the key-stone of the arch of Mediaeval Christianity. When it was removed, the structure fell. Great was the fall of it! No human institutions work either unmixed good or unmixed evil. They stand, or fall, in proportion as their good results compare with their evil. In the Mediaeval Church—in the Papacy, the hierarchy, the priesthood—the evil came to preponderate; this was why the rising tide of life swept them away. The mind and conscience of mankind outgrew them; they became intellectually impossible and morally intolerable things.

(10) And now from the conceptions of life, of God, and of man which took shape in the Church of the Middle Ages mankind is moving ever farther away. To think that we can return to this Church, or it to us, is the wildest of dreams. We do well to fall back from it upon the testimony of the Spirit, upon Scripture, upon that 'spirit of man' which 'is the candle of the Lord.'

But we shall do so, if we are wise, without losing our hold on the permanent elements of value which it contained. We read of the happiest of the many happy creations of M. Anatole France, the Abbé Jérôme Coignard, *il méprisait les hommes; mais il les méprisait avec tendresse*. We should be of the same mind towards their opinions. There is no idea, or set of ideas, which has greatly moved humanity which has not left, for all its base metal, a residuum of gold.

[26] Life and Letters of J. H. Newman. W. Ward, vol. i, 241.

ARE MODERN CHURCHMEN DISHONEST?

By Professor Percy Gardner, D.Litt., LL.D., F.B.A.

WHEN it was decided to include in our programme consideration of the question discussed in this paper, I suggested that such consideration would best come from a layman, who could obviously speak with more detachment and impartiality. Hence my share in the business.

In the clash of tendencies and schools, whether in politics or religion, no accusation is more often brought by one party against another than that of inconsistency or dishonesty, for the two accusations are almost identical, and it must be confessed that in our highly-complicated surroundings complete consistency and transparent honesty are things very hard of attainment. Probably in all parties in the Church there are some who have not succeeded in the very difficult task of becoming perfectly at one in themselves. And we learn by experience that men otherwise good and high-minded may drift into an extremely unsatisfactory intellectual position.

But the accusation brought often by Anglo-Catholics against us is of a more general and corporate kind. We are accused of clinging to our place in the Church, and in fact to our posts and emoluments, while we are in heart disloyal to the English Church, and to the Church of Christ at large. We have here two accusations which may best be separately rebutted. First, are we disloyal to the Anglican branch of the Church? And second, are we really Christian? Of these the second is more serious.

For the English Church itself, from the circumstances of its foundation and constitution, is essentially a Church of compromise. In its formulae, its purposes, its services, it aims at comprehension. It is at once Catholic and Reformed, and in the Prayer Book sometimes the one character and sometimes the other is insisted on. The ministry includes, and always has included, some men who are very near the Roman position, and some men who are in full sympathy with the Reformers of the sixteenth century. The Creeds are the heritage of the Middle Ages, while the Articles of Religion are strongly Protestant.

Some of the services are distinctly High Church, and some are Evangelical, while most attempt to find a *via media* which shall be acceptable to all parties.

This spirit of comprehension is in a national Church of the greatest value. And any attempt to make the Prayer Book really self-consistent in one direction or the other could only result in splitting the Church, and expelling some of its most valuable elements.

But it is seldom that we find in the world great advantages which do not entail corresponding disadvantages. And the great disadvantage which is the dark shadow of comprehension is a certain hesitation and unreality. Probably every clergyman finds the reading of certain prayers or of some parts of the liturgy a by no means pleasant task. It would indeed be easy to point out many passages which very few can really like, for example, the Commandment which forbids the making (not merely the worshipping) of graven images, and that which enjoins the rigid keeping of the Sabbath day. In the scripture lessons and the Psalms there is much which the ethics of modern times decisively dislikes. And in fact everyone who in church is critical of what he is hearing or saying must often have an unpleasant shock.

In itself this fact is very unfortunate, and some who are possessed by a very keen sense of veracity are driven by it from church. Yet if congregational worship is to be kept up, it is unavoidable. No one could draw up a liturgy which would suit the beliefs of all. I fear that by degrees both clergy and laity become callous, and repeat mechanically phrases which in their quiet hours of reflection they would strongly repudiate. For example, the prayer for the King in the Communion Service which is commonly used implies a view of monarchy which no one now holds, an extreme theory of the divine right of kings. Yet some liberals seem to prefer repeating that prayer to the much less extreme one which is printed as an alternative.

I remember that, when I was a boy, I once suffered from hypertrophy of the conscience, and resolved that I would repeat in church only such words as represented my particular beliefs. The result was that I was constantly stopped short, often in the middle of a sentence. I had to be silent in many responses, and

even to omit verses and lines of hymns with which I could not agree. But I had sense enough soon to see that if everyone adopted my plan there could be no such thing as congregational worship, and further, that the critical spirit which I was indulging was as far as possible from the spirit of Christianity.

I cannot now go into the question of the revision of the Prayer-book. Most of us here probably think that it would be possible greatly to improve it without going far into the questions of doctrine, by merely introducing changes in detail. But any attempt to make it thoroughly consistent, in one direction or another, could only lead to disruption.

But looking at the matter broadly, I think that any impartial judge would say that the whole tendency of the services of our church, including the Communion and Ordination Services, is quite as much in accord with the views of Modern Churchmen as with those of the Anglo-Catholics. Everywhere more stress is laid on the value of Scripture, the need of a diligent and blameless life, continuance in prayer, the working of the Divine Spirit, than on the doctrines of the High Church. The Roman doctrines of the Mass, of Transubstantiation, of the veneration of the Saints are emphatically repudiated.

Thus, if it were merely a question of conformity to the Prayer Book, the consistency and honesty of Modern Churchmen could be easily vindicated.

But, of course, this is not really the ground of the attack on us. We are accused, not so much of revolting against the doctrine and discipline of the English Church as of taking up a position inconsistent with the teaching of the Christian Church in the early ages, and, in fact, with essential Christianity. This is an accusation which we indignantly deny.

The first question is, what do the accusers mean by Christianity? Christianity is a living religion, which has passed through many phases, and still exists in many forms. There is the religion of Christ himself, the religion of the Apostolic Age, the religion of the early Fathers, the religion of the Middle Ages, and so forth. The Roman Church has definitely decided that it will make no terms with Modernism. In the English Church, with which specially we have to do at present, there is a great variety of schools of thought and of practice. Some of

these schools, as we can readily understand, are entirely opposed to the principles of Modernism. Among the members of the Churchmen's Union there are some who would call themselves Anglo-Catholics. But I can hardly imagine that any man who believed in a rigidly dogmatic and sacramental form of Christianity could join it. Such men as believe in Apostolic Succession, the Sacrifice of the Mass, and in fact in almost all the Roman doctrines except a celibate clergy and the supremacy of the Pope, stand necessarily outside our fundamental belief in Christianity as essentially a spiritual religion, not enclosed in any formal organization, but free to welcome any fresh growth of science or any spreading impulse in the spirit of man. We know that there is in the English Church a strong and aggressive party which is sacerdotal and sacramental. We have no wish to attack it unless obliged to do so, in self-defence. But that party has no right whatever to set itself up as the sole representative of historic Christianity in the Church.

And there is another party, the extreme members of which are the Fundamentalists of America, which still clings to the infallibility of scripture, and its traditional interpretation. That party is of course intolerant of all Modernism, and would not recognize us as Christians at all.

But we claim the liberty which has been asserted by many of the most pious and eminent of English Churchmen in all ages, of interpreting Church formulae, and expounding the principles of Christianity, with open eyes and unfettered minds, so long as we act with loyalty to Christ the invisible Head of the Church, and our brothers who are members of it. And we will not allow any party in the Church to deprive us of that liberty.

John Stuart Mill was a man with whose religious views few of us would agree. But on the question of honesty or dishonesty there could be no higher authority. His reverence for truth was almost a fanaticism. And on the particular question which we are discussing his view is definite, and I would venture to say almost final. Henry Sidgwick had called in question the honesty of the Modernist party, which was defended by our late president, Dean Rashdall. Mill gives his verdict that it is honest for English Churchmen to remain in the Church so long as they are able to accept its articles and confessions

in any sense or with any interpretation consistent with common honesty, whether it be the generally received interpretation or not. Donald Hankey also, in a book of most transparent sincerity, has written, 'The right procedure is to take full advantage of the liberty that is allowed within the Church. It is, I am convinced, by using the freedom of the Church to pursue our ideals that we shall both avoid the pitfalls of separation, and commend our ideas to the Church.'

Those who reproach us for disloyalty usually concentrate on the question of the Creeds. These they hold to be of the essence of Christianity; and they tell us that we cannot honestly claim to accept them in the sense in which the Church of the past has accepted them. But they have no right as Anglicans to put the Creeds in this dominant and exclusive position. The eighth article, which asserts the credibility of the three Creeds, does so expressly on the ground of their warrant by Scripture. No Church, so far as I know, has placed the authority of the Creeds above that of Scripture. But in our days no instructed person holds to the verbal infallibility of Scripture; why then should we cling to the verbal infallibility of the Creeds? And in fact no one does hold to the literal meaning of all the clauses of the Creeds: everyone reinterprets more or less, we somewhat more than other parties in the Church. But even Bishop Gore, in a recent publication, has rejected some part of the (so-called) Athanasian Creed, which the Eighth Article puts on the same level as the other two. He also urges that the Articles of Religion should be removed from their authoritative position, and relegated to the position of historical documents.

Having mentioned this publication of Bishop Gore, *The Anglo-Catholic Movement To-day*, I feel constrained to say a word or two in regard to it. I read it not only with appreciation, but with delight. The noble spirit which it breathes, and the evidently anxious search which it shows for principles of agreement in the Church are above praise. At first it seems like a hand stretched out in friendship to us Modern Churchmen. But at the same time Bishop Gore does not recede from the position which he has taken up in condemnation of our doctrinal and historical principles. As regards doctrine I have not time to speak, and other members of the Conference have spoken.

But as regards historic views I must say a word. History is not the Bishop's strong point; rather ethics and theology. And I must venture, as one who has spent a long life in the study of ancient history, to say that the Bishop's view of history and his canons of historic evidence are such as would not be admitted in any of the institutions and schools of history with which I am acquainted. Here we cannot give way. In his later life Dr. Sanday came round completely to the historic views, against which in his earlier writings he had fought. One can hardly hope that the Bishop will do so: but if he did, he would open lines of progress and expansion for the English Church which to contemplate makes one's heart beat faster.

I must, however, return to the question of the Creeds. It is quite true that the early councils of the Church did attach supreme importance to the theses which they accepted and formed into dogmatic systems. But why did they do this? The Jews never had any formula of belief, except the assertion of the divine unity, which is still the only formula accepted by them. In the Gospels and the Epistles there is no recognized formula of belief. When the Ethiopian eunuch is baptized, the only confession of faith he makes is, 'I believe that Jesus the Christ is the Son of God.' And more elaborate declarations of faith do not belong to the apostolic age. It has been clearly made out by theologians that the notion of a creed comes not from Judaea, but from Greece. Greek philosophers, in their endless disputations in the market-places, found it necessary to frame skeletons of the scheme of philosophy for which they stood. Alone among the mystery religions, Christianity took over this notion. The kernel of the Creeds was the declaration of belief made by a convert on his baptism, and this declaration, at first very simple, became more and more elaborated until it reached the complexity of the Nicene formula. And this formula, except in the historic clauses, bears obvious traces of its Greek and philosophic origin. Since the days of Descartes it has become in some ways out of harmony with the modern schools of thought. As a historic record it is valuable; but as a purge for the Church it is of little practical value. It does not, in fact, mention most of the really important doctrines of Christianity.

Thus, though we may freely grant the importance of the Creeds in the history of Christianity, we may consider it undesirable at present to lay great stress upon them.

I am a member of an Oxford Committee which has been formed in connection with the American Movement for Faith and Order. The Committee includes high, low and broad churchmen; it has had very interesting discussions on subjects laid before it by the Central Committee. Among other subjects the position of the Creeds came up for consideration. The Committee was of opinion, I think unanimously, that the Nicene Creed, at all events, ought to be retained in the services of the Church; but that its repetition did not imply that every Churchman literally accepted every article of it. The Creed is in fact a record of the belief of the Church, not primarily of individuals. The earliest form of it began not with 'I believe,' but with 'We believe.'

No doubt if a clergyman, or even a layman, were convinced that the trinitarian formula, and especially the doctrine of the divinity of Christ, is wrong or superstitious, he would find himself unable to join in the services of the English Church; but in the interpretation of these formulae there has always been room for wide differences. The so-called Athanasian Creed, I may observe, is not an interpretation at all; it explains nothing, but merely puts the phrases of a Creed side by side, in all their simple inconsistency. Anyone who wants to have a reasonable doctrine of the Trinity, certainly cannot leave the matter where the Athanasian formula leaves it.

Of course if a clergyman feels quite out of harmony, in the matter of belief, with his people, his position must be painful. But this applies more to other groups than to the Modernist. I have heard of extreme Anglo-Catholics in Cornwall who have succeeded in alienating and driving from the church almost all their parishioners, through a fanatical adherence to certain practices.

It is particularly hard that Modern Churchmen should be accused of dishonesty, seeing that of all parties in the Church they are the party who have been most eager and devoted in searching for truth. But an accusation which is unjust does not rankle. Let those whom the cap fits put it on; but I am convinced that it will fit but few of the heads which I see before me.

THE CONFESSIO FIDEI OF A BROAD CHURCH LAYMAN

By Sir ARTHUR HORT, Bart., M.A. (sometime Fellow of Trinity College, Cambridge), Author of *The Life and Letters of Professor F. J. A. Hort.*

I SUPPOSE that the question on which I have been asked to speak implies that to some people it appears that those who hold 'modern' views have no right to call themselves Churchmen; that it is only by some sort of intellectual dishonesty that they make such a claim, and that the Christianity which they profess is not the real thing. Well, the whole programme of this Conference has aimed at shewing that this is misconception, and, if the papers which we have heard from expert theologians and philosophers do not convince those who fight shy of liberal theology that its aim is not to pull down but to build up, I doubt if any remarks from one who is a layman in more senses than one can help much towards a truer impression. However, I feel so keenly that, unless the position taken up by Liberalism is to be recognised as consistent with loyal membership of the Church of England, that church may presently find itself the champion of a lost cause, that I am more than willing to contribute what little I can. But, seeing that I have no qualification to speak with any sort of authority, I will venture to take a somewhat personal line: it is only by individual personal 'testimonies' that a movement which represents rather a common attitude of mind than a common confession of faith can win confidence. It happens that recently, partly to clear my own mind, partly because I thought it right that my own family should know where I stood, I wrote for strictly domestic circulation a sort of *confessio fidei*: and it has occurred to me that I might read you an abridged version of this essay. I ask the indulgence of such an audience for many crudities of statement, as well as for the autobiographical form.

My father, the Lady Margaret Professor at Cambridge, was, I believe, one of the wisest men of his time. His life was devoted to theological studies, but in the widest sense, since

theology did not seem to him something apart from other branches of knowledge: the memorial brass which commemorates him in Trinity Chapel says that he sought Truth *ante omnia et per omnia*. His one published contribution to religious philosophy, '*The Way, the Truth, the Life*,' only appeared after his death: it has been said of it that 'it contains the germ of a new Reformation,' and he has been claimed as the real founder of the Modern Liberal Movement. I read it once a year, and always with fresh astonishment and reverence. It is not apologetic in the ordinary sense; still less is it dogmatic.

In trying to put together what I have learnt from my father and from others, let me first say that I assume that there are some ultimate problems which are not soluble by finite minds, though religion and philosophy may dispel some of the darkness which surrounds them. I assume, also, that religious faith is in any case a venture, that it can never reach the certainty of positive demonstration: indeed, even 'knowledge' can hardly be said really to attain such certainty.

I cannot remember a time when I have either felt that absolute conviction about religion which is granted to some, or, on the other hand, have been able to put the whole thing on one side. Everyone, I suppose, starts with some preconceptions or prejudices, due to his inheritance and environment. I find in myself a strong vein of Protestantism. Yet the Evangelical position has never satisfied me, not for want of admiration of some of its prophets (even as there are Catholics, Roman and Anglican, whom I heartily respect and admire), but because its individualism has seemed to me one-sided. The Oxford Movement did great service when it corrected Wesley's ideal of personal piety by reviving the idea of a Christian community. Hence, if a label is necessary, I have always considered myself a Broad Churchman.

I do not think I have ever had the experience which is called 'conversion,' though I believe that the term denotes something which really does happen to many. Yet I can pretty definitely mark a date at which I in some sense 'got religion'; that is, at which I became conscious of the meaning of religion for *me*, and, at the same time, of its overmastering claim. That was when I first read *Ecce Homo*: whatever Seeley's own ex-

planation of Jesus would have been, had he, as the Preface promised, gone on 'with a study of Christ as the creator of modern theology and religions,' he had already revealed to me, as no doubt to others, more than the humanity of his subject. But, seeing that I did not then face the Christological problem, what impressed me even more was the social significance of the teaching of Jesus. I have since come to see that what He *was* matters even more than what He taught. At least I saw that religion meant, not securing a good place in another world, but losing one's own soul in the furtherance of the Kingdom: and that idea has remained to me central, however lame the performance. There are many who, while having a grasp not less firm on the idea of the Kingdom, have also a constant sense of the presence of God in their personal lives. This devotional spirit I have not cultivated with success: that it needs cultivation I am aware. I am far from meaning that I have found no use in prayer: I could not live without it. I regret my own weakness on the devotional side, and often recall Martineau's warning against mistaking an interest in religion for the love of God.

I am thankful that circumstances have almost compelled me to study the Bible. For over thirty years as a master at Harrow I had to teach both Testaments, and found in this subject a perennial freshness. Now that I am no longer bound by a teacher's responsibility, who, with every wish to teach candidly only what he himself believes, yet is bound to practise a certain economy, since immature minds easily misapprehend and exaggerate,—now it seems possible to consider whither those years of not very systematic thought and reading have led me. The Bible, I take it, is the principal record of Revelation. I cannot pretend to see where Discovery ends and Revelation begins. Man is a spiritual being, as most of the philosophies now in vogue profess: a materialistic or mechanical view of the Universe is no longer dominant. Nor is he less spiritual if he has been evolved from the humblest organisms. The old saying in the Hebrew legend of Creation that man 'was made in the image of God' expresses surely a profound truth — that there is a certain kinship between man and God, that the spirit of God moves in man, though in different degrees in different men and nations, and in a higher degree as the man or nation

has been truer than others to what man in the divine purpose was intended to be. To many nations God has revealed something about Himself, or, if we prefer to put it so, has allowed them to discover something. We may surmise that the revelation to the Hebrew race was not so unique as has generally been supposed : still, that revelation is of unique importance, if only because through the Hebrews was to come what we recognize as the supreme revelation in Jesus the Christ. Moreover this race, with their peculiar genius for religion, not only had a firm grasp of Monotheism, but, unlike Mahomet, did not stop there : through the inspired teaching of a wonderful series of preachers they outgrew the primitive conception of Jehovah as an arbitrary tribal divinity, and came by degrees to such a conception of Him that the full revelation through Christ of the Fatherhood of God was not beyond their grasp. Now, inasmuch as the Old Testament is the record of this development, and inasmuch as our Lord was a Jew and is unintelligible without the background of Jewish history and tradition, I cannot think that this venerable literature can ever be disregarded by those who in any sense call themselves His followers. But of course it cannot be to us what it was to the nation for whom it was written : much of what they read as history to us must be parable. To illiterate people all Bible personages, or at least all those of Hebrew descent, are 'Christians' : we are but slowly learning to read the Old Testament in the light of the Christian experience, instead of trying to read the New Testament into the Old. Criticism ceases to alarm if one believes that every advance in human understanding is due to the action of the Spirit of God : but that fact does not make either the Scriptures or their students infallible. Many who are more or less satisfied that the Old Testament is a fair field for the critic, would yet warn him off the New. Let me merely say that I cannot accept what I feel to be a cowardly position. As to the results of criticism, I feel no doubt that the gospels give us in the main a trustworthy portrait of Jesus, and also shew us pretty distinctly what impression He made on His followers. They were clearly convinced that He was more than man, and as certainly convinced that He rose from the dead : indeed, without this belief the growth of Christianity has no explanation. And I think

that, making due allowance for the fact that modes of thought and expression are different in different periods, we cannot but come to the same conclusion. The early church fought long over the problem how He could at once be God and Man, and the definitions reached are embodied in our creeds. It may be that the attempt to define a mystery was carried too far: *omnia abeunt in mysterium*, and here is a mystery which we cannot hope to fathom till we understand our own human nature and what is really meant by 'personality.' Some light may perhaps be thrown on these difficult matters if we put the case thus:—Ancient peoples, for instance the Jews, believing the earth to be the centre of the universe, with heaven above it and the place of the dead underneath, thought of God as sitting up somewhere in the sky and directing thence the world below Him. True, such a conception has, or ought to have, become impossible since the revolutionary discovery by (or revelation made to) Copernicus and Galileo, that this earth is but one of the minor orbs of a system which is itself but one of countless systems, while the 'heaven above us' is but the atmosphere attached to this planet. This truth has never been completely assimilated: we still say that 'God is in His heaven,' though we are conscious that, in localizing Him at all, we are speaking figuratively. Now surely we must so far agree with the ancient view as to believe that God is, so to speak, 'outside' the world, transcends it. The only alternative (save atheism, which explains nothing) would be to identify God and the world: but this view also leads to practical atheism and abolishes morality. Yet it will not do to cut God off from the world, as did Epicurus of old. Hence we are driven to think that in some sense He is *in* the world, is immanent. In fact, we are bound to say that He is *both* transcendent and immanent. Here we reach one of the ultimate mysteries, and must be content to leave the apparent contradiction unresolved. We can at least explain *something*, and the mystery is not more baffling than the old question: Had the Universe a beginning or not?—to which by the rules of logic the answer must be either Yes or No, while either answer is beyond the grasp of our intelligence.

When then we say that God is in some sort immanent in the world, we mean that He is to some extent revealed in

Nature and, if the famous words in *Genesis* are true, especially in Man, and in some men more than in others. And, as Jesus of Nazareth was, we feel, a perfect man, in the sense that we cannot conceive of a better human character, then He is the supreme revelation of God, not only through what He taught, but through what He was—and is. And, though our ways of thinking may make impossible for us the very precise definitions of the union of God and Man in one 'person' which the early Church formulated—though, further, Jesus does not seem to have told His followers to worship Him as God, but rather to make their prayers to the Father in His name—yet we cannot surely be wrong if, while we remember this injunction, we give Him divine honour. I am assuming that, as His followers were convinced, He overcame death and still lives. Nor, as He above all others has made known to us the kinship between the human and the divine, do I hesitate to accept St. Paul's mystical language, as when he says that, if he does anything good, it is not he that does it, but Christ in him. Further, he calls the Christian community the Body of Christ: which warns us not to take too individual a view, but to think of Christ's spirit as informing collectively those who accept His sovereignty, while it informs also each 'member' of the Body in proportion as he sets himself to receive it.

In the doctrine of the Trinity in Unity we touch the supreme mystery. While I hold fast to the belief that God is One, I believe equally in God as our Father, in Christ as the way to God and the supreme manifestation on earth alike of God and of humanity, and in the Holy Spirit as possessing the souls and directing all the spiritual energies of men. To attempt to go further in definition is to probe the depths of personality: on which let me only remark that, as much recent psychological enquiry seems to shew, we may be wrong in regarding, as we commonly do, a 'person' as an entity entirely complete in itself and absolutely cut off from every other person.

Such are my gropings after truth in regard to the essential things, and I claim that the conclusions reached are Christian, and are honestly held. A word must be added on what the Gospels tell of the facts of our Master's human life, and especially the element in those narratives which we call 'miracu-

lous.' That an absolutely perfect man should have had what seemed to be supernatural control over disease, bodily and mental, no longer staggers men even of an advanced way of thinking: many such have no doubt of the reality of the cures, even though they themselves could not describe them just as they are described by the evangelists. Nor do they go on, as used to be thought inevitable, to say that if one cannot take the evangelists' records of 'wonderful works' exactly as they stand, it follows that the picture of Jesus which they give cannot be trusted at all. That He however should also have had power to walk on water, to quell a storm, and to raise the dead is no doubt staggering to our minds: nor can we honestly give up that belief in the regular order of Nature which has been won by patient research, guided surely by the Spirit of God, since from Him must come all enlightenment: the 'laws of Nature' are the observed principles by which God reveals Himself in Nature. Nor can we forget that these records were written at a time when men knew nothing of scientific principles and were almost inconceivably credulous. Again, there are one or two 'works' which it is hard to harmonize with the general picture given of Jesus' character. I for one can hardly believe that He sanctioned the destruction of useful animals or cursed a fig-tree with barrenness, whatever the moral lessons conveyed through these 'signs.' I would far rather believe that the onlookers misunderstood what happened, or that the story had grown in the telling before it was written down. This enormous subject cannot be pursued further here. You cannot cut the miraculous out of the Gospels: on the other hand, the Master Himself attached only a secondary value to the faith of those who believed 'for the works' sake.' I am content to suspend judgment: if, while not ruling out miracles off-hand, we confess that at present at least we do not understand them all, I do not see that our belief in 'the essentials' need be affected. This will not satisfy some, but it is surely not dishonest.

Apart from the 'works,' there are two things in the gospel story which many in our time find very hard to understand—the accounts of the manner in which Jesus was born, and the accounts for His appearances after the Resurrection. Here too I would fain keep an open mind, while I cannot but feel that

I would *rather* think that He was born of human parents in the ordinary way: it is at least no help to my belief in His perfect humanity (which is an article of the most orthodox creed) to be told that He entered on His human life in an abnormal way. The records of the Resurrection appearances no one has ever succeeded in explaining, or even in reconciling with one another. I have no doubt that our Lord overcame death: nor do I doubt that in some way this was revealed to His followers, that something real lies behind the beautiful stories. I hold fast to the fact, admitting that I know little or nothing about the mode. A correspondent tells me that to say this seems to him 'unduly reticent, not to say dishonest.' I confess that I do not see the dishonesty of making clear how far one goes and keeping silence when one has no more to say.

Thus it appears that, starting as a Broad Churchman, I come now under the label Modernist, in the sense in which that not very acceptable designation is understood in England. The development has been slow and gradual, which I do not regret. Nor should I wish that any who find less difficulty in the traditional ways of thinking should be in any hurry to give up anything which they sincerely hold. But I do feel it most highly desirable that those whose education enables them to think for themselves should face the 'religious question' and make up their minds. They would not all reach the same position, but we should have less conventional conformity and less indifference. Let me quote a sentence of my father's: 'The easy belief, the lazy belief, the easy acquiescence in suspense between belief and disbelief, which infect those multitudes upon whom the burden of asking themselves whether the faith of the Church is true or not has been laid, are manifestations of a single temper of mind which ought to cause Christians more disquiet than the growing force of well-weighed hostility.'

One more thing. I can conceive nothing more disastrous than that there should come to be a section of 'intellectuals' who should either be cut off by the traditionalists as 'heretics' or should cut themselves off as 'superior persons.' The leaders of the liberal movement in our Church seem fortunately most earnest in seeking to avoid this disaster. Yet the English Church, the most tolerant of all churches, is not too friendly to

the 'broad' section. The more necessary is it that that section, by honest statement of its position, should, by all means consistent with charity, seek to win charitable recognition.

I apologise once more for intruding on you so egotistic a paper, and for repeating ideas which are familiar enough to students of the liberal movement in the Church of England. I began with my father, of whose thoughts these ideas seem to me to be in the main a legitimate development. May I conclude with a prayer which only this week I found among his papers? It was probably written for use in the college of his adoption, Emmanuel, a college famous in the history of the earlier Reformation. It seems to me to voice the best aspirations of those who in our own day are seeking once more to purge away the fog which dulls the vision of the Church.

> Almighty and Everlasting God, who at Thy appointed seasons dost scatter the earth-born mists of human darkness by light and fire from heaven, we render to Thee humble thanks for that Thou didst give our forefathers grace to welcome the clearer knowledge of Thy Holy Gospel, and in its power to build up the ruins of things wasted and decayed into a new and living order,—stablish us, we pray Thee, with Thy Word, and enlighten us with Thy Holy Spirit, that we may alway cherish Thy unchanging truth and eternal kingdom, and may alway have hearts open to receive whatsoever Thou in Thy good pleasure shalt make known. All this we ask for the sake of Christ Jesus our Saviour, who liveth and reigneth with Thee and the Holy Ghost, one God, world without end.

THE LOSS OF VITAL RELIGION

(Conference Sermon preached in Christ Church Cathedral, Oxford, on Sunday morning, August 30th, 1925, by the Rev. W. W. Longford, D.D., Rector of Caversham, Reading.)

'Show us the light of Thy countenance, and we shall be whole.'
—Ps. lxxx, 19.

REALISATION of the condition in which they found themselves, knowledge of the means by which they could be restored, confidence that restoration was still within the bounds of possibility—these are the notes of that pathetic supplication which here forms the burden and the climax of Israel's plea.

Is there one of us who does not feel the aptness of both psalm and supplication to our present state? Surely we realise. A vine which had deep root and filled the land—that we are no longer. The hills are no longer covered with the shadows of it, nor are the boughs thereof like the goodly cedars. The boar ravages; wild beasts feed upon it; growth itself is stunted. For power of growth is being stifled by a blighting of the vine which increases year by year.

Let us recognise our condition: that is the necessary first step to restoration, if restoration is to be accomplished. Those who have at heart the welfare of our English Church, who are not partisans blind to everything but the triumph of a section—these have cause enough to mourn, as they watch internal schism deepening and unities of even twenty years ago fast breaking up. That growing temper of uncharitableness—almost, indeed, of malice—so marked in the religious press, so active in actual church-life to-day, is symptomatic of a deadly evil, an evil which no improved organisation, no increased episcopate, no life and liberty fast becoming but another bondage, can ever cure. It is the denial of the Christ. Those who sit in sheltered places have been heard to urge that alarm is untimely, that its origins are artificial. Do not heed them. Those of us who are in daily and hourly contact with the real life of the Church know better. We cannot but sense catastrophe. For the Church is showing increasingly, and over more widely extended areas, the loss of *vital religion.* From lack of it all our present ills arise—all those disloyalties and hostilities now well nigh endemic in our midst. Unless it be recaptured we are doomed. And recapture entails a singularly difficult thing, the rediscovery of a *living faith,* a thing impossible in any generation which grows blind to the light of God's countenance.

Normally we should hardly turn to the modern novel for pertinent observations upon the secret success in life. But in a recent novel by John Buchan we find this word of value: 'People should realise,' he makes a character say, 'that whatever they've got they hold under a perpetual challenge, and that they are bound to meet that challenge. Then we'll have living creatures and not mummies.'

In that observation we may find the key to the understanding both of our present state and of the only way of escape from it. Vital religion, like life itself, is a possession, held by the Church and by the individual subject to that condition. It is held under perpetual challenge; and if that challenge is not accepted we are doomed to watch the vital energies retreat

from the body, to watch those that devitalise take their place: first, morbid conditions; afterwards, those unspeakable conditions that follow death. To be able to point to living activity within the Church is no proof of vitality. Activity within the dying body and the corpse is equally a living activity; but that activity is not the body's life, it is its disintegration. The Church's life, as also that of the individual, lies in a condition in which heart and will and mind are united in a living fellowship with God. *That* is Religion, vital Religion. It is a fellowship which can only be fully maintained if every aspect in personality meets its special challenge. Each is concerned in the possession; no single one can leave the burden to the others.

And what is the challenge? It is the challenge which should inevitably arise out of the possession in itself.

There is, of course, another type of challenge, less subtle, more blunt. It is found in the temptations which come from without. There is the challenge of the world, of all lesser goods than God, to our affections; there is the challenge of the flesh to our will; there is the challenge to deny belief which the combined temptations of the world and the flesh present to the mind. These *lower* challenges are notorious; none can be unaware of them. They must be met. In them, in fact, the activities of organised religions find their chief concern. They can, however, only be met successfully by realising and meeting the *higher* challenge arising out of the possession in itself—the challenge which asks in the sphere of devotion 'Is what is offered the best you can offer Me?' which asks of the will 'Do you live up to the best that you know of Me?' which says to the mind 'Is what you know the best to be known of Me?'

Fail to realise this challenge to the heart, and devotion, which should mean personal and corporate surrender, inevitably sinks into formal ceremonialism. Fail to realise this challenge to the will, and conduct must become a mere matter of code. Fail to admit the challenge to the mind, and belief inevitably hardens into a mere form of words. Ceremony, code and creed—not without value in their place—are not Religion; they are not fellowship with God. A church must have them; individuals need to use them; but they *may* mark a stage in the progress of death. Losing their true function, they are steps towards corruption.

Can we not see to-day ceremonial devotion which has lost its true meaning, ever groping towards new objects of its morbid activity? Do we not find to-day ethical code, hardened by divorce from its true inspiration, opening the way to the deceits of a false casuistry? Even more, we see passion for the letter of credal statement coming to live happily with credulity and superstition. These are symptoms the significance of which no competent observer can miss. Their multiplication is the measure of our present condition. Mere traditionalism (I emphasise the word 'mere'), never more rampant with us than it is now, bears in itself the germs of its own religious dissolution. Idolatries, false casuistries, superstitions, always develop in proportion as men shield their eyes from the light of God's countenance, and refuse a present for a bygone knowledge of God.

There is but one way out. We must meet the challenge, and meet it on every side. The challenge is the challenge of Reality. To fellowship of heart it says 'Is this that you offer true in its end, is it loyal to its end?' To fellowship in will it says 'Is this true in endeavour, is it loyal to endeavour?' Truth in the object, loyalty in the subject—these are essential conditions to Reality in fellowship with God. But loyal though we may be to the end and the endeavour which we set before ourselves, the real

quality of devotion, and the real *quality* of conduct, is relative to Truth. And while the mind can by no means be held sole arbiter, Truth can only be conceived adequately when the perpetual challenge to mind is realised and met.

Do not mistake me. Some measure of vitality can be maintained by all who strive *ex animo* to meet the high challenge of heart and will as far as they hear it. It is maintained by many who apparently have never heard the challenge whether what they know is the best they *can* know of God. It is maintained by many who are conscious of the challenge, but refuse from some false sense of loyalty to meet it; by others who meet it, but only from behind high walls. But such vitality is either a sluggish or an impaired vitality, with no promise but of ultimate failure. A truly living Faith, capable of sustaining a true and living devotion, of inspiring a true and living ethic, can only have full course in those who are continually willing to test the adequacy of their conceptions of the Divine nature, the Divine will and the Divine ways.

We here to-day, members of this Conference, recognise this challenge to the mind, and we accept it. *Our* danger is not that we should be oblivious to the challenge, or unready to meet it in the open. Our danger is that we should isolate this challenge, that we should lose sense of its proportion and of its significance.

It is Religion, the religion of Christ, that we are fighting for. Mere intellectualism, the itch to make mind the measure of all things, the passion to reject what is not understood—this can be more dangerous to vital religion than actual refusal of all challenge to the mind. It may itself arise from that lower challenge to the mind already mentioned.

This is a danger not always recognised. Academic theologians are often too oblivious to it. They, not infrequently, so intellectualise religion that it becomes merely a philosophy. Often, again, they seem to treat it as but the subject matter of theology. Religion is something beyond all philosophy: the only justification of any theology is that it should be ancillary to Life. Liberalism, properly understood, is no justification of any claim to occupy ourselves merely with doubts and speculations. Liberalism means the unfettering of mind in its endeavour to come to grips with Truth—but with Truth with a view to living, not with a view merely to intellectual satisfactions. Critical apparatus is essential to our task; but critical apparatus will never save a soul from death, or keep a foot from falling. And it is not for us to break bruised reeds, or to quench smoking flax—to make faith more difficult or hope less secure for any one. It is possible that some among us do not recognise this fact as they should.

It is Religion that we are fighting for; and not as isolated units, we must remember. We are members of Christ's Body: and that Body must always come before the individual. Our personal predilections have to be subordinated in all sorts of ways to the general needs of others; our duty to ourselves can never be accomplished apart from loving consideration of our fellows, babes and full grown—'by manifestation of the Truth commending ourselves to every man's conscience in the sight of God.' Our real concern is with recovering and maintaining *within the Church* a full and true spiritual experience, a life flowing from an evergrowing apprehension of the meaning of God in Christ.

Liberal Catholicism, liberal churchmanship, stands for unhesitating loyalty to the Spirit of Truth, a loyalty through which the light of God's countenance can be focussed and dispersed over the whole church. It is a loyalty which carries no light cross.

THE VINDICATION OF THE FAITH OF A MODERN CHURCHMAN*

'Shew me thy faith without thy works, and I will shew thee my faith by my works.'—James ii, 18.

THE name of Joseph Milner is almost forgotten by our generation, but I wish to recall it to you for the sake of a peculiar theory which was held by him. This theory was to the effect that at certain intervals there come down upon the visible Church large, but temporary, outpourings of divine grace. It was in order to commend and illustrate this doctrine that he took in hand the composition of his great Church History, a work which was completed by his still more illustrious brother Isaac, the Dean of Carlisle. Although it is not my purpose to stand forth as a reviver of this theory, I would suggest to you that there is much of truth in it; for the study of the Church's history reveals to us the fact that whatever progress has been made has not been constant, but that times of decay and degeneration have followed on times of growth and illumination, to be followed in their turn by fresh revivals. Like an incoming sea, one wave has fallen back and broken, as its successor regathers the strength of the tide.

In connexion with such revivals I seem to find that the most notable of them have arisen in the early years of the century to which severally they may be said to belong; they have then gathered force and attained great influence; and at length have ebbed slowly away—still to preserve our metaphor—back into the common sea of the Church's life. The movements associated with the names of Francis and Dominic, for example, belong to the early years of the thirteenth century; the Reformation, as a movement to be reckoned with, dates from the Diet of Worms in 1521; in our own branch of the Church it was 'In November 1729' that, to quote the words of the most notable of them, John Wesley himself, 'four young gentlemen of Oxford . . . began to spend some evenings in a week together in reading chiefly the Greek Testament'; and finally it was Keble's Assize Sermon, preached in this very place on July 14th, 1833, which marked the beginning of the Tractarian Movement.

A consideration of these last two movements may well lead us to suppose that, amongst our own nation at least, religious revivals begin in academic circles, expand into the wider world of the parish, and for something like a century rise in influence, until, their force being spent, they fall away before some newer development.

The Evangelical Revival was a great movement, and its services to this realm and Church will never be forgotten; but it failed at the very point where its influence was most needed. It failed because a spirit of timidity and suspicion seized upon its leaders; it failed, moreover, because from the very first it had had too narrow a view of life and of religious experience; and so in the end it became negative and quarrelsome instead of courageous and trustful. There are, however, at this time not wanting signs of recovery amongst Evangelicals, and the check which the move-

* Sermon preached by the Rev. L. Elliott Binns, B.D., F.R.Hist.S., Vicar of West Ham, on Aug. 30th, 1925, in the Church of St. Mary the Virgin, Oxford, at the conclusion of the Modern Churchmen's Conference.

ment received in the middle years of the last century was perhaps only a temporary one. A school of younger men is growing up, of men who are not afraid of new knowledge, and yet who can justify their claim to stand in what Sir James Stephen called the 'Evangelical Succession.' If they are to succeed better than their fathers they must guard against a critical and negative spirit, they must on no account allow their sympathies to be narrowed.

The Tractarian Movement was great also, though its influence did not affect so large a part of the nation's life. To it as a Church we owe the needful reminder that religion must have its corporate side, that reverence and beauty in worship need not render it unspiritual, and above all that the religion of the Incarnation is a sacramental religion. Strangely enough, one of the most striking results, though a result of negative character, of the movement was that it turned the Evangelicals into Low Churchmen.

But if the Oxford Movement turned the Evangelicals into Low Churchmen the same fate seems now to be overtaking the successors of the Tractarians themselves—if at least we may judge the future course of the movement by the achievements of the more advanced of its adherents. For many of these seem to have abandoned any conception of a Catholic, or even of a National, Church, and apparently hold, as an ideal organisation of the Body of Christ, a number of independent congregations each under the despotic rule of a petty, but none the less infallible, pope. Symptoms like this suggest that the Oxford Movement has spent its force, and that there is the need and the opportunity for a new spiritual movement, flowing along less restricted channels, to bring fresh vigour and hope to the Church to-day. It is this situation which makes so important the immediate future of our own particular movement.

I need not remind you that we are living in a creative age, or rather in an age which must create or else see itself decay. Humanity, driven from its secure resting places by the violence and horrors of the past years, is once more on the move. But whither? The way ahead is dark and full of threatenings, progress is difficult and advance uncertain. We may in our march weary, and stumble, and die. But to go back is not merely to retrace our steps—it is to risk losing our foothold altogether.

Can we rise to the opportunity before us? Have we the spiritual resources adequate to the need of our times? Are we prepared to make our contribution, worthily and generously, to the ever growing life of the Church?

If we Modern Churchmen are to enter in and possess the land, or are even to obtain wider recognition as a force within the Church, two lines of policy, I would in all humility suggest, must be pursued. On the one hand, our powers and energies must not be dissipated in attacks upon other schools of thought; on the other, the faith which we hold must be exhibited on a much larger scale than has hitherto been possible, the message must be popularised and carried throughout the country.

First of all, then, we are to exercise restraint when we feel tempted to attack those who do not agree with us. This is to commend a positive rather than a negative policy. But we are to adopt it not merely because it is expedient, but because it is Christian. It is certainly expedient, for when we attack those who differ from us, especially if our utterances are lacking in discrimination and real knowledge, the effect is almost inevitably to stiffen our antagonists and to drive away, sometimes into open opposition, those who might well be our allies. Moreover, such a policy

seems at the bottom to reveal a lack of trust in God, an inadequate belief in the power of truth to prevail by its own illuminating light. Our function, I take it, is 'to lift the torch of reason in the dusky cave of life'; it is not to thrust our smoking brands in the faces of those who do not see eye to eye with us.

The condemnation of others and of the views which they hold is, of course, sometimes a necessity. But if we are compelled to take this course let us at least do it with discrimination, not confounding together age-long beliefs of the Church with moderns fancies and inventions. Let us also endeavour to realise that our own knowledge and our own religious experience are not exhaustive. It might seem unnecessary to utter such warnings to Modern Churchmen; unfortunately it is not so. History, both recent and remote, shews us that liberal opinions may often be combined with a narrow and illiberal attitude towards the opinions of others. We must have perceptions of sufficient delicacy and intellects of sufficiently wide sympathy to enable us to appreciate the point of view of those who may be unfortunate enough or blind enough to differ from us!

Readers of the *Life of Bishop Percival* will hardly need to be reminded of his tragic failure to obtain the influence and power which his many gifts, both of mind and of character, deserved. The failure was due, as his biographer points out, to the fact that 'He had not the capacity of understanding why men cared for views which seemed to him mistaken. To this must be attributed his strange inability to convert men to his point of view' (*op. cit.*, p. 166). The Bishop could gather round him at Hereford brilliant and able men of a liberal outlook, but the rest of the diocese remained almost entirely unaffected. 'We have hardly any Modern Churchman outside the Cathedral,' he writes pathetically to Canon Bannister in 1913 (*op. cit.*, p. 352). The principle which Dr. Temple lays down is surely true: 'No man, broadly speaking, can convert another intellectually unless he can first do full justice to that other's position' (*op. cit.*, p. 167).

Violent attacks provoke violent reprisals, and an attempted reformation which relies on force and clamour is the prelude, even if it be successful, to an equally stern re-action. The method of Erasmus may be slower than the method of Luther, but it is more sure. All this I tried to show some years ago in my Hulsean Lectures,[1] but the truth will bear re-asserting.

May I, in passing, say how rejoiced I was to see that Sir William Ashley, in his address to the British Association at Toronto last year, promulgated exactly this doctrine:—

'There have been those,' he said, 'who have maintained that reformers are the better without knowledge; that fanaticism has the advantage of "getting things done." It was, for instance, at one time common to find the violent but creative Luther compared, entirely to his advantage, with the wiser but, as it was supposed, impotent Erasmus. . . . But the further the Reformation recedes into the distance, the more, I think, are the places of Luther and Erasmus in our sympathies being reversed; the Reformation of the Church could so conceivably have taken place in a way which should not have provoked the Wars of Religion, and the modern revolt of the laity in Latin countries from the Church altogether.' (*The Guardian*, August 15th, 1924.)

If we wish the Truth, as we see it, to prevail, we shall best promote its ascendancy, not by attacking those who differ from us, but by showing forth its power in our own lives and characters.

[1] *Erasmus the Reformer: a study in Re-statement.* (Methuen.)

This brings me to the second of our lines of policy. The necessity for the views which we hold to be more widely held and practised. I think it would be admitted by most people that at present they are largely confined to academic circles or to people of an academic type of mind. We are perhaps mainly of those for whom life is an interesting problem, to be contemplated in one's leisure moments—like a cross-word puzzle. May I remind you that there are others for whom it is either a grievous burden or a desperate adventure. For them at least there is a besetting need of

'some true
Song in the dark, some story against fear.'

A scientific or intellectual conception of life may be true as far as it goes—I for one believe that it is—but it does not exhaust life's significance. Let us not be deceived into supposing that the Celt and the Latin alone see visions. We peoples of the northern race are mystics too. We, too, dream dreams in the darkness; we, too, are acutely conscious of void spaces in our lives full of strange silences; we, too, hear at times the trumpet sounding on 'the hid battlements of eternity.' It is because of this that we can never find entire satisfaction in the things of time and of sense. From such materials we cannot build an abiding habitation for the soul, which ever yearns to go out beyond what the Latin writer has called 'the flaming ramparts of the world.'

I hope that this digression will not lead you to imagine that I am of the number of those who believe that Modern Churchmen have no message for the ordinary man, or that people in academic circles fail entirely to understand the needs of less favoured mortals. If one may judge by some of the statements which are made by the pious, one would be led to suppose that such a thing as evil did not exist in the Universities, and that it is only when men have left such secluded groves that they experience real vice and feel the need for some power to overcome it. It may be, of course, that the Devil finds the labours of some clerical dons so serviceable to his own purposes as not to desire to interrupt them by the disturbing fact of sin.

Leaving aside such opinions as based on an entirely insufficient knowledge of academic life, we are yet, I think, bound to admit that the Faith of the Modern Churchman is not widely represented amongst the rank and file of Churchmen to-day. There are parishes which are known as Anglo-Catholic, there are others which are Evangelical of one degree or another; but it is difficult to find more than a few parishes, though some of these are notable, which can be called Modernist. Thus whilst the adherents of other schools of thought can produce as evidence for the vitality of the type of Christian faith which they favour a long record of lives fortified and ennobled by it, the Modernist, simply because he is a Modernist, can do no such thing. I do not by this statement wish to deny the truth of Dr. Inge's assertion that Liberal Christianity is older than either Catholic or Protestant Christianity—yet because it is an outlook on life and not a system of doctrines, the ideas which Liberalism puts forth are novel. The Modernist has a strong belief in the power of his own faith; but the works which will justify it are largely yet to come.

When the Methodist movement and the Tractarian revival spread from the Universities into the parishes they found many already prepared to welcome them. The Modern Churchman cannot be so certain of finding sympathisers. The well springs are brimming over, but, if their waters are to spread with beneficent kindliness, channels must be found to contain them. Unfortunately the vast number whose views are akin to those

of the Modernist have for the greater part drifted away from the influences of the Church, and indeed of organised religion altogether. This fact constitutes the great obstacle to further advance at the moment, and the work of the movement is still largely preparatory.

But this work of preparation needs the greatest care, for to proclaim broadcast the truths held by even the more moderate would in most parishes result only in the bewilderment of the large bulk of the people. Here again we need, above all else, to be positive and constructive in our methods. We shall make no progress by merely denouncing what are to us obsolete ideas of Christianity. Such views are precious in the eyes of those who hold them, however inadequate they may seem to us, and the only effect of merely destructive criticism is to alienate them from us and make impossible any further teaching. To cast before an uninstructed congregation crude renderings of the latest unproved theological hypothesis is liable to disturb their faith—not, I would have you mark, their faith in traditional views, but their faith in the one who is trying to teach them better things. If we have a real, living faith of our own, and a real, living message; if we have sympathy for our people and the desire to help them, opportunities will continually arise for guiding them into fuller knowledge, into higher truth.

Finally, I would again remind you that it is essential that we should recognise, and this recognition will spur us on to greater and wiser effort, that if the Faith of the Modern Churchman is to be taken seriously by the Church at large, it must show that it is capable of producing such spiritual fruits as have blessed the labours of the older schools of thought within the Church. For Faith, as the Master of Marlborough recently reminded us, is 'not an act of the reason pure and simple, not an act only of intelligence. It includes not only that, but my will and my affections, too; it is an affirmation made by my whole self.'[2] To exhibit this faith not merely as the working faith of a few select individuals, but as the power of common life both individual and collective, is the task to which we are to go forth from this Conference.

At the beginning of the thirteenth century a great part of Southern France was given up to the Albigensian heresy, and in spite of the efforts of missionaries and papal legates the false teaching continued to spread. On one occasion, it is said, the legates were returning from their fruitless labours, but still surrounded by their accustomed pomp and magnificence, when they met the youthful Dominic. The discomfiture which they had experienced was still further increased by the rebukes of the future saint. 'It is not by the display of power and pomp,' he exclaimed, 'cavalcades of retainers, and richly houseled palfreys, or by gorgeous apparel, that the heretics win proselytes; it is by zealous preaching, by apostolic humility, by seeming it is true, but yet seeming holiness. Zeal must be met with zeal, humility by humility, false sanctity by real sanctity, preaching falsehood by preaching truth.'[3] There, allowing for the limitations of the mediaeval mind, we have the secret. It will not be by congratulating ourselves on the splendour of our intellectual wealth, on the logical security of our position, and on our ability in controversy, that we shall win the Church, much less the world: but by exhibiting in our lives the great virtues of humility and holiness, of zeal and of love, we shall draw men willingly to our side. The final vindication of the Faith of the Modern Churchman must be the Life of the Modern Churchman. There is no other way.

[2] In a paper read to the Oxford Church Congress and reprinted in *The Modern Churchman*, 1924, p. 454. [3] Milman: *The History of Latin Christianity*, vi. p. 13.